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————— THE RELATIONS OF GREAT BRITAIN AMD AMERICA.—————
( Especially from 1861 to 1866.) 
lETRODUCTIOir.
The student of any period of history is alwaysconfronted with fascinating problems, dealing with present ofr past 
actualities.At one time we are confronted with colonial acquisition, 
at another with social and intellectual development, at another with 
constitutional progress and internal reform and at another with the 
relations of state and state; and of all the many problems which 
history presents, surely the last mentioned is the most enthralling and important, for not only do the relations of state and state 
affect a nation's foreign affaire "but often internal development is 
also concerned. For instance, when John of England lost his 
possessions in Prance, the dissatisfaction which was caused in 
England, forced him to grant Magna Garta, and Elizabeth's haste to 
settle the religious problem in 1558-9, was mainly caused by the 
condition of things abroad. Prince Bismarck, too, in his Memoirs 
in a letter to Roon in 1861 says as follows:- "My belief is that nothing but a change in our foreign attitude can liberate the 
position of the Crown in domestic matters 11.
Thereforei one may claim that the relations of 
state and state are supremely important and exceptionally 
interesting. Morier complains bitterly in his Memoirs, that in the 
sixties, we are no longer at the centre of affairs in Europe, but at the same time one must admit that the relations of Great Britain 
with Louis Napoleon, with Italy, and with the Balkan Peninsula are 
exceedingly interesting. Yet the ordinary man in the street will 
always feel a certain sentimental curiosity concerning our relations 
with America. This, of course, is due to the fact that both Great 
Britain and America are two powerful nations, possessing a common 
speech, literature, and love of independence; and to a certain 
extent, in spite of America's foreign element) the tie of blood and 
kinship must be considered, for nothing can obliterate the fact 
that originally America was a British colony - a child of the 
mother country who had fought valiantly for her independence and 
who had conquered the mother from whom she had sprung.
What then, we ask ourselves, will be the policy 
of Great Britain towards the child who had defeated her, and how 
will America treat her kindred nation across the Atlantic ?
Goldwin Smith, Regius professor of History at
Oxford, a leading political thinker and writer, and president of the 
Manchester Union & Emancipation Society, wrote in January 1865, that 
there were two lines of policy which Britain could pursue with regard to America. One alternative was to treat her as a natural 
enemy and do all that was possible to crush her and destroy her greatness; but the other alternative was to treat her as our natural 
friend; and show on every proper occasion and in every way 
consistent with our honour, that we were sensible of the blood tie which united us, and that we could divest American greatness of 
danger by making it our own.
It may be safely stated, that after 1783 the • 
government of Great Britain never committed itself to the first 
alternative, although, as will be seen later, there were certain 
very powerful classes in this country, which during the Civil war 
of 1861-65, would have rejoiced at the shattering of the great American Republic. Nor did we exactly adopt the second alternative,
(1)
but never was our avowed policy a definitely hostile one, aiming at disruption. to
. ' 4 __ WJS The separation of Great Britain and America, which 
n«f?n^ ML1?76 ' was sealed in 1782, when the independence of the 
United States-was recognised by the British Government. But although 
peace was formally made,bitter feelings still existed, owing to the 
behaviour of the British forces and the Hessian mercenaries, the 
harshness of Americans to those loyal to the British crown, the cold 
contempt expressed by the English, and the assertive arrogance of 
the Americans.
Besides these bitter memories there were also
controversies with regard to certain important material interests, 
which the treaty of 1783 had left unsettled. Then in 1812, owing to 
the maritime policy of Great Britain, America declared war-against 
her, but happily peace was made in 1814 by the Treaty of Ghent. This 
however, merely sanctioned the formal resumption of reciprocal - ' 
commerce as before the war and still the disputed points remained, 
fortunately, however, by the beginning of the Civil War, some of . 
these had been settled. For instance, the Webster Ashburton Treaty 
of 1842 defined the disputed boundary of the United States between 
Maine and New Brunswick; and although important omissions were 
made, on the whole it was honourable for each side. What was 
arranged was arranged fairly; and what was omitted was deferred 
without prejudice. Then again in 1846 the dispute as to the 
possession of the Oregon country was settled by Great Britain 
granting concessions which she had at first refused.
The Reciprocity Treaty of 1854 also furthered a
friendly understanding. By this, the citizens of the United States 
were allowed to take fish in the bays, harbours and creeks of the 
British North American provinces, without any restriction as to 
distance from shore. Newfoundland only was excepted. In return for 
this, Canadian colonists were allowed to send into America duty 
free, the principal products of the soil, mines and forests. The 
navigation of the St.Lawrence River was also allowed, to the United 
States and the British colonists were allowed to navigate Iiake 
Michigan. Of course the fact of the existence of this Treaty, shows 
the desire to maintain friendly relations between the two countries, 
and undoubtedly at the beginning of the sixties, a general 
appearance of harmony existedi^Great Britain had just given^p the 
long disputed right of forcibly visiting and searching American 
vessels on the high seas, in time of peace, for British seamen;
In 1850, the Clayton Bulwer Treaty had been signed. 
This was negotiated because of the situation created by the project 
of an inter-oceanic canal across Nicaragua, each signatory being 
jealous of the activities of the other in Central America. Great 
Britain had large and indefinite territorial claims in three regions 
- British Honduras, the Mosquito Coast and the Bay Islands. On the 
other hand the United States held in reserve ready for ratification, 
treaties with Nicaragua and Honduras, which gave her a certain 
diplomatic vantage with which to balance the de facto dominion of 
Great Britain. But as it was impossible to agree on these points, 
the canal question was put in the foreground, and the treaty bound, 
both parties not to obtain or maintain any exclusive control of the 
proposed canal, or unequal advantage in its use. It also guaranteed 
the neutralization of such a canal and it stipulated that neither 
signatory should ever occupy, fortify, colonize or assume or 
exercise any dominion over Nicaragua, Costa Rica, the Mosquito Coast 
or any part of Central America.
But there was a long controversy over the meaning
U)
of these terras, for Great Britain claimed that the treaty did not 
apply to her settlement at Honduras, and that she could still retain 
the Bay Islands and her protectorate over the Mosquito coaet. By 
1860 however this controversy had been settled, for Great Britain 
withdrew from the Mosquito Coast and recognised the Bay Islands as 
part of the Republic of Honduras, - a settlement which the United 
States accepted without cavil for many years. The Prince of Wales 
had also Just.visited America in a private character, and this, 
according to the speech of President Buchanan in December 1860,-had 
proved entirely auspicious and had increased the kindly and kindred 
feelings of the two nations.
But this satisfactory state of affairs was not to
last much longer, and we shall see how the Civil War brought tension 
of a most threatening sort between the two countries, but how 
rupture, in spite of the undoubted ill-feeling which existed, w«,s 
avoided.
The problem of slavery in the United States had
always been a more or less difficult one, and every time the matter 
was discussed, it tended to become more dangerous. Abolitionists of 
a vehement type had appeared in the Northern States in the early 
thirties, and the Missouri Compromise of 1820 (which admitted 
Missouri into the Union as a slave state, but which excluded slavery 
from the rest of Louisiana lying north of latitude 36°3ptr) was 
disliked by North and South, as the population of America spread 
towards the West and new communities asked to be admitted. Then in 
1854 was passed the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, which declared the 
Missouri Compromise inoperative and void, and which allowed each 
territory before it was admitted into the Union to decide whether 
it should be admitted as a free soil or a slave-holding state. Public 
excitement ran very high, and matters were brought to a crisis -in 
1860 by the election of Abraham Lincoln as President, for the South 
knew that he was a determined opponent of the extension of slavery. 
It was now practically certain that a breach would occur, and the 
beginning was made on December 20th 1860.
The despatch of Lord logons, the British ambassador 
at Washington, is worth quoting. It is dated December 24th 1860 and 
is as follows :-
^n the 20th instant the Convention at Charleston passed 
unanimously an Ordinanc.e declaring that the union now 
subsisting between South Carolina and other states under 
the name of the United States of America "is dissolved". 
The secession of South Carolina has been for some time - 
regarded as certain. The formal .accomplishment of it, has, 
therefore, not in itself produced much sensation 11.
Before Lincoln was inaugurated as President, March 
4th 1861, 6 other Southern States had also withdrawn from the 
Union, and .delegates whom they had appointed, had met in convention 
at Montgomery, Alabana, to frame a provisional constitution and 
choose a provisional executive for a separate Southern confederacy. 
Mr.Jefferson Davis, who had been a senator of the United States from 
Mississippi, was chosen as President, and a permanent constitution 
was adopted. TMs action of the South took the North by surprise 
and before the authorities at Washington had decided what to do, 
every fortified place in the South was in possession of the 
Confederacy, with very few exceptions - one of which was Port Burnter 
in Charleston harbour.
Even now, men's thoughts were turning to compromise, 
but when Port Sumter was attached by the Confederates on April 12th
(3)
and forced to surrender two days later, it was quite clear that the 
issue of the struggle would toe decided toy war. Indeedi the civil 
war had now toegun, and tooth parties called for volunteers at home 
and "began to look for sympathy atoroad. And it was to England that 
men's eyes chiefly turned. W.H.Russell, the war correspondent of 
•Ehe Times", writing from-the Confederate States a few weeks later, 
said, in support of this view, that England was the only power in - 
Europe for the good opinion of which the combatants really seemed 
to care. This was only to toe expected, because of the tie of 
kinship-which existed. Great Britain, too, was economically the 
leading power of the world, and her mercantile marine and navy held 
first place. Therefore, her support would toe invaluatole. Democracy 
was also a factor which had to toe considered. Both nations had 
steadily advanced in this direction since the Treaty of Ghent,and 
although manhood suffrage was not yet estatolished in Great Britain, 
there were signs that this could not toe long delayed. Hi en one 
considers that these ideas, which were now approaching their triumph 
in Great Britain, were ideas that America held to toe peculiarly her 
own, one can easily imagine why men f s thoughts at the beginning of 
the conflict, at once turned to Great Britain. Her attitude, 
therefore, was to toe all-important. The following chapters will 
show what this was to toe.
(3.a.)
CHAPTER 1. GREAT BRITAIN AKD THE BEGINNING OF THE STRUGGLE.
•^^^^l^^HMM^M^n^H^MMM %
The reference to American affairs made by Queen
Victoria on February 5th 1861, at the opening of Parliament, almost 
struck the note which the policy ef Great Britain, was to continue, 
for she mentioned the serious difference which had arisen amongst 
the North American States and expressed her heartfelt wish that
«
those differences might be susceptible of a satisfactory adjustment. 
The speech of the Earl of Derby, a former Prime Minister, expressed 
similar views, for he stated that no one viewed with more regret 
than himself the present disruption of the United States.
A little later in the month, on February 21st, 
before Great Britain knew that America was to be torn asunder by
internal strife, we find Lord John Russell, the British secretary
t of Foreign Affairs, writing to Lord Lyons that the success or failure
of Mr. Seward'e plans to prevent the disruption of the North American 
Union is a matter ef deep interest to Her Majesty's Government. But 
they can only expect and hope. They would not be acting prudently 
were they to obtrude their advice on the dissentient parties in the 
United States* Supporting, however that Mr. Lincoln acting under 
bad advice should endeavour to provide excitement for the public 
mind^by raising questions with Great Britain, her Majesty's 
Government would feel no hesitation as to the policy they would 
pursue. He then proceeded to state that the British Government 
would be very forbearing,but their forbearance would spring from 
consciousness of strength and not from the timidity of weakness.
To my mind this despatch, viewed in the light 
of events which followed, is very significant.
In May 1861, the Palmers ton - Russell ministry 
(4)
had been in power nearly two years. Palmerston was Premier, 
Russell had charge of Foreign Affaire, Gladstone was Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and Sir George Cotoewall Lewie was the Secretary 
for War. It was generally supposed that the sympathies of Russell 
would incline towards the North as representing anti-slavery 
sentiment t but that Palmerston would array himself more or less 
openly on the side of the South.
Russell's views are well seen "by the following 
speech made on the eve of the Civil War.
"My honourable frlend ; ( Sir John Ramsden ), alluded 
the other night to one subject, in a tone which I was very sorry 
to hear used "by anyone. My honourable friend said that "the great 
Republican bubble in America had burst*. Now, sir, I am proud to
. f-
confess that- - - - if a despotic government fall and the people, 
who have been subjected to It, are likely to obtain better and freer 
government f I cannot conceal that It gives me satisfaction.- - - - 
But I own I have very different feelings when a great Republic, 
(which has enjoyed for 70 or 80 years, institutions under which the 
people have been free and happy,), enters into a conflict in which 
that freedom and happiness is placed in Jeopardy.- - - - Therefore 
I do not think it Just or seemly that there should be among us 
anything like exultation at their discord. "
Such language was exceedingly generous, and
although at times, during the struggle, the policy of the British 
Government hesitated and wavered and caused much disaffection in
^
America, yet on the whole the above speech well revealed the views 
of the great bulk of the British people.
But from the outset, the South had the sympathy 
(5)
and favour of the higher classes,of the press ( and of the most 
eminent men in society and politics. This was partly due to the 
fact that an aristocratic class could have no sympathy with a 
democratic political institution,and was consequently glad to hope 
and "believe that "the great Republican "bubble in America had burst". 
The Southern democracy was also considering less pronounced and 
aggressive that* the Northern and the recent recurrence of the North
Mutated
to protection in the Morill Tariff^the prosperity of British 
manufactures, while Free Trade undoubtedly appealed to both Britain
and the South.
But the sympathy of the masses was with the
Northland surely this had some effect on the policy of a Government, 
which was based upon popular or democratic support. It is also a 
noteworthy fact that from 1861 - 65, no|meetings open to the general 
public were held to support the Confederates, because no resolution 
adverse to the North could have been carried.
From the election of Lincoln until three days
preceding his inauguration, a period of nearly four months,(which 
embraced the whole drama of Teceesion and the organisation of the 
Confederacy), not a word of information with regard to these 
proceedings was sent by the retiring Buchanan cabinet to foreign 
powers. But on February 28th, Black the Secretary, sent a diplomatic 
circular to the American representatives at foreign courts, which 
stated that the Government had not relinquished its constitutional 
jurisdiction within the territory of the seceding States and that 
it did not desire to do so. Also it considered that any recognition 
of their independence must be opposed. Then when the Lincoln 
administration began and Mr. Seward became Secretary of State, he
too notified the American representatives that they were to "use
(6)
all proper and necessary measures to prevent the success of efforts 
which may be madefy persons* claiming to represent the seceding 
states, to procure recognition". Mr Dallas was then the American 
minister in London,and on April 8th,he was granted an interview 
with Lord John Russell, who stated that the British Government was 
in no hurry to recognise the separation as complete and final; "but 
that on the other hand he could not bind her Majesty's Oovernment, 
nor tell how and where circumstances might arise which would make a 
decision necessary. He expressed his regret at the events which had 
occurredi "but declined, at that moment to enter into any further 
discussion. He stated, however that "the coming of Mr.Adams^ (the 
newly appointed American representative for London} would doubtless 
be regarded as the appropriate occasion for finally discussing and 
determing the question" of the attitude of Great Britain towards 
Amerioa. (The British consul at Charleston in Southern Carolina had 
meanwhile received orders to continue his functions, but if he should 
be required to recognise the independence of South Carolina, he was 
to refer home for instructions).
Consequently the despatch of Mr Dallas to
Mr.Seward, the day following the interview, states that, "His lordship 
assured me with great earnestness that there was not the slightest 
disposition in the British Government to grasp at any advantage which 
might be supposed to arise from the unpleasant domestic differences 
in the United States, but on the contrary that they would be highly 
gratified if these differences were adjusted and the Union restored 
to its former unbroken position. I pressed upon him how important 
it must be that this country and France should abstain, at least for 
a considerable time, from doing what by encouraging groundless hopes,
(7)
would widen a" breach still thought capable of "being closed. He seemed 
to think the matter not ripe for decision one way or the other, and 
remarked that *foat he had said wae all that at present it was in his 
power to say". This despatch was considered by the State Department
r
of the United States as fairly satisfactory, and the confidence which
>
it caused* probably explains the reason why Adams was not hurried to
his post.
The attitude of Seward towards England must now
be considered. In London his political reputation was not good, for 
he was believed in official circles to be unreliable and tricky. 
At any rate, to a certain extent he was indiscreet* In I860, for 
in stance; during the visit of the Prince of Wales to America, Seward 
had told the Duke of Newcastle, who was at the head of the Prince's 
suite, that "I expect soon to hold a very high office here in my 
own country; it will then become my duty to insult England and I
mean to do so". " ~* *t  «*
Naturally one can only explain this by regarding
it as mere banter, but it was in the very worst taste, and was often 
thought of in England when relations became strained. Undoubtedly 
at this time, Seward had not grasped the real meaning of the situation 
in Amerloa / and from the evidence available it seems quite apparent 
that his idea was to unite North and South against a foreign foe. 
'On April 4th, he told W.H.Russell that "Any attempt against us by 
a foreign power would revolt the good men of the South and arm all 
men in the North to defend their government 11.
The violence of his language at this time also 
seems to point to the fact that he had hopes of achieving his idea.
»
On April 1st he had declared that "the Southern commissioners could 
not b« received by the government of any foreign power, officially
(8)
or otherwise, even to hand in a document or to make a representation, 
without incurring the risk of breaking off relations with the United 
States". Of course no Government would allow itself to "be 
intimidated by this threat.
The same idea is apparent in his pamphlet " Some 
Thoughts for the President's Consideration", which was found in 
manuscript amongst Lincoln's papers after his death. This, too, was 
drawn up in April, and proposes a general foreign war to the President 
as a national distraction* This policy of course^has often been waged 
with succesSjbut it was not possible to then use it in America, and 
the idea can only be condemned as reckless and wild. -^
Then on April 10th, he wrote to Adams a letter of 
instruction* with regard to the policy he was to pursue in Great 
Britain. "You will not rely on mere sympathies or national kindness. 
You will make no admission of weakness in our Constitution. You will
/
in no case listen to any suggestion of compromise by this government, 
under foreign auspices, with its discontented citizens.You may assure 
them that if they determine to recognise the Confederates, they may 
at the same time prepare to enter into alliance with the enemies of 
the Republic. You alone will represent your country at London. When 
you are asked to divide that duty with others, diplomatic relations 
between the government of Great Britain and this Government will be 
suspended.- - - - You will indulge in no expression of harshness, or 
disrespect,or even impatienoe f with regard to the seceding States, 
their agent s, or their people".
Of course ^ it is quite apparent that the tone of this 
letter la uncomproaising f and to a certain extent a veiled hostility
can be discovered.
Another action of 8eward at this time also, according
(9)
to Lord Lyons, made an unfavourable impress ion upon the British 
Government. This was the dispatch of a certain Mr.Ashman, 
(a secret agent^) to Canada^ wi thout consulting Lord Igrons/ and the 
refusal to give the British Government any information upon the 
subject until June. Then Seward stated that the object of the mission
^ •
was to ascertain public feeling in Canada with regard to the .fitting 
out of privateers on the St.Lawrence, and that Mr.Ashman had^by that 
tlme^een recalled.
Again, on May 1st Reward told Lyons that he had
received intelligence that the "Peerless", an iron steamer, had been 
sold to the de facto Southern Government and was on her way out of 
Lake Ontario to be used as a privateer. He stated that it was 
believed that she carried the British flag and that she had regular
British papers^but that he had sent an order to the naval officers
r » 
of the United States to seize her under any flag and with any papers.
Lyons naturally protested and Seward gave way so far as to promise 
that if the information* on which the seizure was made, should prove 
incorrect, full satisfaction should be given to the Government of Her
t
Majesty and the parties aggrieved. Russell , on May ISth^informed 
Lyons that the British Government would accept the assurance.
Later, Seward stated that the dispatch of Mr.Ashman to 
Canada ( was owing to the information he had received concerning the 
 Peerless, for the governor-general had been asked to detain her and 
he had refused. One can ( of course, understand Seward's annoyance at 
the refusal, but the British Government ought to have been notified 
of the mission of Ashman.
Fortunately, the "Peerless" did not cause friction 
between Britain and America, for the governor-general afterwards
(10)
intervened,and prevented her from sailing until all danger of her 
"being converted into a privateer was past.
Still, Seward's attitude was undoubtedly unfriendly, 
and lyons reported that incredible as it might appear, he really 
believed that the American Secretary of State wished to overawe both 
England and Trance by threatening language.
That England, at this period was quite determined not 
to interfere^is quite apparent • for the Under-Secretary for Foreign 
Affairs / announced on April 29th that Her Majesty's Government/ after 
mature deliberation,had decided that it was not desirable for Britain 
to obtrude her advice or counsel on the Government of the United 
States f and that Lord lyons, therefore,had been instructed to give no 
advice unless asked to do so by the contending parties.
But certain questions were now arising which the 
British Government found itself obliged to consider. For instance/ 
on April 17th, President Davis had issued a proclamation which 
invited applications for letters of marque and reprisal, under which 
privateers were offered the opportunity to roam the seas and ravage 
the commerce of the Northern States.
Lincoln, on the 19th, Issued a counter proclamation, 
which declared that the ports of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama , 
Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana & Texas ( were under a state of blockade. 
On the 27th the blockade was also extended to the ports of Virginia
<r
and North Carolina, in pursuance of the laws of the United States and 
of the law of nations in such case provided. For this purpose a 
competent force will be posted so as to prevent entrance and exit of 
vessels fram the ports aforesaid. If, therefore, with a view to 
violate such blockade, a vessel shall approach or shall attempt to
(11)
leave either of the said ports, she will be duly warned by the commande1" 
of one of the blockading vessels, who will indorse on her register 
the fact and date of such warning| and if the same vessel shall again 
attempt to enter or leave the blockaded port, she will be captured 
and sent to the nearest convenient port for such proceedings against 
her and her cargo as prize,as may be deemed advisable". It was also 
stated that persons who molested a vessel of the United States^would 
be held amenable to the laws of the United States for the prevention 
and punishment of piracy.
Naturally if this Proclamation were carried into
effect, the interests of British commerce would be seriously affected* 
The British Government had as yet heard nothing definite on the 
subject, and on Hay 1st, Lord John Russell sent for Mr .Dallas with 
regard to the reports concerning Lincoln's intentions. During the 
interview( he informed the American representative that Messrs Yancey 
& Host, the Confederate commissioners xhad arrived in England and had 
asked for an interview and that he was not unwilling to see them 
unofficially. At the same time he stated that England and France 
would act together and take the same course with regard to recognition 
of the Southern Confederacy.
Dallas thereupon informed Lord John that Adams was to
sail from Boston that day and that he would be in London in a fortnight. 
Lord John then agreed to pay no attention to mere rumours^"but to await 
the arrival of the new minister who would know the intentions of his 
government. Meanwhile^in America, Lord "Lyons was trying to obtain 
Information with regard to the blockade and his efforts were 
practically as unsuccessful as those of Russell in England. As early 
as February 12th we find him writing that the principal engines to
be employed to force "back the seceding states into the Union^were 
cutting off postal communication and stopping foreign trade. He 
continues "It seems to be taken for granted that all foreign Powers 
will aaauiesce in the exclusion of their merchant vessels from the 
ports of the South".
This, of course was the first hint with regard to the 
blockade and shows the trend of opinion in America.
On April 27th, the State Department sent Lord Lyons 
copies of the Proclamation of the 19th,________ but even this was 
far from satisfactory, for the communication was accepted as the 
announcement of an intention to set on foot a blockade, and not as 
a notification of its actual commencement. Of course t it was to the 
advantage of British trade to obtain definite information ( and this 
is what Lyons had attempted to do. On the 29th,he had an interview 
with Sewardjbut he did not obtain any definite announcement with 
regard to the rules which the Americans would Impose and observe.
One trouble was that the blockade would become effective 
in different places at different times and that British vessels might 
be eaptured in ignorance of the fact that a blockade existed.Haturally 
any Illegal seizure would Irritate the British Government.
When Lyons pressed for some definite information for 
the guidance of British vessels, Seward promised that he would send 
him a copy of the instructions,issued to the officers of the 
blockading squadron f and that he felt confident they would be found 
satisfactory. He also promised that if the rules of the blockade 
should bear hardly on British subjects, he would be ready to consider 
the equity of the matter.
On May 4th the instructions had not arrived, so Lyons 
(13)
reminded Seward of his promise. Then the State Department wrote that 
no copy could yet be communicated "because of th«e inconvenience of 
publicity. The existence of the blockade wouldi however, be made 
Jifiowj! in proper form by the blockading vessels*
This same day( Ijjrons was able to forward to England a 
copy of a note ; which Seward had addressed to the Spanish minister in 
Washington, and which stated that the blockade would be strictly 
enforced upon the principals recognised by the law of nations; that 
armed vessels of neutral states would have the right to enter and 
leave blockaded ports*and that merchant vessels in port when the 
blockade took effect would be allowed a reasonable time for their
departure.
It will be quite clear from this, that the British
Government was left more or less in ignorance upon a point which 
concerned certain of her vital interests,and I consider that the 
publication of the Queen's Proclamation was not actuated by any 
hostility towards the North, because we made no formal protest with 
regard to the insufficiency of the evidence regarding the blockade. 
At first it almost seems as if the action of the American Government 
was discourteous, but when we consider the difficulties of blockading 
a coast of 5.000 miles, this charge may be dropped.
Another point in favour of the desire of the American 
Government to carry out the blockade according to international law, 
is found in the fact that fifteen days were allowed for any vessel to 
leave a blockaded port even after the blockade had begun,and that 
vessels captured^before the expiration of that time were restored to
their owners.
As yet, therefore, the state of things was more or
less satisfactory.
(14)
On May let, however, orders were given to the Admiralty to send 
sufficient re-inforcements to Her Majesty's squadron on the North 
American and West Indian station, lest British vessels, engaged in 
trade off the coast of the United States and in the Gulf of Mexico, 
should suffer inconvenience from the issue of letters of marque. But 
nothing was to "be done by the forces nfoich would indicate partiality.
This was announced in the House of Commons on May 2nd ( 
"but when Lord John was asked idiether privateers sailing under the 
flag of an unrecognised Power, would be dealt with as pirates, no 
satisfactory answer could be given, and all that could be said was 
that the Government felt it was their duty to use every possible 
means to avoid talcing any part in the struggle, and that nothing 
but an imperative sense of their duty to protect British interests 
and honour would justify interference. Lord John also stated that 
before he answered the above question he wished to obtain the best 
possible advice upon the subject.
The next day he received the Confederate commissioners 
unofficially* (The recognition of the Confederacy still hung in the 
balance). One can only describe the arguments of the Southeners as 
weak, and to a certain extent as apologetic, for Lord John was 
assured that it was the heavy duties which, the North had forced the
South to pay and not the attachment to slavery which has caused the
' 
secession. Lord John has described the interview in a letter to
lyons. * I said that I could hold no official communication with the 
delegates of the Southern States.—— -They pointed to the new tariff 
of the United States ae a proof that British manufacturers would be 
nearly excluded from the North and freely admitted in the South. 
Other observations were made but not of very great importance. The
(15)
delegates concluded by stating that they should remain in London 
for the presenti in the hope that the recognition of the Southern 
Confederacy would not be long delayed".
The delegates themselves expressed their satisfaction 
with the interview. One cannot help thinking, however, that this was 
merely done to arouse the suspicions of the North, for Lord John 
had made no promise and had given no guarantee of recognition.
On May 6th, Lord John announced that the Attorney & 
Solicitor General, the Queens Advocate and the Government had come 
to the opinion that the Southern Confederacy of America, according 
to princip%3es, which seemed to them to be Just, must be treated as a 
belligerent. On May llth., Dallas communicated Lincoln's proclamation 
of the blockade'and on May 13th the much discussed proclamation of 
the Queen was issued.This stated that none of Her Majesty's subjects 
were to serve in the army or navy of either of the belligerents or 
fit out vessels for warlike purposes in Her Majesty's dominions* 
Ho person in Her Majesty's dominions was to attempt to persuade 
anybody to enlist or to embark for the purpose of enlistment in 
America. The armament of ships of war was not to be increased in 
British ports and Her Majesty's subjects were forbidden to break the 
blockade and also prohibited from carrying officers, soldiers, 
dispatches or any article Judged as contraband of war, for either 
party. Of course, the proclamation derived its greatUmportance 
from the fact that it recognised the Confederacy as a belligerent, 
with rights ascribed to a power engaged in international war.
This was opposed to the Northern theory that the Southenere 
were insurgents^and that they should be treated as rebels and traitors. 
Also it gave to any cruisers which might be built for the Confederates
(16)
the quality of privateers instead of that of pirates. Naturally this 
was a decided disadvantage to the North and it caused much irritation* 
Also a certain section of the Federal Government was not slow in ^ 
observing (although it seems to me their observation was unjust), that 
the proclamation had followed hard upon the unofficial reception of 
the Commissioners. Complaints were also made that it was issued 
with unseemly haste and without regard to the assurances given to 
Mr. Dallas. Personally} I consider that the haste was rather 
unseemlyy and that the British Government ought to have awaited the 
arrival of Mr. Adams before taking so decisive a step. As it was, the 
Proclamation appeared in the London Gazette on May 14th, the day 
Mr. Adams arrived in London.
Of course to the agitated North it seemed as if the British 
Government had hastened its action designedly ; in order to avoid 
listening to arguments against it, and they were quite convinced 
that it made clear that official sympathy was with the Conf ederates | 
and that the recognition of the Confederacy as an independent power 
was merely a question of time. When troops were sent to Canada the 
impression that the ruling classes of Great Britain desired to aid 
the South, received still more support. This sending out of 
reinforcements was discussed in Parliament. Certain members thought 
that the North would regard the act as one of host ill ty ; but Palmerston 
defended it by saying that it was simply a measure of precaution.
Queen Victoria was also of the opinion that troops should 
be sent to Canada; and she, as we shall discover in December, loathed 
the idea of war with the United States. She wrote to Lord Palmerston 
on May 30th that she thought it of great importance that we should be
strongln Canada and that the Artillery should be Increased % two
(17)
that arm could not "be supplied "by the Colony. She 
continues," The Haval Forces would, however, require strengthening
even more. It is less likely that the remnant of the United States 
could send expeditions by land to the North while quarrelling with the 
South, than that they should commit acts of violence at sea 11.
With regard to the 'definite assurances' given to Mr.Dallas, 
I cannot find that they exist. Lord John had said that he could not 
bind Her Majesty's Government nor tell when circumstances might arise 
which would make a decision, with regard to the independence of the 
Confederates, necessary.
This seems to me exactly the opposite of any definite 
assurance,and I do not think the Proclamation can beVttacked on these
grounds.
Many varying opinions with regard to its publication have
naturally been expressed. Motley, on June 18th, wrote to his wife 
that," Had the English declaration "been delayed a few weeks or even 
days, I do not think it would ever have been made^and I cannot help 
thinking that it was a most unfortunate mistake". JohiiBright, too, 
said that the recognition of the Confederates was done with unfriendly 
haste-and Adams, later, in an interview with Lord Russell remarked 
"that the action taken seemed —— a little more rapid than was 
absolutely called for by the occasion".
But I am convinced that the Proclamation was not issued in 
any unfriendly spirit towards the North. President Davis had invited 
applications for letters of marque fand Lincoln had proclaimed a state 
of blockade. Therefore one had to expect maritime warfare and British 
interests had to be considered, and If the Confederates had not been 
recognised they would probably have preyed upon British shipping. 
3onsequently f the best way to protect British interests was to recognise
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that a state of war existed and this could only be done when both 
sides were recognised as 'belligerents.
The London Times of May 16th presented the matter in a 
cynical and sneering fashion fbut with undoubted truth :- 'Being no 
longer able to deny the existence of a dreadful civil war* we are 
compelled to take official notice of it.—— Our foreign relations 
are too extensive)the staKe we hold in the commerce of the world is 
too vast, and) we may add, our attitude is a matter of too much 
importance for us to allow ourselves the gratification of saying *!Peace 
when there is no peace"*) so largely indulged in up to the very last 
moment by the statesmen of America herself. Yes y there is war—— 
Eteocles and Polynices are confronting each other with hostile weapons, 
and England ; like the venerable queen of Thebes, stands by to behold 
the unnatural combat of her children".
Lord Russell in an Interview with Adams in June,also ably 
defended the British position) by saying that unless the Proclamation 
had been published) our naval commanders and mercantile marine would 
have been left without positive orders^and this would not have been 
right. Also we could not treat 5,000,000 men ^ who had declared their 
independence ,like a band of marauders. Besides, the United States, 
themselves) had not treated the Southerners whom they had captured as 
traitors or rebels, and our measures of severity could not be expected 
to exceed those of the North.
Britain's position in also Justified by Dana & Woolyey, two 
of the best authorities on international law; and in December 1862, 
even the United States Supreme Court declared that the President's 
proclamation of blockade was "itself official and conclusive evidence 
to the Court,that a state of war existed".
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James Ford Rhodes also inclines towards the British point 
of view, for he thinks that after the Confederates had won the "battle 
•f Bull Run in July, the Proclamation could not possibly have "been 
delayed'and what greater damage resulted to the Northern cause from
having the proclamation issued May 17th instead of August 1st ?
i 
But the "bitterness which the Proclamation caused in the
North must here "be mentioned, as it .probably had some effect on the 
continual pressing of the Alabama claims by the American Government. 
Motley wrote on June 14th that there was a deep and intense feeling 
of bitterness and resentment towards England Just then in Boston. 
Other letters from New York are in a similar strain. Augustus Belmont, 
financier, banker and democrat, wrote on May 28th, "it would be 
difficult for me to convey to you an idea of the general feeling of 
disappointment and irritation produced in this country,by the manifesto 
of the British Government, by which a few revolted States are placed 
in their relations with Great Britain, upon the same footing as the 
Government of the United States 11 . Of course, the North greatly 
disliked the encouragement which the proclamation gave to the South; 
but on the other hand ; the latter overestimated the value of the 
declaration to themselves.
We must now consider Southern diplomacy with regard to Great 
Britain,and this is a more or less simple matter at the beginning of 
the war. The Confederates wished, of course, to get any possible aid 
from Great Britain, but the chief thing they wanted was their 
recognition by Europe as an independent nation. Hence the interview 
of th* Confederate Commissioners,Messrs Yancey, Rost; and Mann, with 
Lord John, and later the mission of Mason & Slid ell.
Of rovrgy TV"" all important factor in the eyes of the South
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was that of cotton, "because Great Britain depended almost wholly for 
her supply on the Confederates ; and it was from this supply that we made 
our most important manufactures. On July 2nd, the Richmond Examiner 
said as follows i- "By the end of this summer, the stock of cotton 
and tobacco in Europe will be exhausted. Europe must have more / or 
witness the commencement of the most terrible of revolutions at home 
a revolution arising from starvation. It is,therefore, a matter of 
compulsion that they should break through the blockade and obtain our 
crop under the right of their neutral flag".
The above exactly summed up the prevailing idea of the South,— 
they confidently thought that the want of cotton would compel Europe 
to recogniset"hen»and break the federal blockade*, and so on May 21st, 
we find that the Confederate Congress passed an act which forbade the 
export of cotton except through Southern ports, which of course, were 
now blockaded !
James L Orr, the chairman of the House Committee of Poreign 
Affairs of the Confederate Congress,stated that the Confederacy never 
had a foreign policy, nor did its government ever consent to attempt 
a high diplomacy with European powers. The son of C.F.Adams considers 
this statement consistent with facts | because he believed that Jefferson 
Davis overestimated the importance of the cotton factor. But I 
consider that the Confederate Congress did have a foreign policy and 
that it was bound up with the attempt to obtain recognition; and it 
will be seen later that diplomacy was attempted with Prance and England.
It oannot be denied that the importance of cotton was 
overestimated. "Cotton et King", was the cry of the South and this was 
universally believed. A Charleston merchant said to W.H.Russell, 
pointing to some bales of cotton early: in 1861, look there's the key
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which will open all our ports    you must recognise us, sir, "before 
the end of October".
James Ford Rhodes thinks that Jefferson Davis did not §£&!  
the overweening confidence of his people,but from the biography "by
x 
Mrs Davis is quite clear that he did. "The President and his advisers 1^
she wrote, "looked to the stringency of the English Cotton market and 
the suspension of the manufactories to send up a ground swell from the 
English operatives, that would compel recognition    Foreign 
recognition was looked forward to as an assured fact".
W.H.Russell wrote at the same time from Montgomery:-"They 
firmly Believe that the war will not last a year. Theybelieve in the 
irresistible power of cotton". During July, August & September we 
find the Southern press advocating that cotton should be absolutely 
withheld until the Confederacy was legally recognised.
A
Of course, Britain did desire to obtain cotton ;and Palmerston' 8 
remark to Belmont in July was,"We do not like slavery, but we want 
cotton and we dislike very much your Morill Tariff". It was at this 
time, too that Belmont was struck by the lack of sympathy for the 
North amongst commercial classes. Yet it is greatly to'their credit* !,.«*.* 
that they valiantly supported the Government's policy, in spite of
financial loss.
We must now return to the Queen's Proclamation and the
arrival of Mr Adams, the newly appointed American Minister. We can 
easily imagine his feelings as he read the London Gazette, and his son 
informs us that he considered that the act of the British Government 
had given an adverse and unfortunate opening to his diplomatic career. 
An Interview was arranged for him at the Foreign Office,the day after 
his arrivaljbut owing to the death of Russell's brother, this was 
postponed until May 18th.
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The appointed day arrived and the interview took place. 
Adams at once expressed his disappointment with regard to the feeling 
which existed in England towards America. He aleo stated that he 
regretted the issue of the Queen's Proclamation,and he alluded 
especially to the speech of the Lord Chancellor on the previous 
Thursday ; in which he had characterized the South as a "belligerent 
State and art the war as liKtum helium. To this Russell replied that 
more stress had "been laid upon these events than they deserved^ and 
that the advice of the legal officers was that a war existed, and 
that under the circumstances it must be spoken of as a war of two 
sides. But this did not imply an opinion of its Justice. It merely 
endeavoured to "bring the management of the war within the rules of 
modern civilised warfare. This 11 , said Russell, * was all that was 
contemplated "by the Queen's Proclamation. It was designed to show 
the purport of existing laws,and to explain to British Subjects their 
liabilities in case they should engage in the war".
Then Russell asked for information with regard to the 
"blockade. Was it the design of the United States to institute an 
effective "blockade along its whole extentjof coast, or to make only 
a declaration to that effect, and to confine the actual "blockade to 
particular points ? As no government could recognise the validity 
of mere paper "blockades, he could hardly suppose they meant the 
latter. Adams replied that he had every reason for affirming that 
it was the intention to make an effective "blockade, and that was more 
practicable than at first sight appeared, for although the coast line 
was very long, yet the principal harbours were comparatively few^and 
these were not very easy of access.
On the whole, therefore, the interview must be regarded
ae satisfactory to both parties^in spite of the\fact that no definite 
assurance could "be given with regard to the recognition of the South. 
Mams hinself, was not of this view, for he wrote in his diary," My 
conclusion from it (the interview) is that the permanence of my stay 
is "by no means certain".
We must now consider the negotiations of Great Britain with 
both North & South,with reference to the Declaration of Paris. This 
leclaration states that (1) privateering is and remains abolished, 
!ll) The Neutral flag covers enemy's goods except contraband of war, 
111) Heutral goods, except contraband are not liable to capture 
nder the enemy's flagi and (IV) A blockade to be binding must be
ffective.
The leading European nations assented to these four
ropdsitions^and the adhesion of the United States was also invited, 
it the Government of that time wouldlonly accede on the condition of 
.e acceptance of a fifth proposition by the other powers - namely -
at the goods of non-combatants should be exempt from confiscation 
maritime war. This was rejected by the British Government,and the
sOtiations with America were suspended until after Lincoln became
ssident.
Then Seward took up the negotiations,and in April Adams was
Jtructed to ascertain whether the British Government were disposed 
enter into negotiations for the accession of the Government of 
United States to the declaration of the Paris Congress, with the 
litions annexed by that body to the same. If the British 
srnment were so disposed,he was to enter into a convention with 
i. On July 18th,Russell wrote that the Government would feel 
iselves authorized to advise the Queen to conclude the convention, 
oon ae they knww that a similar convention had been agreed upon
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"between the American and French Governments.
A fortnight later Adams wrote statinp that the negotiations 
in Paris were proceeding favourably. Russell's answer was that 
Britain would "be ready to carry out the negotiations as soon as the 
necessary arrangements could be perfected in London and Paris. But 
then came the following words :- " I need scarcely add that on the 
part of Great Britain, the engagement will "be prospective and not 
Invalidate anything already done".
Seward, at once, when this was communicated to him, replied 
that Lord John's statement was not satisfactory and instructed Adams 
to ask for an explanation. But before the despatch containing these 
instructions reached Adams, the attitude of the British Government 
was explained by Russell submitting to Adams the draft of a 
supplementary declaration, which stated that Britain did not intend, 
by the projected convention for the accession of the United States 
to the articles of the Congress " to undertake any engagement which 
shall have any bearing direct or indirect on the internal differences 
now prevailing in the United States".
Upon receiving this information, Adams wrote to Seward that 
the proceeding was " of so grave and novel a character as to render 
further action inadvisable. " until he had obtained further instructions.. 
The answer returned by the President in September was,of course, the 
only one that could be given. The United States would not accede 
except on the same terms as the other parties. " To admit such an 
article^ wrote Seward, tt would, for the first time in the history of 
the United States, be to permit a foreign power to take cognizance 
of, and adjust its relations upon, assumed internal and purely 
domestic differences existing within our own country".
(25)
The negotiations, therefore, were at an end, but Seward 
definitely stated that the failure did not make Great Britain and
*•«
America enemies, although success might have made them "better friends. 
9 We ftgftrd Great Britain as a friend? he said. Her Majesty's 
flag, according to our traditional principles,covers enemies goods, 
which are not contraband of war. Goods of Her Majesty's Subjects, 
not contraband of war, are exempt from confiscation though found 
under a neutral or disloyal flag. Ho depredations shall be committed 
by our naval forces so far as we can prevent it, upon the vessels
" •>.'.
or property of British Subjects. Our blockade being effective must
be respected".
Russell,in a letter of August 28th to Adams/ gave reasons
for the Insertion of the declaration. He stated that serious 
differences had arisen over the meaning of the Clayton Bulwer Treaty, 
and that it was most desirable that a new agreement should not give 
rise to a fresh dispute,and this might easily be caused by the 
different attitudes of Great Britain and the United States in regard 
to the Internal dissensions of the latter, for Her Majesty's 
Government had come to the conclusion that a civil war existed and 
the Government of the United States on the other hand designated
those concerned as rebels and pirates.'* 
However, as stated above the negotiations were not carried
through. At the same time, the British Government was negotiating 
with the Southern States on the same subject, by sending 
communications in a clandestine manner through the British Legation 
in Washington to Mr Bunch, the English consul at Charleston, through 
whom they were laid before the authorities at Richmond. President 
Davis drafted a resolution declaring that he would observe the 2nd
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3rd and 4th rule, but that he maintained the right of privateering.
Mr Bunch was a fervid Southerner, and he wrote to Lyons 
that the wishes of Her Majesty f s Government seemed to have "been 
complied with, for as no proposal was made that the Confederates 
should abolish privateering, it could not be expected they should do 
so of their own accord, particularly as privateering was the arm 
which they most relied for the injury of thejextended commerce
of their enemy.
Meanwhile the American Government had formed a suspicion
that Britain was negotiating with the Confederates. Tor instance, on 
August 17th,Seward sent a despatch and a bag to Mams by a special 
messenger. The despatch stated, that on the 5th of the same month ; 
he had been warned that a certain Robert Mure of Charleston was on 
his way to Hew York to embark at that port for England, and that he 
was a bearer of dispatches from the Confederate authorities of 
Richmond to Earl Russell. Information from other sources agreed 
that he was travelling under a passport from the British consul at 
Charleston. Mr Mure was detained by the New York police and in his 
possession were found 74 letters, a passport, and several copies of 
a pamphlet which was an argument for the disunion of the United 
States, and also the bag referred to above. This bag was labelled 
•K)n Her Britannic Majesty's Service", was addressed to Lord John 
Russell, Foreign Office, and signed and sealed by Robert Bunch, It 
seemed, according to, Seward, to contain voluminous papers.
The marks and outward appearance of the bag indicated that 
its contents were legitimate communications from the British consul 
at Charleston to the British Government. Seward, however, stated 
that he had the following good reasons for believing that the bag
(27)
contained treasonable papers.
1st. There was no reason at that time why Mr Bunch should 
indulge in an extensive correspondence with his government. 2nd. The 
consular passport ought not to have been issued,and even if this had
.•been regular, the passport ought to have been countersigned by the 
Secretary of State,and the commanding general of the Army of the 
United States. 3rd. Mr Mare was a colonel in the Southern Army and 
the papers found in his possession proved that h« was disloyal to the
United States. 4th. If the papers were not illegal,why were they not
? sent in the ordinary way through Lord Lyons.
A sense of propriety prevented Seward from breaking the 
seals of the bag and it was forwarded to London intact. Instructions* 
however* were given to Mr Adams, to state that if the papers were 
found to be treasonable* the United States Government expected that 
they would be delivered up. On the other hand^f the correspondence 
were innocent ; the Government of the United States expressed its regret 
at the brief interruption of the correspondence and stated that it 
would endeavour to render any satisfaction which was Justly required.
One letter found on Mute to which the Federal Government 
greatly objected was as follows :- Mr.B, on oath of secrecy 
communicated to me also that the first step to recognition was taken. 
He and Mr Belligny together sent Mr Trescot to Richmond yesterdayf to 
ask Jeff .Da vis, president to 
 
 
 the Treaty of  
 
 to 
 
 
 the
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neutral flag covering neutral goods to be respected. This is the 
first step of direct breaking with oufc government, so prepare for 
active business by January 1st".
Adams forwarded the bag and Seward*s information to Russell 
together with the request of the American Government, that Bunch
(28)
should be removed from office. Russell's answer on September 9th 
expressed surprise at the seizure and detention of the bag, and 
stated that when the bag was opened there was found to be no ground 
for Seward's supposition that it contained treasonable matter. 
He averredt however, without hesitation that in pursuance of an agree- 
ment between the British & French Governments) Mr Bunch was instructed 
to communicate to the persons / exercising authority in the so called 
Confederate States, the desire of those governments that the 2nd,
3rd and 4th articles of the Declaration of Paris should be observed
iHe-s 
by those States,in the persecution of the hostility in which they
were engaged. Mr Adams was also told that the commerce of Great 
Britain and France was deeply interested in the maintenance of the 
articles providing that the flag covers the goods,and that the goods 
of a neutral taken on board a belligerent ship are not liable to 
condemnation. Because Mr Bunch had acted under instructions from his 
government,he could not be removed from office.
But Russell stated that 'Her Majesty's Government have not 
recognised,and are not prepared to recognise the so-called Confederate 
States as a separate and independent state", and all responsibility 
for the statement that the first step to recognition was taken, was
denied.
The United States Government was not yet satisfied) for on
November 21st Adams informed Russell that the President had withdrawn 
Mr Bunch's exequatur) because he had violated an American law, which 
prohibited any person not specially appointed by the President, from
assisting in any political correspondence with any foreign government.(
Satisfaction was however expressed) because if Bunch had made any 
assurances to the insurgents on the part of Her Majesty'8 Government 
to recognise them as a state, he had acted without authority.
U9)
Russell's reply of five days later, exposed the weakness 
of the American position. He stated that It was quite apparent from 
the despatch submitted, that the North recognised the Confederacy as 
a foreign state'and that consequently President Lincoln could not 
interfere with the functions of the Consuls of other Governments in 
that state,and that the exequatur of such Consuls could only "be 
withdrawn by the Confederate government. Russell also gave notice 
that in order to protect the interests of British subjects, it might 
become necessary to have further communication both with the central 
authority at Richmond and with the governments of the separate states.
Such communications would be made,but would not imply any acknowledge­ 
ment of the Confederacy as an independent state*
It is to the credit of the American Government that it 
realised the difficulties of communication and was prepared to 
sanction measures to obviate the inconvenience} provided that the 
measures adopted were consistent with the safety and welfare of the 
United States. Permission had already been given for warships of 
friendly powers to carry official correspondence to the agents of 
those powers in the blockaded ports. A few months later, however* 
notice was given that this permission would be restricted and that 
letters must not be sent to consuls who were allowed to engage in 
trade — a restriction imposed owing to the success of British 
subjects in "blockade running and the fact that the impartial neutral­ 
ity of certain consuls was much to be suspected.
We are bound to ask ourselves why the British Government 
entered into negotiations with the South re the Declaration of Paris. 
The answer is not hard to find* It was mainly to protect British 
commerce and this was certainly Justifiable. Can the same be said 
with regard to the secrecy of the negotiations ? I think that again
(30)
the answer must be "yes'J in spite of the faot that the Confederacy 
was not recognised as an independent state for nobody, of course, 
can deny any two powers the right of secret agreements.
The North, however, certainly had a grievance, for its
accession to the four articles had "been impeded Toy conditions which
< 
it oould not accept consistently with its dignity, while the
Confederacy had only "been asked to consent to the 2nd, 3rd and 4th
points.
At Geneva, when the claims arising out of the Civil War
were finally settled, the Government of the United States contended 
that if the diplomacy of the British Government and the South had 
"been successful ( it would have meant the destruction of the commerce 
of the United States or its transference to the British flag. If the 
course of insincere neutrality should have forced the United States 
into war, the North would also have lost their principal resources 
upon the ocean. British commerce, too, while Britain was still 
neutral, would greatly "benefit by the recognition of the 2nd and 3rd 
articles. Also the rebel privateers and cruisers would have "been 
protected, and their devastation legalised, while the North would have 
been deprived by its assent to the 1st article, of a dangerous weapon
•".>•""
of assault upon Great Britain.
In spite however of the arguments advanced by Seward ; aadft<meli,t 
Adamsjneither side was convinced that it was in the wrong. But the 
next year, when it seemed as if Charleston would be attacked, a 
British man of war entered the port and took Mr Bunch away.
Seward himself said that he thought that the real objection 
of the English Government to giving an unqualified assent to the 
adherence of the Federals to the Treaty, was because Great Britain 
knew that by mid-August any vessels cruising as Confederate
(51)
privateers, would be English ships; and that Great Britain, while 
opposed to this mode of warfare in the abstract and on principal £ 
was willing to become the patron of privateering when it was aimed 
at the devastation of Northern shipping.
One cannot help thinking that this view, when one considers 
British policy on the whole, is entirely unjust; and that Seward, in 
making this speech, was once more actuated by hatred of Great Britain.
We must now return to the first interview of Adams and 
Russell on May 18th. After this, until June 10th, things were very 
quiet* But that day, Adams received Saward's famous despatch, 
number 10, of May 21st. Undoubtedly, this was written in a mood 
of intense irritation, caused by the news of the Queen's Proclamation 
of neutrality, but if it had been sent to England in its original 
form, it is quite possible that war might have resulted, for Great 
Britain was menaced for her unofficial intercourse with the Confederate 
commissioners and threatened with war if she should recognise the 
Confederacy* It also declared that the United States would emerge
from that war in a better position than Great Britain.
<
When Seward read the despatch to Lincoln, the latter was 
quite conscious of its defects^and he consequently retained it,and 
altered it in such a manner that it lost all offensive crudenesSjWkiile 
gaining in dignity; for his alterations removed its original 
vehemence, which told the British Government what the United States 
would not submit to, in so offensive a manner, that Great Britain 
would have been practically forced to object.
11 We intend to have a clear and simple record of whatever
ii 
issue may arise between us and Great Britain wrote Seward. "leave this
out"was Lincoln's marginal note.
(S2)
Again, speaking of recognition, Seward stated that British 
recognition of the Confederacy would b« British intervention to 
create within American territory a hostile stately overthrowing the 
Republic itself. Then came another sentence which Lincoln ordered to 
be omitted :- "When this act of intervention is distinctly performed, 
we from that hour shall cease to be friends,and become once more, 
as we have twice before been forced to be, enemies of Great Britain".
The conclusion of the despatch was also violent: "We are 
not insensible of the grave importance of this occasion . We see how, 
upon the result of the debate in which we are engaged, a war may 
ensue between the United States,and one, two, or even more European 
nations. War in any case is as exceptionable from the habits, as it 
is revolting from the sentiments of the American people. But if it 
come, it will be fully seen, that it results from the action of 
Great Britain, not our own; that Great Britain will have decided to 
fraternize with our domestic enemy, either without waiting to hear 
from you our remonstrances and our warnings, or after having heard 
them.—— The dispute will be between the European and the American 
branches of the British race —— Great Britain has but to wait a 
few months and all her present inconveniences will cease with all 
our own troubles. If she takes a different course, she will 
calculate for herself the ultimate as well as the immediate 
consequences,and will consider what position she will hold when she 
shall have forever lost the sympathies and the affections of the 
only nation, on whoee sympathies and affections she has a natural 
claim. In making that calculation, she will do well to remember 
that in the controversy she proposes to open, we shall be actuated by 
neither pride, norjpassion, nor cupidity, nor ambition; but we shall
(S3)
stand simply on the principle of self-preservation ; and that our 
cause will involve the independence of nations and the rights of
human nature".
Lincoln's Instructions with regard to thi s , were f that it
should "be omit ted, and instead the following words were to "be written 4 
paper is for your own guidance only and not to he read oiHshown
to anyone!1.
However, when the despatch was returned to Seward,he
prefixed to it two (short introductory paragraphs, in which he embodied 
the President's direction that the despatch was merely a confidential 
instruction, and that Adams was not to say anything inconsistent with 
its spirit. Of course, this made it unnecessary to omit the 
conclusion, and the last two paragraphs accordingly remained in the 
document which was sent.
In its amended form the despatch began as follows :- 
" This Government considers that our relations in Europe have reached 
a crisis, in which it is necessary for it to take a decided stand, 
on which not only its Immediate measures "but its ultimate and 
permanent policy can "be determined and defined". Then came the 
instruction that the contents were not to "be shown ,nor were any 
of its positions prematurely, unnecessarily ; or indiscreetly" to "be 
made known. "but Mr Mams was to "be guided "by its spirit.
Adams's criticism of the despatch is to he found in his 
Diary. " The government seems ready to declare war with all the 
powers of Europe, and almost instructs me to withdraw from communicatinn 
with the ministers here in a certain contingency1 "( i.e. that of 
continued intercourse with the Confederate Commissioners "by the British 
Government). But Adams also wrote " ^y duty here, is, so far as I can
ttic^cat
do it honestly, to prevent the n-eiatral irritation from coming to a
(34)
downright quarrel".
This, I think,gives the clue to his policy - he wished to
avoid war and so we find that during his interview with Lord John 
Russell on June 12th, he translated the harsh and offensive tone of 
the despatch into courteous tut forcible reasoning. He says himself 
that he tried to live up to his instructions, but at the same time he 
tried to soften as well as he could the sharp edges. He spoke of the 
irritation produced in America "by the Queen's proclamation, of the 
uneasiness caused "by the stay of the Confederate commissioners in 
London, and of the interviews^which they had teen admitted. To this 
Russell replied that an interview did not imply recognition and that 
he had no expectation of seeing them again.
The whole spifcit of the interview was one of courtesy and 
conciliation, and it was with regret that Adams told Russell that if 
Great Britain entertained any design to extend the struggle going on 
in America,he was "bound to acknowledge in all frankness, that, in thfluf 
contingency, he had nothing further left to do in Great Britain. 
Lord John, of course, disavowed any such intention, and Indeed, 
stated that instructions had "been given to British naval officers to
respect the "blockade - a statement vfoich must have given pleasure
% 
"to the American minister*
Meanwhile in America some of the irritation against Great 
Britain was dying down. On June 5th for instance, Sohleiden wrote 
to Sumner from Washington as follows :- "There has nothing occured 
here in r*gard to Great Britain; and the President told me that it 
appeared to him as if this Government had no reason to complain of 
any European power in this contest 11. Two days earlier a leading 
article in the Hew York Tribune had stated that the "evident desire" 
of the Western European powers to maintain amicable relations with
(55)
America had not been fairly met^and in some measure it defended 
England for the recognition of the belligerent rights of the 
Confederate States, and excused the unofficial reception of th*ir 
commissioners. The nex$ day it went still further, and said that 
even if Great Britain or France should open one of the blockaded 
ports and load a merchant fleet with cotton, America had better 
pocket the insult for the supreme reason of necessity, for the war 
with the South was a "life and death" struggle*.
Lincoln's Fourth of July message, was also favourable, 
" The sovereignty and rights of the United States" he declared, 
" are now everywhere practically respected by foreign powers / and a 
general sympathy with the country is manifested throughout the world"
It was, of course, quite clear from this,that war with 
Great Britain was not desired.
English opinion, too, was becoming more favourable to the 
North. On May 51st Adams wrote from London "The feeling towards the
A
United States is improving in the higher circles here. It was never 
otherwise than favourable among the people at large". The following 
dajr^still greater satisfaction was given to America,by an act of the 
British Governmentj which prohibited armed ships and privateers
of-
belonging to the United FederaljO* the Confederated States of 
America from carrying their prizes into British ports.
This, of course, would only damage the South,for the North 
had comHdssioned no privateers; and naturally any prizes taken by 
their armed ships would be taken into Northern ports,which were not 
blockaded as were the Southern ones.
Seward remarked with satisfaction that the measure would 
probably prove a death blow to Southern privateering. Yet there is
still proof to be found in the diary of W.H.Russell that some
(56)
irritation etill existed in America against us, for he wrote in June
rfrom America,that the career open to the Southern privateers is 
effectually closed by Newcastle's notification that the British 
Government will not permit the cruisers of either side to bring their 
prizes into or condemn them in British ports, but strange to say 
the North feel indignant against Great Britain for an act which
deprives the enemy of an|[ enormous advantage, and which must reduce
 
their privateering to the mere work of plunder and destruction on the 
high seas. later in the same month he wrote that we were in an evil 
case between North and South.
t
I consider* however, that the above statement does not refer
... fto the American Government, but merely to a certain section of the 
community, which was still under the influence of the idea which had
Sanedominated Seward in April and May. SQ&» level-headed people were 
now beginning to see that war with Great Britain would be indeed 
disastrous,and that it certainly would not unite North & South as 
Seward had hoped.
Yet unfortunately in the next few months the danger of war, 
partly owing to the Trent affair, was to become exceedingly serious.
(57)
CHAPTER 11 THE BEGINNING OF THE BLOCKADE AHI» THE TRENT.
We must now consider the American "blockade of the Southern 
ports. As I have stated before ; this affected certain vital interests 
of Great Britain and might have been a cause of serious irritation. 
It undoubtedly did cause a certain amount of friction "between the two
nations and it says much for the good sense of "both governments that1 t
complaints were listened to quickly, and redress obtained in certain
cases. One of the first questions put to Mr Adams on his arrival
in London (see Chap.l. page 23) asked whether the President was/ ™ *
serious in his proclamation of a blockade of all the ports of the 
Southern States, and the answer had been 'yes*. Orders were therefore 
given, as Adams was informed on June 12th, to British seamen that the
blockade must be respected.
The following day Russell wrote to Lyons saying that it
was of the utmost importance that Her Majesty's Government should 
receive accurate information with regard to the biookade, and-that a 
circular had been addressed to Her Majesty's Consuls asking for 
early and accurate information in regard to the port blockaded and 
the manner in which the blockade was maintained.
Consequently in "State Papers" we find despatches from the
OTlea<»tS
British consuls at New 0*4**i|fc», Charleston, Savannah ; and other 
Confederate ports f giving the. desired information. The testimony of 
Mr Bunch, the consul at Charleston, is perhaps the most important. 
According to instructions ( he informed Lord Lyons that the blockade 
of that harbour began on May llth by the United States' ship Niagara, 
but that the vessel in question quitted the neighbourhood on the 
15th, and that no other vessel had appeared there on the 20th, the
date of writing.
(38)
lyons at once wrote to Seward setting forth these facts. 
Seward's reply, however, was that the blockade had not been abandoned, 
relinquished,or remitted. The 'Niagara had been replaced by the 
^Harriet Lane", but owing to some accident that vessel did not reach 
her station, until a day or two after the Niagara had left. Sew-^ard 
claimed that this temporary absence did not impair the blockade and 
lyons accepted the statement.
But Bunch was determined to prove that the blockade at 
Charleston was ineffective. In. June, he wrote again to Russell t 
stating that a British ship, on May 13th, entered the port in the 
very face of the Niagara,and that on May 15th the Niagara was no 
longer seen; and the port, for all practical purposes remained open 
until May 21st or 29th, when the Minnesota appeared and resumed the 
blockade. During this period 5 vessels had entered the Portland even 
at the date of writing,vessels were still arriving and leaving.
There was also other evidence with regard to the 
Ineffectiveness of the blockade, for at the beginning of July, 
Commander Hickley of the "Gladiator reported that no blockade existed 
between Cape HaMreras and Cape Fear. Commander lyons of the Ha«r Hater ^ 
also thought the blockade was merely nominal* Captain ROBS of the 
Desperate, however, considered that the blockade was generally actively 
maintained; and Consul Mure of New Orleans on June 18th stated, " The
blockade is rigidly enforced. Business of all kinds, except a few
Merchants 
retail sales is at an end. Almost all the British ^r«*««le here have
closed their offices and have left the city".
(& These conflicting reports can be easily explained. 
Undoubtedly during the first few months the blockade was effective 
in some parts and not in others. As time went on ; naturally its
(39)
effectiveness increased*
On June 28th Mr Adams received an interview with Russell, 
and it was during this interview that a new source of irritation, with 
regard to the "blockade,was touched upon. Lord Russell spoke to 
Mr Adams concerning the Republic of New Granada, which had merely "by 
Decree, closed certain ports. The opinion of Her Majesty's 
Government was, after taking legal advice, that it was perfectly 
competent for the government of a country in a state of tranquillity 
to say which ports 'shall "be open to trade and which shall "be closed, 
but that it was not competent for a government in the event of civil 
war ; to close ports which were in the hands of the insurgents* He did 
not suppose that the enactment of a law closing the Southern ports 
would be proposed bjr the Government of the United States, but it was 
possible that owing to the prevailing animosities,such a law might 
be proposed by some private member of Congress. In any case this 
would be an invasion of international law with regard to blockade,and 
the Government had instructed Admiral Milne that the commanders of 
Her Majesty's ships were not to recognise the closing of the ports. 
Adams did not think that any such law would be passed ; but he was 
wrong', for at the beginning of July the Congress of the United States 
asserted by law the right of the government to close ports in the 
hands of the insurgents.
The British Government could not admit this. On July 19th 
Russell wrote as follows to lyons :- n It is impossible for Her 
Majesty's Government to admit that the President or Congress of the 
United States can at one.and the same time exercise the belligerent 
rights of blockade and the municipal right of closing the ports of 
the South- In the present case Her Majesty's Government do not
(40)
intend to dispute the right of "blockade on the part of the United 
States with regard to,ports in the possession of the Confederate 
Statesi Tout an assumed right to close any ports in the hands of 
insurgents would imply a right to stop vessels on the high seas 
without instituting an effective "blockade. This would "be a manifest 
evasion of the necessity of blockade in order to close an enemy's port. 
Neutral vessels would be excluded} when no force exists in the 
neighbourhood of the porti sufficient to carry that exclusion into
effect.
Her Majesty's Government cannot allow the Queen's subjects
to be deprived of any of the rights of neutrals. They would consider 
a decree ; closing the ports of the South actually in the possession 
of the insurgent or Confederate States^as null and void, and they 
would not submit to measures taken on the high seas in pursuance of 
such decree".
Iflrons was ordered to express strongly to Mr Seward the wish 
of Her Majesty's Government to maintain the relations of amity with 
the United States ;but he was also to express plainly the decision of 
the British Government.
Before this despatch reached America, Sev/ard had written to 
Adams on July 21st that if the government of the United States should 
close their insurrectionaryborts under the new statute and if Great 
Britain should disregard the act, nobody could suppose for a moment 
that the United States would acquiesce. But Seward saw quite clearly 
that this new incident might enlarge a "domestic controversy" into a 
general war among the great maritime nations ; and so he stated that 
the law only authorized the President to close the ports if it should 
become necessary, and that it did not definitely state that this would 
be done* At the same time the British Government was assured that
(41)
" no ohange of policy now pursued , injuriously affecting foreign 
commerce will be made from motives of aggression against nations 
which practically respect the sovereignty of the United States".
But on the other hand, it was stated that the President 
fully agreed with Congress in the principle of the law which authorized 
him to close the ports and that he would put it into execution and 
maintain it with all the means at his command^at the hazard of 
whatever consequences, whenever it should appear that the safety of 
the nation required it.
The same "bill which authorized the President to close the 
ports also gave him a right to establish a Custom House for the Hei^ 
dlstrict^either on land or on "board any vessel near the coast. All 
vessels would be there detained, duties collected^nd a written 
permission given to the master to enter the said port. If any ship
tried to enter by force without obtaining the said permission, frfee
&U 
MUM, with her cargo, would be forfeited to the United States*
This, of course, meant" that any vessel attempting to enter 
a port which was not blockaded but declared closed, would be liable' 
to capture. To this the British Government could not agree. So, on 
August 8th .Russell wrote to Ijyons that Her Majesty's Government could 
not acknowledge that ports in the complete possession of the (so 
called) Confederate States, and which were not blockaded, should be 
interdicted to the commerce of Her Majesty's subjects by a mere decree
-f
or law. w This would be in effect to allow the lawfulness of sC paper 
"blockade extending over 5 ? 000 miles of coast. Her Majesty's 
Government cannot admit a right in any power ; not in the possession of 
the port to erect a so-called "Custom House" on board a ship " at sea 
near the coast" and there to exact duties" he continues. A hope was
(42)
also expressed that the President would not use the power entrusted
to him.
The question which arises here is, of course, whether the
President intended to put the law into execution^as well as maintain- 
ing the "blockade', or did he intend on putting the law into force,to 
give up the blockade. This point cannot "be decided from Seward's 
despatches, although they seem to incline to the latter alternative. 
He says for instance on July 21st " whether it (i.e. the law in 
question) shall "be put into execution today x or tomorrow7 or at what 
time* will depend on the condition of things at home and abroad,and 
a careful weighing of the advantages of so stringent a measure against 
those which are derived from the existing blockade."
But it is quite clear from Russell's despatch of July 19th 
that he considered that the fifcst alternative would "be adopted. Yet 
other British Government officials were rather undecided on this 
point*, but "by August 16th, Palmerston had stated that if the law in 
question were put into operation, he construed it as putting an end 
to the blockade. In this case instead of accepting a blockade/ foreign 
nations would have to accept a levy of duties.
The British Prime Minister did not, however, touch the
.. '.*
difficulty involved by the levy of duties. This wa», of course 
serious, for it meant that one set of duties would be levied by the 
government on ship-board and another by the insurgents on land. Adams 
wrote that objection would be made to this and he did not wish to 
have to discuss the Act in any way until it became absolutely necessary, 
for he believed that the government was on the whole favourably 
disposed towards the fforth and that the Act would certainly create
friction.
Jour days before this despatch was written Seward had
(43)
informed lyons that the question of issuing the Proclamation was 
dropped, for the minutef although influential persons were in favour 
of bringing it forward again. Fortunately this never happened^and 
so this cause of friction was removed.
It is worth noticing that Lord John's remonstrances were 
conveyed by word of mouth by Lord Lyons'and that X)UK upon his 
announcing his willingness to make a written declaration Reward begged 
him to confine himself to the verbal announcement* saying that it 
would be difficult to make any written communication which would not 
have the air of a threat ; and any threat at that moment might have an 
unfortunate effect*
One cannot help thinking that it was owing to the attitude 
of Great Britain that the Act in question was never put into effect, 
although there is no official evidence available to support this.
If the blockade would be proved ineffective it would no 
longer be respected, and the efforts of the Southern commissioners 
in England were now bent in this direction.
We have seen how the early attempts of these delegates to 
obtain recognition failed,and that on June 12th Russell told Mams
i
that he had no intention of seeing them again. They still remained 
in England however; hoping that he would be forced to change his 
decision and on August 14th they again pressed their views in a very 
lengthy dispatch, presenting facts which showed that the act of 
June 1st which prevented either belligerent from bringing prizes into 
Her Majesty's Ports operated exclusively to their detriment and 
declaring that they were an agricultural people, owning but few ships 
and that consequently there had not been any necessity for the 
Government at Washington to issue letters of marque. " But they stated
(44)
that it was otherwise with the Forth, for their ships afforded them 
the sinews of war and supplied their industries. Consequently tbc.
0V JcjV'>t>ttlo»! cfr
crippli»<LWieir commeroe and aeefcroy,, their ships ; were legitimate means 
of warfare. Now, they complained, Great Britain had struck at this ; 
and "by the Act in question had afforded a practical protection to the 
commerce and ships of the United States.
Of course, the act in question was injurious to the South, 
"but as will be seen later, Southern privateers were still abli* to 
plunder American commeroe and cause serious losses.
Then they affirmed that the North had not been able to make 
an effectual blockade of a single port, except of those which find an 
outlet through the mouth of Ohesapeake Bay; and that vessels of every 
class had found their way in and out of all other ports at which the 
attempt had been made.
They said that they were aware that the anti-slavery 
sentiment of England shrank from the idea of forming frethidly public
e
relations with a Government recognising the slavery e^* a part of the 
human race, but they could not discuss the question of its morality 
with any Foreign Power. They contended that the great object of the 
North was not to free the slave, but to keep him in subjection to his 
owner and to control his labour through the legislative channels 
which the Lincoln Government designed to force upon the master. They 
proclaimed that they contained in themselves the elements of a great 
and powerful nation and called attention to their victory at Bull Run.
Then they stated that the cotton picking season had begun 
and that the crop would be prepared for market and delivered on the 
nharves as usual, when there should be a prospect of the blockade 
being raised but not before. Thev|defended the act of the Confederate
(45)
Congress of May 21st ; which forbade the exportation of cotton except 
through Southern ports. (Of coursei they were still trusting in the 
idea that 'Cotton is King 1 ).
On August 24th Lord Russell briefly acknowledged the despatch, 
stating that the British Government did not intend in any way to 
pronounce Judgement upon the questions in debate "between North and 
South. This, of course y gave the Commissioners no hope* But their
attempts at proving the blockade ineffective were not yet ended. On>
November 30th they communicated a list of over 400 vessels which they 
claimed had entered the blockaded ports up to the 20th of August, and . 
they again urged the British Government to interfere.
Russell's response was again very brief. He presented his 
compliments and acknowledged their letters,"but stated that in the 
present state of affairs he must decline to enter into any official 
communication with them.
An attempt had already been made in England to alter the
\
policy of the government with regard to the blockade. Letters were 
sent to Russell at the beginning of September by certain Liverpool 
merchants ; who stated that they contemplated fitting out vessels to 
trade with the port of New Orleans and other ports of the United 
Statesi and that locking to the undisturbed state of friendly relations 
which existed between Her Majesty's flovernment and the United States, 
they considered that British ships had a right to enter into and 
depart from the ports and harbours of America. They consequently 
asked for protection by Her Majesty's cruisers, and stated that if it 
were with eld they would defend themselves as best they might in 
pursuance of their legitimate trade f and that all parties hindering 
them would become responsible for the consequences.
(46)
RUBsell replied through his secretary as follows :- 
"Understanding from the tenor of your letters ; that the ports to 
which your vessels are to proceed are ports which are or may "be 
 blockaded "by the naval forces of the United States, Lord Russell 
directs me to warn you of the serious consequences, which the measures 
contemplated} will entail on all concerned therein, and to inform you 
that Her Majesty's Government will not afford the slightest protection 
Of countenance to the projected enterprise.     Under these 
circumstances, (i.e. neutrality of Great Britain), if any British ship / 
being a neutral, knowingl\y attempts to break an effective "blockade, 
she is liable to capture and condemnation. If such ship defends her- 
self by force against a national vessel enforcing such blockade, such 
defence is a breach of the law of nations, and will expose ship and 
cargo to condemnation as a prize. I am to state that the general 
rule as to trading by neutrals in time of war with belligerents is that 
they may freely trade, "but that they are bound to respect every effect- 
ive blockade ; and that if they carry contraband to either belligerent 
they do so at the risk of capture and condemnation 11.
It will be seen from the above that the policy of the 
government of impartial neutrality was not universally popular in 
England,and after the Battle of Bull Run it was still less so.
Darwin wrote on June 5th to Aso Gray^ " I hav* not seen or 
heard a soul who is not with the North". This, however, must, I think 
be treated as a slightly exaggerated statement of public feeling, and 
it is certainly contradicted by a letter of the Duke of Argyll, ( a 
member of the British Cabinet and a friend &f the Uorth)/ to Sumner, 
(the chairman 64 the committee of Foreign Affairs in America) "I find
' ItkV '
much uneasiness.prevailing here^Twtt things should be done which would
(47)
arouse a hostile spirit in this country," he wrote. " I believe there 
is no desire stronger here than that of maintaining friendly relations 
with America. But there are points on which our people art very 
sensitive; and if they saw themselves touched on these points in 
honour or interest, the irritation would be extreme and could not be
controlled n.
Especially after Bull Run, the dominant sentiment was that
of the main body of the aristocracy and the middle class, who had now 
quite decided that the South could not be conquered and were earnestly 
longing for peace. The aristocracy was, of course, glad that the 
destruction^ of a great and powerful democracy was at hand, and the 
middle class was hoping for peace because it meant that cotton would 
be once more freely obtained.
The supplies of cotton were now running very short. The 
Times of September 19th stated:-" The fact is that our supplies of 
cotton are rapidly sinking, while the supplies on the road to us, 
are of uncertain quality and insufficient amount ".
Russell himself, whose generous language we have noticed 
at the beginning of the contest, remarked in a speech at Newcastle
bv»~n
in October, that the American civil war did not b4m on the question
of slavery, free trade , or protection, but that one party was contending 
for empire and the other for independence, and that the only settlement 
of the contest would be the separation of the North and South. The 
London Times was of the same opinion ; and W.H.Russell wrote from 
Washington that f it continues to be improbable that theSouth should be 
conquered and impossible ; that it should be held in subjection*.
As John Stuart Mill sa$s, there was a furious pro-Southern
/ i
Partisanship,' the working classes, and some of the literary and 
scientific men^belng the sole exceptions to the general frenzy. Amongst
(48)
these friends of the North fwe must notice John Bright, Cobden, 
William E Jorster, and the Duke of Argyll. The 'Daily Hews', the
r • r iSpectator.and the London Star also presented favourable views. n We
' /
believe, as we always did, that the South cannot hold out" was the 
verdict of the'News' on September 17th.
With regard to the Southern partisanship, I think that it 
ought to be stated here that this was caused more by hatred of democracy 
in England than by hatred of the North. In support of this view I 
quote the following from a letter of W.H.Bussell to Sumner in October, 
" I do not approve of the tone of many papers in Great Britain in 
reference to American matters; but do not forget, I pray you, that 
in reality it is Bright ism and republicanism at home which most of 
those remarks are meant to smite. America is the shield under which 
the blow is dealt".
Motley, too, wrote to his mother from England on September 
22nd, that the;^ real secret of the exultation which manifests itself 
in the Times and other organs over our troubles and disasters, is 
their hatred, not to America so much as to democracy in England^
But undoubtedly the dominant note was Southern. The Times on
<r
October 9th- declared that the people of the Southern States might be 
wrong but they were ten millions". The answer of the Daily News was 
11 The Confederate States may be ten millions but they are wrong, 
'notoriously, flagrantly wrong?. Even Cobden did not believe that 
North and South could ever again be united. Darwin wrote in September 
11 I hope to God, we English are utterly wrong in doubting whether the 
North can conquer the South". In December he wrote again to Asa Gray, 
9 How curious it is that you seem to think that you can conquer the
South; and X never meet a soul ; even those who would most wish it, who
(49)
think it possible - that is, to conquer and retain it".
Naturally these sentiments in England ; again increased the
c t
irritation in the United States,and the articles in the Times and
r i
the Saturday Review made things worse. The sneers at the panic and 
oowardice of the Northern troops at Bull Run were greatly resented. 
The following extract from Dicey 1 s '£ix Months in the Federal States" 
exemplifies this. He writes, "I recollect arguing once with a 
Northern gentleman.whose name as an author is known and honoured in 
this country, about what seemed to me his unreasonable animosity
•
towards England. After a concession on his part that possibly his 
feelings were morbidly exaggerated, he turned round and pointed to 
the portrait of a near and dear relative of his - a "brave handsome 
lad, who had been killed a few months "before,when leading his men 
into action at the fatal defeat of Ball's Bluff.  How", he said to 
me, "would you like yourself to fez read constantly that that lad died
in a miserable cause, and, as an American officer, should be called
* H 
a coward ? *And I own to that argument I could make no adequate reply !
Hi/hen we consider that in almost every Northern family there 
was some personal element at stake, one cannot wonder at the irritation 
produced by the attitude of a certain section of the English press 
and public. It must not be thought however that the American press 
was free from blame. The New York Herald expressed sentiments towards 
England as bitter and venomous as those of the Times towards America.
But in spite of the pro-Southern feeling which pervaded the 
country, the British Government still preserved an attitude of strict
neutrality.
In October, Motley wrote from Paris to liis mother as follows:-
"3fou are annoyed with the English Press, nevertheless it is right to
(50)
discriminate. The Press is not the Government and the present English 
Government has thus far given us no Just cause of offence- However, 
although we have many "bitter haters in England^we have many warm
(floK«<jfriends". In September* he, had stayed with Russell at Abergeldie, and 
during his stay, Queen Victoria asked to see him at Balmoral. In his 
letters he describes his reception and says, 11 I thought that the sending 
for me, was intended as a compliment to the United States, and a mark 
of respect to one of its representatives 11.
The whole correspondence is admirable in tone and feeling. 
It breathes admiration, respect, and love of Great Britain, while 
giving heart whole devotion and unstinted service to America. Always 
was the writer ready to pour oil on the troubled waters.
 v '
The statement that 'the English Government had thus far 
given no Just cause of offence 1 shows a perfectly unbiased Judgement, 
but unfortunately this state of affairs was not to continue much longer,
Whether Great Britain was the of f endt m party or the offender, depends 
upon individual Judgement; but in November, through the act of Captain 
Wilkes, the commander of the United States ship rSan Jacinto, Britain 
and America were to be brought to the brink of war.
On November 9th, Adams met Lord Palmers ton at the Lord
«
Mayor's banquet. During the conversation Palmerston touched gently on 
American difficulties, and made it clearly Understood that there would 
be no interference by Britain for the sake of cotton. Three days 
later Adams received a "familiar note" from Palmers ton, asking him to 
call and see him. Adams went at the time appointed and in his diary, 
states that his reception was very : cordial and frank.
Th* reasons for this interview were not then fully *;-:  ^i i&l 
explained by Palmerston, but as a matter of fact the appointment was
(51)
made in order to give Adams an intimation of possible impending 
difficulties7 with a view to obviate* them. It was known that two 
Confederate envoys, Messrs Mason & SlldelljWere on their way to 
Europe, and it was thought that the government of the United States 
had given orders for intercepting any vessel in which they might take 
passage and for seizing them. Finally the 'James Adger 1 , a United 
States ship of war,had Just arrived at Southampton ; and it was 
considered that her arrival was in connection with the orders mentioned
above. . i
In consequence of this Palmerston had held a meeting at the
Treasury of the Chancellor, Doctor Lushington;(a Judge of the admiralty 
and privy councillor), the three law officers (Sir William Atherton, 
Attorney General; Sir Round*11 Palmer, Solicitor General;and Doctor 
Phillimore, Counsel to the Admiralty), the Duke of Somerset, Sir George 
Grey and Mr Hammond (Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs). 
The result of their deliberation was that, according to the law of 
Nations as laid down by Lord Stowell and practised and enforced by 
England in the war with Prance, the Northern Uniofc, being a belligerent, 
was entitled by its ships of war to stop and search any neutral 
merchantmen (and the W.Indian packet was such) if there was reasonable 
suspicion that she was carrying enemy's despatches. If such were 
found on board, the ship was to be taken to a port of the belligerent
and tried.
Orders were also given to one of Her Majesty's frigates to
r *
watch the James Adger.and to see that she did not exercise the 
belligerent right within; the three mile limit of British Jurisdiction.
The law officers had deduced their result from British 
precedents, but it was quite obvious to Palmerston that public opinion 
would not accept the fact of an American man-of-war steaming out of
(52)
Southampton and seizing a British mail packet within sight of her home 
port. Hence the interview with Adams^in the hope that this might be
avoided.
The account of that interview was at once transmitted to
Seward "by Adams in a despatch marked "confidential". It runs as 
follows :- "He (Lord Palmerston) received me in his library all alone 
and at once opened on the subject then evidently weighing on his mind- 
He said that information had come to him of the arrival of a United 
States vessel of war, the "James Adgerl She had put into one or two 
places and finally stopped at Southampton, where she had taken in 
coal and other supplies. ——— The impression was that she had been 
directed to keep watch for the steamer expected to arrive from the 
West Indies, in order to take out of it by force the gentlemen from 
the Southern State, Messrs Mason & Slidell, who. were presumed to be on 
board. Now he was not going into the question of our right to do such 
an act. Perhaps we might be justified in it or perhaps not. He would 
set the argument aside for those whose province it was to discuss it. 
All he desired to observe was that such a step would be highly 
inexpedient in every way he could view it. It would be regarded here 
very unpleasantly if the captain —— should within sight of the shore 
commit an act which would be felt Hi offensive to the national flag. 
Neither could he see what was the compensating advantage to be gained 
by it. It surely would not be supposed that the addition of one or 
two more to the number of persons, who had already been some time in 
London on the same errand, would be likely to produce any change in 
the policy already adopted. —— He could not therefore conceive of the
necessity of resetting to such a measure as this, which, in the 
present state of opinion in England could scarcely fail to occasion
more prejudice that it would do good
(53)
".
Adam)8 answer was that the James Adger was watching the Gladiator, 
a ship which was then being fitted out to run the blockade with a 
cargo of arms and munitions} and he absolutely disavowed the existence 
of any orders from his government of the nature of those taken for 
granted by Lord Palmers ton.
It must not be thought* however, that Palmers ton merely 
wished to prevent the capture taking place near the British Coast, 
although wesWould gain this impression from the report of the interview, 
As a matter of fact he wished to prevent the capture, entirely 
irrespective of place', for he knew that no matter where it happened 
it would be considered an insult to the flag,and serious consequences 
might follow.
Unfortunately a few days before the very interview which 
attoipted to prevent the seizure, Messrs Mason & Slidell had been 
forcibly removed from the "Trent, a British mail steamer. The two 
envoys, with their secretaries and families, on the blockade-runner 
Theodora had successfully evaded the Union cruisers round Charleston 
and had reached Havana, Cuba. Prom there they booked passages to 
England on the British mail steamer^Trent, as ordinary passengers 
sailing from a neutral port on a neutral ship. On November 7th the
r |
Trent sailed for St Thomas and when she reached the Bahama channel, 
she observed a ship lying stationary. The'Trent'hoisted her flag but 
no flag was yet shown by the strange vessel. As the 'Trent' drew 
nearer a shot was fired by the other vessel across her course and the 
United States flag displayed. The Trent, however, still continued on 
her way and so another shell was fired across her bows. Then a boat 
put off from the strange vessel, which was discovered to be the 
San Jaointo', a United States vessel of war, commanded by Captaifl Wilkes,
(54)
(L lieutenant, in the uniform of the United States, then "boarded the 
Trent, and asked Captain Moir the commander, for his list of passengers. 
The demand was refused and so the lieutenant stated that it was known 
that the Confederate envoys and their secretaries were on "board and 
his orders were to transfer them to the San Jacinto'. While the 
captain was still protesting, Mr Slidell stepped forward and told the 
American officer that the four persons he required were standing "before 
him, but that they absolutely refused to board the 'San Jaointo' unless 
force were used. Commander Williams ; the British Admiralty agent in 
charge of the mails of the Trent vehemently protested against this 
act, but the American officer still persisted in carrying out his 
orders and the envoys and their secretaries were forcibly removed. 
Phen the San Jacinto made for Boston and transferred her prisoners
to Port Warren.
Of course, this was a clear case of violation of inter­ 
national law. Even if, as Lincoln maintained, the envoys were rebels 
and traitors, they were absolutely protected from seizure on board a 
British ship, for they were as much under British Jurisdiction on 
board the Trent, as if they had been on British soil.
Upon the first news of the capture America Indulged in a 
wild outburst of exultation, utterly ignoring the fact that Britain 
would not calmly accept the insult. One United States officer said 
to W.H.Russell, "Of course, we shall apologise and give up poor Wilkes 
to vengeance "by dismissing him, but under no circumstances shall we 
ever give up Mason & Slidell. No, sir, not a man dare propose such a 
humiliation for our flag". This, indeed, seemed to "be the prevailing 
viewj - under no circumstances would the envoys be given up.
On November 22nd,W.H.Russell wrote again that all the
American papers had agreed that 'the Trent business is according to
(55)
law f custom and inter-national comity, and that England could do
Hi* 
nothing. Tfei-e shrewd observation was, however, as follows :- "They
cry so loudly in this one key, that there is reason to suspect they 
have som« inward doub.t".
The anger of Great Britain was undoubtedly increased "by the 
attitude of certain American officials towards Wilkes. Banquets were 
given in his honour and he was thanked by the Secretary of the ITavy 
and "by the House of Representatives. On December 2nd a joint 
resolution declared that the thanks of Congress are due and are hereby 
tendered to Captain Wilkes of the United States Navy for his brave, 
adroit f and patriotic conduct in the arrest and detention of the 
traitors, J.M.Mason and John Slidell.
But the rejoicing was not solely owing to the capture - much 
more stress was laid on the fact that the British Flag had been 
flouted. 3?or instance, Governor Andrews of Massachusetts at a banquet 
in honour of Wilkes proclaimed that the crowning satisfaction of the 
whole affair was that the commander had "fired his shot across the 
bows of the ship that bore the British Lion at its head".
Yet certain people in the North knew that the action was 
unwise and unjustifiable by the law of nations. General M'Clellan 
advised the immediate surrender of the prisoners, and Sumner, the 
chairman of the committee of foreign affairs, remarked as soon as he 
heard of the capture^,"We shall have to give them up".
Meanwhile in England on November 25th ( Mr & Mrs Adams had set 
out to visit Mr Richard Milnes, statesman, writer and M,P.' for 
Pontefract until 1862,(j«ho afterwards became Lord Houghton) at his 
country seat in Nottinghamshire. Two days later, a telegraphic despatcK 
from the American legation was put into his hands announcing the
(56)
•startling 1 news that Slidell & Mason had "been taken by force out of
a British steamer in the Indies "by an American steam frigate.
"The consequences" wrote Adams in his Hiary, "rose up very vividly in
my mind".
We must now remember that in 1861 there was no Atlantic
cable between Britain and America/ and that it took 16 - 20 days to 
send a message and get a reply. Probably this was now of great 
service with regard to avoiding war; for as time passes, angry feelings 
are apt to become mollified} and demands which America gratified 
afterwardsi would probably have been refused during the first few days
of excitement.
But the lack of communication was rather embarrasing for/-
Mr Adams, for naturally he had, as yet, received no official 
instructions from home, and he was quite in ignorance as to whether
»
Wilkes had acted under orders or not. On November £8th he returned to 
London and found a summons from Russell awaiting him. He says that 
he noticed in the face and bearing of the latter a shade more of 
gravity but no ill will y and in reply to Russell's questions all he 
could say was that he was wholly unadvised both as to the occurrence 
and the grounds of the action of Wilkes.
After the Cabinet meeting called to discuss the situation , 
Palmerston, on November 29th, wrote to the Queen:-" The general outline
•* »
and tenor which appeared to meet the opinions of the cabinet would be 
that the Washington Government should be told that what has been done 
is a violation of international law and of the rights of Great Britain, 
and that your Majesty's Government trusts the act will be disavowed 
and the prisoners set free and returned to British protection and that 
Lord Lyons should be instructed that, if the demand is refused, he 
should retire from the United States". Mention was also made to the
(57)
Queen of the American General Scott who had recently arrived in Paris 
and Palmerston reported that this man had told Americans in Prance 
that he had not come on an excursion of pleasure "but on diplomatic 
business; that the seizure of the envoys had been discusaed in the 
Cabinet at Washington when he was present and that it was deliberately 
determined upon and ordered; that the Washington Cabinet fully foresaw 
that it might lead to war with England and that he wa ^ commissioned to 
propose to Prance in that case to join the States in war against 
England and to offer France t if she did so, the restoration of the 
French province of Canada* With his usual cynicism Palmerston added, 
•General Scott will probably find himself much mistaken as to the 
success of his overtures; for the French government is more disposed 
towards the South thafc the Northland is probably thinking more about 
Cotton than about Canada"*
One can only discuss the latter part of this letter as an 
ill grounded rumour, and from the evidence available it is absolutely 
untrue. TheWashington Cabinet definitely state that no orders had 
been given to Wilkes to seize the envoys,and we must accept their word.
Besides even if General Scott had been sent on a diplomatic 
mission to Paris, he would not have proclaimed the fact to the 
detriment of his country. One cannot help wondering, however, whether 
the rumou.r was not circulated by Southern agents .with the desire of 
causing was between the North and Great Britain.
The day following Palmerston's'letter to the Queen, a draft 
of the despatch to Lyons was also sent to her. She and Prince Albert 
were quite aware of the critical nature of the communication and of 
the danger of war. Consequently, although Prince Albert was already 
suffering from the illness which ended his life a fortnight later, he
(58)
and the Queen carefully examined it. In Her Majesty»s Diary we find 
the following remark, " He could eat no breakfast and looked very 
wretched. But still he was well enough on getting up to make a draft 
for me to write to Lord Russell, in correction of his draft to Lord 
Lyons, which was sent to me yesterday^and of which Albert did not
approve w.
The memorandum which was returned to Russell ran as follows:- 
t 
The Queen returns these important drafts which upon the whole she
approves; but she cannot help feeling that the main draft - that for 
communication to the American Government - is somewhat meager - She 
should have liked to have seen the expression of a hope that the 
American captain did not act under instructions, or if he did that he 
misapprehended them - that the United States Government must be fully 
aware that the British Government could not allow its flag to be 
insulted and the security of her mail communications to be placed in 
jeopardy; and Her Majesty's Government are unwilling to believe that 
the United States Government intended wantomly to put an insult upon 
this country and to add to their many distressing complications by 
forcing a question of dispute upon us: and that we are therefore glad 
to believe that upon a full consideration of the circumstances of the 
undoubted breach of international law committed^they would 
spontaneously offer such redress as alone could satisfy the country, 
vizt the restoration of the unfortunate passengers and a suitable
apology.
It is, of course, quite apparent that the spirit of the
above is pacific, and it was in this strain that Russell wrote his 
despatch of the 30th which, in a perfectly friendly manner, elearly 
etated the British position. After relating th« circumstances of the 
seizure the despatch continued as follows :- It thus appears that
(59)
certain Individuals have "been forcibly taken from on "board a British. 
vessel* the ship of a neutral power, while such vessel was pursuing 
a lawful and innocent voyage; an act of violence which was an affront 
to tht British flag and a violation of international law. Her Majesty's 
Government bearing in mind the friendly relations which have long 
subsisted between Great Britain and the United States, are willing to 
believe that the United States naval officer who committed this 
aggression was not acting in compliance with any authority from his 
Government* *£ that if he conceived himself to be so authorized) he 
greatly misunderstood the instructions which he had received. For the 
Government of the United States must be fully aware that the British
r
Government could not allow such an affront to the national honour to 
pass without full reparation,and Her Majesty's Government are 
unwilling to believe that it could be the deliberate intention of the 
Government of the United States unnecessarily to force into discussion 
between the two governments a question of so grave a character, and 
with regard to which the whole xf British nation would be sure to 
entertain such unanimity of feeling". Then a hope was expressed that 
the United States Government would, of its own accord, offer to liberate 
the envoys and their secretaries^nd place them under British 
protection with a suitable apology. If these terms were not offered 
by Seward,logons-was ordered to propose them. He was also informed 
that h« could read the despatch to Seward^and if the latter desired it, 
a copy was to be handed to him.
If is, of course, quite evident that the despatch is 
courteous but firm. It contained nothing which attacked the 
belligerent rights of America, it merely defended -Mb* neutral rights, 
and yet it was quite consistent with the honour and dignity of the
(60)
British Nation.
A private note to lyons accompanied the despatch. This
instructed the British Minister that if the demands of the British 
Government were not complied with within seven days, he and the members 
of his Legation were to leave Washington and repair to London.This 
naturally would mean that war would follow.
Then at the last moment another private note was added. 
Wy wish would "be that at your first interview with Mr Seward, you 
should not take my despatch with you, but should prepare him for it ;
p r
and ask him to settle with the President and the Cabinet what course 
they will propose. The next time you should bring my despatch and
*
read it to him fully. If he asks what will be the consequence of his 
refusing compliance) I think you should say that you wish to leave 
him and the President quite free to take their own course and that you 
desire to abstain from anything like menace".
It is quite clear of course,that both the Ministry and the
Queen shrank from wary but at the same time they were determined to
•' 
obtain redress, and in case the United States should refuse this
demand.preparations were made for war. Troops were dispatched to 
Canada and reinforcements sent to Admiral Milne's squadron, and on 
November 29th & 30th a Proclamation was issued prohibiting the export 
of gunpowder, saltpetre, nitrate of soda, and brimstone, and on 
December 4th the export of arms, ammunition and military stores was
forbidden.
Meanwhile in England the position of Adams was not to be
envied. He knew that Wilkes was in the wrong,but from his despatch to 
Reward on November 26th he did not think that war could be avoided. 
"I confess that the turn things have taken, has given me great anxiety
for the fate of my unhappy country. But I shall await with resignation
(61)
the instructions which will probably close my mission"..;- AB yct no 
official news with regard to the Trent had come from America, and on 
December 8th we find Adams writing, "The despatches came,but not an 
allusion to the case of the Trent. Here have I been nearly three 
weeks, without positively knowing whether the act of the officer was 
directed by the government or not. My private letters make me anxious. 
Strange to relate, the uniform tone is to sustain the action of Captain
Wilkes ".
Then on December 17th a despatch written by Seward on
November 30th arrived. It related chiefly to other subjects, but at 
the end Seward referred to the seizure of Mason & SIidell as a "new 
incident" which was " to be met and disposed of by the two governments 
if possible in a spirit of mutual forbearance". It was also stated that 
"Captain Wilkes having acted without any instructions from the 
government f the subject is free from the embarrassment which might have 
resulted if the act had been specially directed by us". Seward then 
expressed the wish that the British Government would consider the 
subject in a friendly temper and that the best disposition on the part 
of the United States could be expected.
Reasons for lack of instructions in this despatch were given 
confidentially. "I forbear from speaking of the capture of Messrs 
Mason & Slidell. The act was done by Commander Wilkes without
instructions and even without the knowledge of the government. Lord
fc*s 
lijrons ha4 Judiciously refrained from all communication with me on the
subject and I thought it equally well to reserve ourselves until we 
hear what the British Government may have to say on the subject".
On the 19th Mr Adams had a long interview with Russell at 
the Foreign Office, and after reading his despatch of the 30th in full 
It was discussed in a friendly spirit. The conclusion reached was that
(6*)
an adjustment could "be arrived at with no great difficulty. This 
however was rather sanguine, when we consider the state of irritation 
which existed both in Britain and America. But Mams inferred from 
the interview that Russell did not desire war,but that he was likely 
to be pushed over the precipice by his desire to walk too close to
the edge!
I do not consider that Ford Rhodes'?criticism of British
policy at this Juncture is very sound. He statet that an inkling of
v>
Adams % conference with Russell on the 19th leaked out, and that\ t
consequently popular opinion took an admirable turn, urging arbitration 
rather than war. But Palmers ton failed to confirm the rumour and 
allowed his accredited organ,the Morning Post,to assert that the 
despatch in no way related to the difficulty about the Trent. Goldwin 
Smith in Macmillam's Magazine fer 1865 speaks of "the suppression of 
Mr Seward's pacific note and the positive denial of the fact that such 
a communication had been received, published in the prime-minister's
•
personal organ". John Bright also wrote on December 14th that the 
government was ready for war, if an excuse could be found.
Prom such evidence as this, therefore, 3?ord Rhodes considers 
that Palmerston had no wish to destroy the warlike enthusiasm of the
British nation.
But, and this seems to me to be most important, we must
remember that Seward's despatch of the 30th gave no definite assurance 
that the action of the American government would be acceptable to 
Great Britain - it merely expresses a wish that the subject may be 
considered in a friendly temper. Also on November 19th, a month before 
the interview of Russell and Adams, I^yons had written "I do not think 
it likely they will give in,but I do not think it impossible they may 
do so, particularly if the next news from England brings note of
(63)
warlike preparation and determination on the part of the Government 
and the people". Again until it was certain what course the United 
States would take - and this as we now know, long trembled in the 
balance-no matter what were the private wishes of Her Majesty's 
Government (and I do not believe that Palmerston desired war), only 
one course could be taken. An infelxible determination had to be 
shown. Besides nobody will deny that Seward's despatch of the 20th 
did not reflect the sentiments of the Cabinet, Congress, press or 
people. W.H.Russell wrote to the Times that he believed the government 
would retain Mason & Slidell at all risks, because it dare not give 
them up in face of popular sentiment.
Such evidence, therefore, seems to me to quite justify the 
attitude of the British Government.
Russell's despatch of November 30th was delivered to Lyons 
at half past eleven on the night of December 18th. The next day, the 
British minister acquainted lyons with its purport and said that Her
f
Majesty's Government would only be satisfied with the liberation of
the envoys. With reference to the interview "Lyons wrote that Mri
Seward received his communication seriously and with dignity but 
without any manifestation of dissatisfaction - - At the conclusion 
he asked me to give him tomorrow, to consider the question and to 
communicate with the President! A request for further delay was also 
granted and i 4: was not until December £3rd that Russell's communication 
wae formally read to him. Two days before this^a letter from Adams 
had reached the State Department protesting against the action of 
Wiikes. This, of course, from the man who was in London and^probably 
knew better than any other American, the sentiment of England upon 
this point, must have exercised a certain amount of influence upon
(64)
Seward's proposal of surrender.
We must now consider Lincoln's attitude, round which a 
certain amount of doubt seems to hang. Of the first confidential 
interview between him and Seward there is no account. The prevailing 
sentimenti which of course he was "bound to consider, was that the 
envoys must not be given up. On December lOth^ W.H.Russell had written 
that if the rumour which stated that Mason & Slidell were to be given 
up was true, the government would be broken up, for there was so much 
violence of spirit among the lower orders that any honourable 
concession would be fatal to its authors. Naturally Lincoln had to 
take this into account, for at that time, it would have been extremely 
dangerous to the Northern cause, if the authority of th« government
 v
had been undermined. Again a resolution had been moved in Congress 
by a certain Mr Vail and igham that "it is the duty of the President 
now to firmly maintain the stand thus taken and to adopt the act of 
Captain Wilkes in spite of any menace or demand of the British 
Government, and that this house pledges its full support to him in 
upholding the honours and vindicating the courage of the Government 
and people of the United States against a foreign power.
Lincoln's biographers, UTicolay & Hay, report that he said in 
a confidential interview on the day the news of the capture was 
received/"I fear the traitors will prove to be white elephants. We 
must stick to American principles concerning the rights of neutrals. 
We fought Great Britain for insisting, by theory and practice, on the 
right to do precisely what Captain Wilkes has done. If Great Britain 
shall now protest against the act and demand their release, we must 
give them up, apologise for the act as a violation of our doctrines, 
and thus for ever bind her over to keep the peace in relation to
(65)
neutrals and so acknowledge that she has "been wrong for 60 years".
Yet on the other hand, W.H.Russell reports that the President 
said to an old Treasury official, "Sir, I would sooner die than give 
them up; " and the reply was, *Mr President, your death would be a 
great loss, but the destruction of the United States would be a still 
more deplorable event".
I think it is probable that at first Lincoln saw quite 
clearly that the envoys must be given up, but that afterwards, when he 
realised the dominant sentiment of the people and press, he wavered, 
desiring to find some measure which would prove acceptable both to 
Britain and America. It was in this spirit, therefore, -that he wrote 
an experimental draft, from which I quote the following :- "The despatch 
of Her Majesty's Secretary for Foreign Affairs dated November 30th 
has been carefully considered by the President, and he directs me to 
say that if there existed no fact or facts pertinent to the case, 
beyond those stated on the said despatch, the reparation sought by 
Great Britain from the United States would be justly due and should 
be promptly made. The President is unwilling to believe that Her 
Majesty's Government will press for a categorical answer in the making 
up of which he has been allowed no part.   Yet this much he directs 
me to say - that this government has intended no affront to the 
British flag    the act complained of was done by the officer without 
orders from the Government. But being done  - our Government could 
undo the act complained of f only upon a fair showing that it was wrong".
Then followed a proposal to refer the matter to arbitration 
and it was suggested that the determination which should be reached, 
Bhould be made the law for all such cases in the future.
But the terms of the British demand though courteously
(66)
expressed, were firm and inflexiblejand Lincoln was forced to the 
conclusion that a settlement had to be reached at once and consequently 
his proposal for arbitration was useless.
"On December 25th at 10 a.m." wrote Bates, the American 
attorney general,in his diary, "a cabinet council (met) to consider the 
relations with England on Lord Lyon#s demand of the surrender of 
Mason & Slidell, a long and interesting session lasting till 2 p.m. 
The instructions of the British minister to Lord Lyons were read-———— 
There was read a draft of answer by the Secretary of State".
Lincoln's draft, quoted above, was not read, but Sumner, who 
had been Invited to the meeting 7 brought with him several letters from 
Bright and Cobden, and these were read and considered. Cobden had 
written as follows s- "If I were in the position of your government, 
I would act upon their traditional policy and thus, by a great 
strategic movement, turn the flank of the European powers, especially 
the governing classes of England". Another of his remarks showed the 
prevailing sentiment in England t- *Chree quarters of the House of
\
Commons will be glad to find an excuse for voting the dismemberment 
of the Great Republic".
John Bright's letters had the same purport :- "At all hazards 
you must not let this matter grow to a war with England; even if you 
are right and we are wrong, war will be fatal to your idea of restoring 
the Union"   Later in the same strain:-"If you are resolved to succeed 
against the South, have no war with England, make every concession that 
can be made; don't even hesitate to tell the world that you will even 
concede what two years ago no power would have asked of you, rather 
than give another nation a pretence for assisting in the breaking up 
of your country".
Naturally such letters from men who were devoted friends of
(67)
the Union^could not be Ignored. They clearly showed that Great Britain 
was quite determined and that unless the envoys were given up, war must 
result'and war would probably mean the dismemberment of the Federal 
Government. Even more clearly than Russell's despatch do they show the 
prevailing sentiment in England. Lyons had been definitely ordered 
on November 30th not to reply to Seward if he should ask what would 
be the consequence of a refusal to comply with the demands of the 
British, lest his answer should have the appearance of a threat and 
war thus precipitated. But while diplomacy had to avoid any statement 
which might have unfortunate results, the letters of private citizens 
could more faithfully reflect the feelings of the country, and 
consequently they were a valuable source of information to the Lincoln 
cabinet, andiondoubtedly helped to form the decision which was given.
With regard to what actually took place at the meeting, Bates 
gives us still further information. His diary continues:-"Mr Seward's 
draft of letter to Lord Lyons was submitted by him,and examined and 
oritized by us with apparently perfect candour and frankness. All of 
us were impressed by the magnitude of the subject and believed that 
upon our decision depended the dearest interest, probably the existence 
of the nation. I, waiving the question of legal right, - upon which 
all Europe is against us and also many of our own best jurists - urged 
the necessity of the case, that to go to war with England now is to 
abandon all hope of suppressing the rebellion, as we have not the 
possession of the land nor any support of the people of the South. The 
maritime superiority of Britain would sweep us from all the Southern 
waters. Our trade would be utterly ruined and our treasury bankrupt; 
in short, that we must not have war with England. There was great 
reluctance on the part of some of the members of the Cabinet - and even
(68)
jhe President himself - to acknowledge these obvious truths; but all
Y i« W c^
y^tided to and unanimously concurred in, Mr Seward's letter to Lord 
lyons, after some verbal and formal amendments. The main fear, I 
believe, was the displeasure of our own people - lest they should 
accuse us of timidly truckling to the power of England".
This extract seems to me to Justify what I have said on 
pages 65 & 66 , with reference to the attitude of the President. At the 
same time,he both wished to avoid war with England, and yet, by 
favouring public opinion, to maintain his government firmly at home.
.. '„ *
The opinion of Secretary'Chase, another member of the 
Cabinet, is also found in his diary :- lie thought it certainly was
\
not too much to expeot of a friendly nation and especially of a nation 
of the same-blood, religion and characteristic civilization, that in 
consideration of the great rights she would overlook the little wrong : 
nor could he then persuade himself that were all the circumstances 
known to the English Government as to the American, the surrender 
of the rebe3\commissioners would be insisted upon* The Secretary 
(i.e. of State) asserted that the technical right was undoubtedly with 
England———*W«re the circumstances reversed, he thought that the 
American Government would accept the explanation and let England keep 
her rebelsi and he could not divest himself of the belief that, were 
the case fairly understood, the British Government would do likewise. 
%it" he continued "we cannot afford delays. IShile the matter hangs in 
UBOertainty the public mind will remain disquieted,our commeroe will 
suffer serious harm, our action against the rebels must be greatly 
hindered and the restoration of our prosperity must be delayed. Better, 
then, now to make the sacrifice of feeling involved in the surrender 
of the rebels, than even avoid it by the delays which explanations 
must occasion. I give my adhesion, therefore to the conclusion at
riiich the Secretary of State has arrived. It is gall and wormwood to 
me. Rather than consent to the liberation of these men, I would 
sacrifice every thing I possess. But I am consoled by the reflection 
that, while nothing but severest retribution is due to them, the 
surrender under existing circumstances is but simply doing right - 
simply proving faithful to our own ideas and tradition,under strong 
temptations to violate them - simply giving to England and the world 
the most signal proof that the American nation will not under any 
circumstances, for the sake of inflicting just punishment on rebels, 
commit, even a technical wrong against neutrals".
On December £6th the matter was settled. Seward wrote to 
Thurlow Weed, journalist and politician, on January &4nd 1862, that 
the Government when it took the subject up, had no idea of the grounds 
upon which it would explain its action f nor did it believe that it
would concede the case. *Yet it was heartily unanimous in the actual \
result after two days examination and .in favour of th« release. 
Remember that in a council like ours there are some strong wills to be
••t • •
reconciled 11 .
But these "strong wills" were reconciled and the reply of
Seward was accepted. Hicolay & Hay, the biographers of President Lincoln,
•«»«v»u«<} Hit «i*r«M4c«-, jt
claim that thic documentA (which, of course, wae his despatch of
be.
Sevember 26th) is remarkably able, and that the language and argument 
are clear and forcible and that it constitutes one of his chief 
literary triumphs. On the other hand, Pord Rhodes claims that it is 
a mere lengthy discussion of the law, obviously written for its effects
at home* . ,
It begins with a review of the capture and the British
demands as stated by Russell, but with certain modifications of th« 
statements made by Captain Mbir of the Trent, and Commander Williams,
v **
the British Admiralty agent. Ih the letter of Williams^!oh is dated
(70)
November 9th at sea" he states that after the first shot was fired 
the Trent slowed down. This is denied by Seward, who states that she 
still was ; or seemed to be ;moving under a full head of steam, as if to 
pass the San Jacinto.
The statement that the boarding officer boarded the Trent 
with a large armed guard is also denied,and Seward also complains that 
only Just so much force as was necessary to satisfy the parties 
concerned that refusal or resistance would be unavailing t was used.
Williams also says that "a further demand was made that the 
commander of the Trent should proceed on boardvthe San Jacinto,but as 
he expressed his determination not to go,unless forcibly compelled 
likewise) this latter demand was not carried into execution? Moir also 
confirmed this statement} but Seward absolutely denied it from his 
official reports.
It is, of cour&e, absolutely impossible to decide which
report is accurate. Seward'e statement that the Trent was or seemed
"f*- 
to be moving under a full head of steam is weak f and so \ie his
declaration with regard to the force which was employed. Probably 
what the American regarded as just suffici ent ; would seem more than was 
needed to the Englishmen. The best thing is to accept a compromise § 
and remember that both parties were obliged to make out the best case 
possible for themselves.
Seward then claimed that the matter involved five questionsl-
1st. Were the persons named(i.e.Mason & Slidell and their 
secretaries) and their supposed despatches contraband 
of war? From international authorities he decided 
that they were.
- ' •
2nd. Might Captain Wilkes lawfully stop and search the 
Trent for these contraband persons and despatches? 
Again the answer was "yes".
3rd. Did Captain Wilkes exercise that right in a lawful 
and proper manner? This again was answered in the 
affirmative. (71)
4th. Having found the contraband persons on "board and
in presumed possession of the contraband despatches, 
had he a right to capture the persons? The reply to 
this was that such a capture is the chief, if not 
the only recognised object, of the permitted 
visitation and search.
5th. Did Captain Wilkes exercise that capture in the manner 
allowed and recognised lay the law of nations? 
This question really contains the real issue of the 
casejand as Seward states it is here that the 
difficulties begin.
•Haturally he says if a neutral vessel is discovered taking contraband 
of war to the enemy ; she is seized and taken before a prize court, and 
judged as a contraband vessel. But with regard to the contraband 
per sonsi there is no authority. Seward held howeveri that the Trent 
ought to have been taken before a prize court and condemned as carrying 
contraband tbut because Captain Wilkes released the vessel ; the necessary 
examination was prevented.
This was practically the view of the British law officers. 
They admitted that a neutral ship could be searched,if there existed 
a reasonable suspicion that she carried contraband. But she must be 
taken to a port of the belligerent for condemnationand they considered 
Wilkes had absolutely no right to remove Mason & Slidell and carry 
them off as prisoners leaving the ship to pursue her voyage.
Seward then continued that Wilkes had stated that he had at
•
first intended to seize the Trent, but forbore because he was reduced 
in officers and crew and because he had no wish to inconvenience the 
other passengers aboard. These reasons had been accepted by the 
American Government and Wilkes consequently could not be censured for
-\
his oversight.
The despatch concludes as follows :- "I trust that I have
shown to the satisfaction of the British Government by a very simple 
and natural statement of the facts and analysis of the law applicable
(72)
to them, that this Government has neither meditated, nor practised, 
nor approved any deliberate wrong in the transaction to whioh they 
have called its attention, and on the contrary, that what has happened 
has "been simply an inadvertency, consisting in a departure "by a naval 
officer, free from any wrongful motive, from a rule uncertainly 
established and probably by the several parties concerned either 
imperfectly understood or entirely unknown. For this error the Britigi 
Government hajaright to expect the same reparation that we, as an 
independent State, should expect from Great Britain or from any other 
friendly nation in a similar case.—— If J decide this case in favour 
of my own government f l must disallow its most cherished principles 
and reverse and for ever abandon its essential policy—— Nor have I 
been tempted at all by suggestions that cases might be found in history 
where Great Britain refused to ytfeld to other nations and even to 
ourselves, claims like that which is now before us—— The four persons 
in question are now held in military custody at Port Warren in the 
State of Massachusetts. They will be cheerfully liberated. Your 
lordship will please indicate a time and place for receiving them".
Personally, with regard to the qualities of the despatch. I 
am inclined to the views of Nicolay & Hay. The whole is a literary 
masterpiece. Great Britain, as we well know, was in the right^but 
from Seward's masterly phrasing one would almost gather that America 
is conferring -a benefit and not acceding to a stern demand. There was 
nothing at all in the despatch which could offend the American people, 
in spite of the fact that they had suffered a certain diplomatic 
defeat and humiliation. It is rather the triumph of American 
principles, with regard to the right of search which is vigourously
proclaimed!
Great Britain, too, was satisfied, although she disagreed
(73)
with several points ; aswill be seen by Russell's despatch of January 
25rd. But she had secured her main demand - the restoration of the 
envoys - and the very act of surrender was accepted as a formal apology,
In a personal interview on December ii8th, I^yons and Seward 
made arrangements for receiving the prisoners, and in accordance with 
this, at Provincetown, in the State of Massachusetts;on January 1st 1862^ 
the two envoys and their secretaries were restored to the protection 
of the British flag. The 'SUnaldo", a British ship of war, transferred 
them from Provincetown to Halifax from where they embarked for England.
W.H.Russell's comment on the affair was as follows :- 
"Lord lorons has evinced the most moderate and conciliatory spirit and 
has done everything in his power to break Mr Seward*s fall on the 
softest of eider-down. Some time ago we were all prepared to hear that 
nothing less would be accepted that* Captain Wilkes taking Messrs 
Mason & Slidell on board the San Jacinto^and transferring them to the 
Trent under a salute to the flag near the scene of the outrage; at all 
events it was expected that a British man-of-war would have steamed 
into Boston and received the prisoners under a salute from Port Warren; 
but Mr Seward, apprehensive that some outrage would be offered by the 
populace\to the prisoners and the British Flag, has asked Lord Lyons 
that the Southern Commissioners may be placed, as it were surreptitousl-y, 
in a United States boat and carried to a small seaport in the State of 
Maine, where they are to be placed on board a British vessel as quietly
as possible 11 .
How, that, the prisoners were surrendered, Great Britain also
received them very coldly, for she had no wish to let the South imagine 
that her demand for the surrender of Mason & Slidell was inspired by 
any intention of helping the South or hampering the North.
And so lyons wrote to the commanded of the Rinaldo that
(74)
 It is hardly necessary that I should remind you that these gentlemen 
have no official character. It will "be right for you to receive them 
with all courtesy and respect as private gentlemen of distinction; but 
it would be very improper to pay them any of those honours which are 
paid to official persons".
The tact with which lyons conducted the whole affair is 
noteworthy. As W.H.Russell said; he had done everything in his power 
to break Mr Seward's fall. He had told Seward that he desired to 
consult American wishes as far as possible-, he was unwilling that the 
transfer should cause any popular excitement or to be made the accasion 
for anything like a display of exultation on the part of Great Britain. 
There were only two points on which he had insisted, (1) that the 
transfer ehouldjbe made by daylight and (£) that the gentlemen should 
either be received on board a British ship of war in the United States, 
or be conveyed to a British Port in an American ship.
Even the Times approved of this attitude and warned Mason 
and Slidell that they were not to assume the airs or expect the halo 
of martyrs. On January llth the leading article stated that *we may- 
well observe that Messrs Mason & Slidell are about the most worthless 
booty it would be possible to extract from the Jaws of the American
*..,"
lion—— The nation under whose flag they sought a safe passage across 
the Atlantic, the nation that has now rescued them with all her might 
from the certainty of a dungeon and the chances of retaliation, is 
that against which they have always done their best to exasperate 
their countrymen——So we do sincerely hope that our countrymen will 
not give these fellows anything in the shape of an ovatiod. They must
"•*
not suppose, because we have gone to the very verge of a great war to 
rescue them, that therefore they are precious in our eyes   We should 
have done just as much to rescue two of their own negroes".
(75)
Yet Great Britain was undeniably in the right, for the Trent 
was not in the "belligerent service and the only persons whom it is 
lawful to seize on board a merchant vessel, which is not in the 
belligerent service are persons serving in the enemy's army or navy.
*
Also a neutral Government has a perfect right, if she so wishes, to 
receive envoys* or papers,and this prevents the capture of such except 
in enemy territory or on board belligerent ships. Even if the four 
persons were contraband, contraband cannot be captured on board a 
neutral ship unless it has an enemy destination.
But although Graat Britain's demand was just ; the affair left 
angry feelings in America. On December 26th, the suggested surrender 
was violently assailed in the Senate. "It would reduce us to the 
position of a 2nd rate power" said Senator Hale "and make us vassals 
  of Great Britain. I would not humble our flag even to escape from a 
war with Great Britain. Ho man would make more honourable concessions 
than I would to preserve the peace, but sometimes peace is less 
honourable and more calamitous than war. If we are to have war with
*
Great Britain, it will not be because we refuse to surrender Messrs
 ir<* 
8s Slidell - that is a mere pretence -If war shall come it will be
because Great Britain has determined to force war*upon usT Then he 
apoke of the true hearted Irishmen in Canada and Ireland Awho had longed 
for an opportunity to retaliate upon England,for wrongs which for 
centuries that Government had inflicted upon their Fatherland, If 
England enters upon this war", he continued, "she will enter upon one 
more thaA doubtful contingency. She will be at war with the spirit 
of the age, the irresistible genius of liberty and with the sympathies 
of her own best people". Then on December 30th came another bitter 
attack :- "When Ireland was in arms against the Government, what would
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England have said^ad we negotiated with them for ports of entry and 
recognised their letters of marque. It is obvious that England would 
suffer more "by the suppression of Southern commerce than any other 
nation. Hence we see reason why certain leading journals in England 
sympathise with the South. While the English people hate slavery, the 
Manchester school would prefer that four million slaves should continue 
in perpetual "bondage than that her five million dependents should 
suffer inconvenience. I doubt not she will use every means in her 
power to keep Southern ports open. The statesmen of England feel 
kindly towards the South for another reason. As slave states can never 
become a manufacturing or navigating people, they sympathise with her 
free trade policy. But if Manchester should drive England to give aid 
to the traitors, the free people of America will not quail before it. 
We have survived two wars with her. War is always a mighty evil. 
With England it would be especially deplorable. But war with all 
nations is better than national dishonour and disgrace?
Again on January 7th in the House of Representatives f the 
surrender was violently assailed. "We have strutted insolently into a 
quarrel* said Mr Mr Vallandlgham r "and then basely crept out of itt I
* -•*"
would have preferred a war with England to the humiliation which we 
have basely submitted to". Then a certain Mr Wright took up the 
discussion:-"My conclusion is that we have now about as much in the way 
of war upon our hands, without adding a war with Great Britain, as the 
country can well sustain. Yet had I been in the position of Captain 
Wilkes ,1 should have done the same thing, but I would rather surrender 
these rebels a thousand times over, than to have them the cause of war. 
Let England take them - if she has a mind to toast and fete them, let 
her do it. If they have to be surrendered, then let them be surrendered
under a protest, while we shall remember hereafter that there is a
(77)
Blatter to "be cancelled between Great Britain and the United States of
fforth America".
The attitude of Mr Wright seems to me to "be representative
of the majority of the Northern people. They agreed to the demand of 
Great Britain because they knew that the case was one of hard 
necessity, but they hated Britain violently for compelling them to 
accede to her demand, and undoubtedly some of them thought that it 
was merely a matter of time before war would be declared. For 
instance, Mr Vallandigham asked Mr Wright if he were prepared to make 
war on England if she should break the blockade by force of arms. 
Mr Wright'e answer was 'yes*. Then returned the former speaker, "We 
shall have a chance, I fear, to try him before long".
" .* v
Then again on January 14th, in the House of Representatives 
it was stated that on July 27th.1860, a resolution had been adopted 
authorizing the President to do certain things with regard to the 
'world's fair' ; (i.e. an indsutrial exhibition to be held in London), 
and appropriating to carry out the resolution the sum of $2.000. 
How another bill was brought forward, and this proposed to appropriate
155.000 more. One member spoke as follows :- "I believe, sir, that1 h
at this time we have something a good deal more important to do with 
our money than to send any committee to a fair in England. It is 
said that it might seem at this time like turning a cold shoulder to 
Great Britain if we were not represented at the coming carnival of 
the industry of all nations. Well, sir, I do not think that the 
Biglish Government - I do not mean the English people - has been at 
this particular time inclined to stand so very much on the *high 
points'1 of good behatioor as she has been on some other occasions,
-- *.
oertaiKly not so much that we are called on to devote #35.000 dollars 
to purposes of urbanity".
(78)
Still more unfriendly in tone was the speech of Mr love Joy. 
have submitted to "be dishonoured by Great Britain. I think the 
least we oan do, is to acknowledge it, and to stay at home till the 
time comes when we can whip that nation. I hate the British 
government—— And if I am alive when war with England comes, as 
eooner or later it must come, if I oan carry a musket in that war, I
will carry it".
Mr Thomas of Massachusetts, also expressed exceedingly
bitter sentiments. "No wrong was done to England 'Jhe said^but on the 
other hand, England has done us a great wrong in availing herself of 
our moment ef weakness to make a demand which, (accompanied as it was, 
by Hhe pomp and circumstances of war 1 ), was insolent in spirit and 
thoroughly unjust. England's standard of right, has been, is, and 
will be, the interests of England. There is nothing in the law of 
nations that will stand in the way of her imperious will. But the 
loss will ultimately be hers. She has excited in the hearts of this 
people a deep and bitter sense of wrong and injury inflicted at a 
moment when we could not respond. It is night with us now, but through 
the watches of the night even, we shall be girding ourselves to strike 
the blow ef righteous retribution.
Naturally, the above speeches, while typical of certain
•
sections of the American people, must not be taken as entirely 
representing the prevailing sentiment! Sumner wrote to Cobden that on 
December 30th, at dinner, Seward said that he had no memory for 
injuries and that in surrendering Mason & Slidell he did it in good 
faith, laying up nothing for future account or recollection:———— 
Reward may be careless or hasty: he is not vindictive. The President 
is naturally and instinctively for peace, besides being slow to 
conclusions. He covets kindly relations with all the world,
(79)
especially with England".
J.L.Motley, who at thie time was American Minister at 
Vienna, wrote to Oliver Wendell Holmes as follows on January 14th :- 
•The Trent affair I shall not say much about) except to state that I 
have always been for giving up the prisoners. I was awfully afraid 
knowing that the demand had gone forth, -
"Send us your prisoners or you'll hear of it" . 
that the answer would have come back in the Hotspur vein -
•And if the Devil come and roar for them 
we will not send them".
'The result would have been disastrous, for in order to 
secure a most trifling advantage, - that of keeping Mason & Slidell 
at Port Warren a little longer, - we should have turned our backs on
\
all the principles maintained by us when neutrals, and should have 
been obliged to accept a war at an enormous disadvantage.
But I hardly dared hope that we should havdpbtained such a 
victory as we have done. To have disavowed the illegal transaction 
at once, - before any demand came from England, - to have placed that 
disavowal on the broad ground of principle which we have always 
cherished, and thus with a clear conscience, and to our entire honour, 
to have kept ourselves clear from a war which must have given the 
Confederacy the invincible alliance of England, - was exactly what our 
enemies in Europe did not suppose us capable of doing. But we have 
done it in the handsomest manner and there is not one liberal heart 
la this hemisphere that is not rejoiced, nor one hater of us and of 
our institutions that is not gnashing his teeth with rage".
To me,Motley's letter seems,too generous towards America, 
ftr from the previous pages, it will be seen that the action was not 
disavowed at once. Certain private persons certainly affirmed that
(80)
the action of Captain Wiikes was unjustifiable, "but unless Great 
Britain had vehemently protested, it seems quite certain that the 
American Government would not have offered reparation.
In the same letter is also found the following sentence :- 
"The English premier has "been foiled "by our much maligned Secretary 
ef State, of whom, on this occasion at least, one has the right to 
aay, with Sir Henry Wotton, -
answer was his honest thought , 
And simple truth his utmost skill".
While fully agreeing that Seward was worthy of the above 
tribute, one cannot agree that Palmerston was "foiled 11 for there is 
no evidence to show that he was desirous of war with America, as 
Motley seems to think.
lo>t*»-
In a letter of the previous day, however, foe pays a tributeA
to the British Government :- "The course of the English government 
has been courteous and proper, and we make a- mistake in attributing 
too much importance to the manifestations of the press".
It says much for American good sense that Lincoln's 
government was not shaken by the act of surrender. As Asa Gray wrote 
to Darwin, their decision was thoroughly, sustained by the whole 
people, and as Pierce wrote to 8umner( "it was acquiesced in 
universally, for all thought it wise".
But the affair did leave a rankling wound. 'You have made
us sore", wrote Asa Gray to Darwin. Even in 1869 it was stated that
f '* "• 
the Trent was like an east wind to an old wound and set it a- twinge
once more.' —— "That imperious despatch of Lord John's made all those
- .( 
Inherited drops of ill-blood as hot as present wrongs". Undoubtedly
- - \
the smart of defeat was increased by the taunts and jibes of the 
British, Canadian and Confederate press. "Swagger and ferocity built
on a foundation of vulgarity and cowardice « said th« London Times
(81)
tfien describing Captain Wilkes as "an ideal Yankee". Seward, also, 
was referred to in hardly lees uncomplimentary terms.
In Great Britain the surrender was received with great 
thankfulness, public anxiety being set at rest on January 8th by the 
aew» brought by the ^luropa" that the American Government had decided 
to release Mason & Slidell. The state of suspense and anxiety through 
ifaich the country had passed is seen by the condition of the money
aarket, for on the 9th Consuls were quoted at 93i, this being 
higher than on the 8th. The Duke of Argyll wrote to Sumner on the 
10th that "the sews which came to us two days ago has been indeed a 
relief* I am sure I need not tell you how I hated what appeared the 
prospect before us. There were Just two things which appeared to me 
certain; one was that if the act of the San Jacinto were defended, war 
was absolutely forced upon us; the other was that such a war, odious 
at all times, was doubly odious now".
Russell's despatch of January 23rd really concluded the 
matter. HaturaHy on certain points he differs from Seward - Eirst , 
he claims that the envoys were not contraband and that a neutral 
country had a right to preserve its relations with the enemy and from 
this no conclusion of hostility could be drawn. Secondly, he states 
that even contraband cannot be captured when going to a neutral port. 
Thirdly that you can ship an enemy's ambassador in any place of which 
you are yourself the master, but not in neutral territory or aboard 
neutral ships. He continues that packets engaged in the postal 
service and keeping up the regular and periodical communications 
between the different countries of Europe and America and other parts 
of the world though in the absence of Treaty stipulations, they may 
not be "exempted" from visit and search in time of war, nor from the 
penalties of any violation of neutrality, are still, when sailing in
(82)
the ordinary and Innocent course of their legitimate employment, which 
consiste in the conveyance of mails and passengers, entitled to 
peculiar favdur and protection from all Governments in whose service 
they are engaged. To detain, disturb, or interfere with them, without 
the very gravest cause, would be an act of a most noxious and injurious 
character not only to a vast number of individual and private interests, 
but to the public intents of neutral and friendly Governments". 
Another statement of importance which the despatch contained was that 
even if the Trent had been brought before a Prize Court, the gravity 
ef the offence against the law of nations would not have been 
diminished. The one passage of Seward's despatch which might have 
given offence to Great Britain is also criticized. This was the
*
statement that if the safety of the Union required the detention of 
the captured persons it would be the right and duty of the Government 
to detain them. Naturally Russell's reply was that Great Britain 
could not have submitted to this.
The conclusion of the despatch is however very satisfactory. 
 Happily all danger of hostile collision on this subject has been 
avoided. It is the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that 
similar dangers, if they should arise, may be averted by peaceful 
negotiations conducted in the spirit which befits the organs of two
great nations".
There is still however one other point which must be mentioned
with regard to the Trent affair, and this is connected with the 
statements of the British law officers. Almost at the exact moment, 
when Wilkes fired his shell across the bows of the Trent, they informed
k _. fo* *i«v'Russell that the course which Hie, was pursuing (of course, unknown to 
them) was in accordance with British practice. Then at the Cabinet 
aeeting which Palmers ton held early in November ( the same authorities
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modified -their opinion and stated that the offending neutral ship on 
ihicliicontra'band was found, must "be taken to the captor's court and "be 
judged lay a prize court. This, of course was the ground that Seward 
took in his despatch, "but British opinion was still further modified, 
as we have seen in Lord RUB sell's despatch. In short, Seward had 
stated that Wilkes was wholly Justified in stopping the Trent and 
searching her for the envoys ; but that he committed an error when he 
omitted to "bring the ship into port as a prize. Of course, from this 
we can only draw the conclusion that WiUces was disavowed not because 
lie insulted the British flag, "but "because he did not, in addition, 
capture it. Russell's argument had been that there was no warrant in 
the law of nations for the interruption of the Trent's course from one 
aeutral port to another.
Consequently from the above evidence one can only infer that
i?, 
* •* "
at first even the law experts were at sea and that the case was not 
thoroughly understood. Bussell'd despatch of the 23rd, however, 
cleared up all doubtful points.
It must also be stated that at least one American - Sumner - 
did not agree with Seward*s view of the case. On January 7th he gave 
as his opinion that the seizure of the rebel envoys on board a neutral 
ship could aot be Justified according to American principles and 
practices and that there was no single point where the seizure was not
t
questionable,unless British precedents and practices were invoiced.. 
He continued that if Great Britain had gained the custody of the two 
rebels, the United States had secured the triumph of her principles.
This indeed was what had happened and if the diplomatic 
victory was Great Britain's, the moral victory certainly belonged to 
the United States.
The biographer of Sumner, Mr Storey, considers that this
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speech had much to do with smoothing the ruffled sensibilities of the 
American people. It seems, therefore, rather to "be regretted that the 
Times should have published the following article by Mr William V era on 
Harcourt (Hietoricus). "Whether we turn to the puerile absurdities 
of President Lincoln's message, or to the confused and transparent 
sophistry of Mr Saward's despatch or to the feeble and illogical 
malice of Mr Summer's oration, we see nothing on every side but a 
melancholy spectacle of impotent violence and furious incapacity".
The affair was however finished ; and the policy of the 
Government was generally approved. The rebels had been surrendered 
and war avoided. It was unfortunate that other causes of friction 
still remained. Lord Chai-wood thinks, however, that this was the 
last tine that serious friction arose between the two governments 
during the Civil War. He states that the "lapse of Great Britain in 
allowing the famous Alabama to sail was due to delay and misadventure 
la the proceedings of subordinate officials and was never defended, 
and that the numerous minor controversies which arose, as well as the 
standing disagreement as to the law of blockade, never reached the 
point ef danger"*
Why I cannot wholly agree with this view, will be seen in 
the following chapters.
(65)
__ FOREIGN INTERVENTION - THE PRESIDENT'S PROCLAMATION 
CHAPTER 111 AND ANTI-SLAVERY SENTIMENT IN ENGLAND.
On January 29th 1862,Messrs Mason & Slidell arrived at 
Southampton, hoping to win sympathy and help for their cause, 
recognition of the South as an independent state, and the intervention 
of Great Britain in the struggle on their behalf. We have already see? 
how on August 14th Russell had refused the request of Messrs Yancey, 
Host aad Mann with regard to the recognition of the South as an 
imdependent state, "but the problem of Great Britain's intervention 
has not yet been discussed.
The Queen's Proclamation had declared the neutrality of 
Great Britain and Lord Wodehouse(the under-secretary for Foreign 
Affairs until August 1861] had clearly stated in Parliament that the 
government did not intend to obtrude advice on the United States
because, amongst other reasons, so great and powerful a nation would
,-<.«! •»" •
not welcome advice on her internat&etteti: affairs.
Palmerston»s letter of May 5th 1861 to the Honourable Edware! 
ELlioe,M.P. who had been urging proposals for our mediation is as 
fellows, and clearly shows the prevailing attitude :- 'The day on which 
we could succeed in putting an end to this unnatural war between the 
two sections of our North American cousins would be one of the happiest 
of our lives, and all that is wanting to induce us to take steps for 
that purpose is a belief that any such steps would lead towards the 
accomplishment of that purpose and would not do more harm than good, 
the danger is that, in the excited state of men's minds in America, 
the offer of anyone to interpose to arrest their action and disappoint 
thorn of their expected triumph, migfct be resented by both sides; and 
that Jealously of European,especially of English, interference,in 
their internal affairs, might make them still more prone to reject our
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•ffer as impertinent. There would, moreover, "be great difficulty in 
suggesting any "basis of arrangement to which both Parties could agree ; 
and "which would not Toe repugnant to English feelings and principles 
to propose. We could not well mix up ourselves with the acknowledge­ 
ment of slavery and the principle that a slave escaping to a free soil 
State should be followed, claimed and recovered like a horse or an ox* 
Ye might possibly propose that the North and South should separate 
amicably; that they should make some boundary line, to be agreed upon,
wk
the line of separation between them; and that each confederation should 
be free to make for its own internal affairs and concerns, such laws 
as it might think fit - the two confederations entering, however, into 
certain mutual arrangements as to trade and commerce with each other. 
Do you think the time is come for any arrangement of such a
^
kind ? or is It not in the nature of . things and in human nature that
the wiry edge must be taken off this craving appetite, for peace by 
mutual concession can be looked for ? "
That this policy was not actuated by fear is also to England *s 
credit. In a letter to Milner Gib son the Prime Minister acknowledged
V • ••
that war with the North was not a very formidable thing for England
•'•/. 
and Trance combined; and with full realisation of this fact, the policy
n* 1*. "
of Bagland shows still more pralsworthy.
But this state of things was not satisfactory to certain 
members of the Commons. On June 7th for instance, a member named 
Gregory, gave notice of a motion (which he intended to introduce) for 
recognising the Southern Confederacy, but when an earnest appeal was
made to him to abstain from raising a discussion attended with such
/ 
risk and inconvenience^ he agreed to postpone his motion until a more
favourable opportunity should arise. Fortunately the session
terminated without this very delicatft question being again brought
(87)
forward.
The Federals were very anxious that no foreign intervention
should be made. On June 3rd, Seward wrote to Adams that Lincoln 
considered the principal danger in the existing insurrection to be 
that "of foreign intervention} aid or sympathy, and especially of such 
intervention, aid or sympathy on the part of Great Britain! He 
instructed Adams to learn definitely what Great Britain intended.
Five days later he again wrote to Adams that foreign 
Intervention, aid or sympathy in favour of the insurgents, especially 
on the part of Great Britain, could only protract and aggravate the 
war, and still again on June 19th he impressed upon Adams that there 
must be no foreign intervention by saying that "the British Government 
while declining, out of regard to our natural sensibility, to propose 
mediation for the settlement of the differences which now unhappily 
divide the American people, have nevertheless expressed, in a very 
proper manner, their willingness to undertake the kindly duty of 
mediation, if we should desire it. The President expects you to say 
on this point to the British Government that we appreciate this 
generous and friendly demonstration; but that we cannot solicit or 
accept mediation from any, even the most friendly quarter. The 
conditions of society here, the character of our government, the 
exigencies of our government,forbid that any dispute arising amongst 
us should ever be referred to foreign arbitration—— I add a single
t ' -
remark by way of satisfying the British government that it will do 
wisely by leaving us to manage and settle this domestic controversy 
la our own way—• It was foreign intervention that opened, and that 
alone could open similar fountains in the memorable French revolution*.
I do not consider that Seward's apprehension of foreign 
intervention at this time was justified. He based it, however, on the
(88)
following facts :-
I the guarded reserve on the part of Russell when 
Dallas protested against the recognition of the 
insurgents.
II The contracting of an engagement by the governments 
of Great Britain and Prance, to th« effect that both 
governments should adopt the same course of procedure 
in regard to the insurrection.
III Russell's announcement that he was not unwilling 
to see the Confederate Commissioners and
IV The issue of the Queen's proclamation on the day 
Adams arrived in London.
It must be confessed that these facts looked rather suspicious 
at first) but we have already seen the reasons for the issue of the 
$ueea*s Proclamation.in Chapter T. The guarded reserve on the part of 
Russell is also explained by the fact that at that time the Queen's 
Proclamation was not issued,and the policy of the Government still 
undecided. The same reasons also apply to Russell's willingness to 
see the Confederate commissioners. Also, considering the relations 
which existed between Prance and Great Britain at this time, it is 
not to be wondered at that they should agree to adopt the same course 
of action. But this same course did not necessarily mean intervention, 
and certainly although there were certain people in Great Britain who 
would have eagerly welcomed intervention, the majority of the nation 
were determined to support the government's policy of neutrality.
Adams, himself, on June 21st wrote to Seward that all classes 
were equally earnest in disavowing any want of good will which may 
have beea drawn from the Queen'8 Proclamation^and that professions of 
sympathy with the America* Government in its struggle, were profuse. 
"I am now earnestly assured^ he\continues, "that the sympathy with the 
government of the United States is general; that the indignation felt 
in America is not founded in reason; that the British desire only to
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 be perfectly neutral, giving no aid nor comfort to the insurgents. I
"believe that this sentiment is now growing universal, It inspires
Her Majesty's ministers; and is not without its effect on the opposition''
On August 6th Parliament was prorogued. The Royal Speech 
stated that Her Majesty had determined to preserve a strict neutrality 
between the contending parties. We may consequently conclude that 
there was still no danger of intervention.
At this time, howeveri Monsieur Meroier was representing 
the ?rench at Washington, and from the outset of the conflict he had 
advocated a more decisive policy. In March, for Instance, he urged 
his Government to recognise the Confederate States,and in May he 
expressed a strong opinion in favour of raising the "blockade. Russell 
now seems to have become infected with Mercier's ideas, for on October 
17th he wrote to Palmerston saying fThere is much good sense in 
Mercier's observations* But we must wait« I am persuaded that if we 
do anything, it must be on a grand scale. It will not do for England 
'and Prance to break a blockade for the sake of getting cotton".
Palmerston's reply of October 18th was that it was our best 
and tru« policy to go on as we had begun and to keep quite clear of 
the conflict. He also says that the want of cotton would not Justify 
intervention, unless the distress created by that want^was far more 
serious than it is likely to be. ^he only thing to do'Jhe concluded^
*seems to be to lie on our oars and to give no pretext to the 
lashingtoniane to quarrel with us, while on the other hand we maintain 
our rights and those of our fellow countrymen" 
These letters, of course, show quite clearly that even now 
there was no Intention on intervention, and on October 29th the Duke 
of Argyll, another member of the Cabinet, in a speech to his tenantry 
at laveraiK, gave a further indication of the feelings of the Cabinet.
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•Gentlemen, I think we ought to admit in fairness to the Americans 
that there are some things worth fighting for and that national 
existence is one of them". when we realise that Argyll undoubtedly 
thought that the American Union would have teen broken into fragments 
"by admitting the right of the South to secede, it is quite apparent 
that his sympathies are with the North, which was fighting to save
disruption.
He had also written to Mrs Motley a month earlier:- "Sfou
may set Mr Motley's mind at rest, I think, as regards any possibility 
«f our interfering, - provided of course, the contest is carried on 
with a due regard to the law of Hations and the rights of neutrals".
Again if the Cabinet had wished to intervene in the struggle 
and obtain cotton, the Trent case gave them their great opportunity 
and as we have already seen the whole affair gives no sign of any such
desire.
Adams did not however consider that the danger of intervention*
was yet over, and as a matter of fact he was right* although the 
crisis was not as close at hand as he expected. From his despatch of
(t>a«
December 27th,it is quite clear that he £e dreading intervention of 
some-kind, if not actually war. "Parliament will probably assemble 
earlier than has been anticipated, perhaps by the 16th of January 11 , he 
wrote. It will then be impossible to avoid a general expression of
epinion upon American affairs.—— Although lord Russell, in a portion
• ^
•f his latest conversation with m«,affirmed that we should have full
ouv
opportunity given to us of trying to experiment of overcoming the 
rebellion before action on their part, it is not quite clear to my 
mind that he will very long retain the power to make his words good". 
Adams here is referring to the pressure vihicti would probably be put 
upon the Government by their own supporters, as well as by the 
opposition, to intervene in American affairs. His next words give a
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ray of hop«. "Neither do I wish to undervalue the amount of sympathy 
and good will that may "be "brought into play to avert the threatened 
danger* It is from the friends of our government that I gather most 
ef ny conclusions. And one of them is that nothing "but very marked 
evidence ef progress towards success will restrain for any length of 
time the hostile tendencies developed "by the case of the Trent".
But on January 17th, after the settlement of the Trent case,
Mams wrote home that things looked "better and that he did not consider
i
that any attempt would be made to break the blockade for the sake of 
cotton. He was already! however, beginning to suspect the schemes of 
Louis Napolean,and he was growing anxious with regard to the activity 
of the Confederate envoys. Part of this anxiety was caused by an 
article in the'Edinburgh Scotsman of January llth, which ran as follows;- 
There exists ia London an active and growing party, including many 
M.P's, having for its object an immediate recognition of the Southern 
confederacy on certain understood terms. This party is in communication, 
with the quasi representatives of the south in London,and gives out 
that it sees its way to a desirable arrangement. Our information is 
that the south, acting through its London agents, is at least willing 
to have it understood that, in consideration of Immediate recognition 
and the disregard of the 'paper blockade 1 , it would engage for these 
three things) -^ a treaty of free trade, the prohibition of all Imports 
ef slavee, and the freedom of all blacks born hereafter.- It will be
•aeily seen that if any such terms were off ered ; (but we hesitate to 
'believe the last of them), a pressure in favour of the South would come 
upon the British government from more than one formidable section of
 ur public".
But although, as will be deduced from the above, certain
Parties wished Great Britain to intervene in the struggle, at present
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the Government had no intention of doing so, and in March Mams was 
able to write to Seward that the pressure for interference had 
disappeared. But he also struck a warning note. "It will rise again 
la the event of some very decided reverie". This is, of course, 
exactly what happened a few months later.
In May, Mams was once more suspicious. "There is a project 
afloat of a Joint representation of the powers of Europe, which may 
assume some kind of shape, should the struggle be prolonged ". The
\
ambiguity of Russell's letter of the 10th did nothing to improve 
matters. "Her Majesty's Government can only hope that if resistance 
should prove to be hopeless, the Confederate States will not continue 
the struggle; that if, on the other hand, the restoration of the Union 
should appear to be impossible, the work of devastation now going on
will cease".
I consider that now, although the Government was still
determined to wait for a favourable moment, the desire for intervention 
was steadily growing. The wording of General Butler's order with 
regard to any woman in New Orleans, who insulted a Federal soldier, 
did not make matters any better. On June 10th details of the order 
appeared In the London newspapers - on the llth Mams received a letter 
from Palmerston conveying a violent protest. Mams exclaimed, after 
he had read it, *Vhat does this mean? Does Palmerston want a quarrel ?
Prom the tone of the letter it almost seemed as if this 
question must be answered in the affirmative-and on the next day, 
June 12th, Mams wrote to Seward that it was in London then very 
generally "affirmed with more and more confidence that the two 
governments are meditating some form of intervention in our struggle* 
The rumour now is that M. de Persigny has come from Paris exclusively 
for the flake of consulting on that subject. In such a connection,
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this unprecedented act of the Prime Minister may not "be without great 
significance. I have long thought him hostile at heart and only 
checked by the difference of views in the Cabinet. It may be that he 
seeks this irregular method of precipitating us all into a
misunderstanding".
AB we have already seen by Palmers ton's letter to the Hon
Edward Ellice, this view is unjust. A few months later Palmerston 
certainly did suggest an offer of mediation, but he was not ready to
do so as yet.
Haturally Adams could not ignore the letter which he had
received, and so on June 12th he wrote to ask Palmerston if the letter 
was in any way official or Just a private expression of sentiment. If 
it were the former, it infringed on the prerogative of the foreign 
secretary; and if it were the latter,it was almost a personal affront.
Then Adams wrote to Russell requesting an interview. This 
was at once granted, and Adams then handed Russell the note which he 
had received from Palmerston, and asked what it meant. Russell's 
answer was that it was all new to him and that he could say nothing 
until he had seen the prime minister. He expressed the wish that 
Adams would do nothing further in the matter until after that. On June 
15th, after an interview with Russell, Palmerston wrote that he was 
impelled to make known his own personal feelings about Butler's 
Proclamation,before any notice of it in Parliament should compel him 
to state his opinion publicly. Adams did not consider this reply 
satisfactory and on June 16th wrote again, repeating his former 
question. On the 19th during an official interview he informed Russell 
that Palmerston had not yet answered his second note although four 
days had elapsed. Russell stated that he, too, had written a note to 
Palmerston, which had not been answered. But he informed Adams that
the whole matter was exceedingly irregular and could be regarded only
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as a private proceeding^and he referred to the motion of Mr Lindsay, 
ifcich was to "be proposed the next day in the House of Commons, as a 
motion that must come t© nothing. Adams's remark with regard to the 
interview was that it was the most kindly he had yet had.
We may certainly conclude, that whatever may have "been 
Palmer st on » e aim in writing the letter of the llth, there was no desire 
on the part of the Cabinet for intervention. Russell, on the 19th 
had even stated his "belief that the rebellion was drawing to an end, 
at least in the open field. I also cannot think that Palmerston desired 
to force a quarrel - his probable wish was, when Butler's Order was 
discussed in Parliament to be able to inform the Government that he 
had already taken action in the matter. But because his act had not 
received the official sanction of his colleagues or supporters, he 
was forced to write in the ambiguous strain which he had adopted.
This view of non-intervention is also supported by 
Palmerston 1 s own statement at this time in the House of Commons. 
"Any intervention in the American civil war," he said "would only 
serve to aggravate the sufferings of those now enduring privations in 
consequence of its effects in this country". The Governments of both 
England and Prance would gladly embrace a favourable opportunity for 
mediation, but at present, while both sides were animated with the 
most vehement resentment against each other, he feared that no 
proposal of the kind would meet with a favourable reception from
either side. ^^ ^^ however, Adams received a reply to his second
letter "If I had been merely a private gentleman*; wrote Palmerston,
merely a» a private gentleman,! Should not a* head of the government 
have thought it of any uee to oo^nioate with you upon any matter
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ihich might have a "bearing upon the relations "between our two 
countries. So much for the first part of your question.
As for the second part it is well known that the Secretary 
of State for foreign Affairs is the regular official organ for 
communications between the British Government and the Governments of 
foreign States: "but it is also well known that it may sometimes "be 
the duty of the first Minister of the Crown to communicate with the 
representatives of Foreign States upon matters which have a bearing 
upon the relations "between Great Britain and those States:——I 
conceived that I was doing good service to both, by enabling you in 
such manner as to you might seem best, to let your Government know
f
the impression which General Butler's Proclamation has produced in 
this country; and I thought it better that you should know that
impression privately and confidentially from a person who is in a 
situation to Judge what the feelings of the British-nation may be»
than that you should for the first time learn them in a more public
manner ".
The letter is, of course, really a clever explanation of an
act which might not to have been committed. If the British Government 
had wished to protest against Butler's order, the protest ought to 
have been made formally through the foreign secretary.
Adams's entry in his diary on Friday June 20th is 
interesting :- "Sent a closing note to Lord Palmerston assuming his 
note to be a withdrawal of the offensive imputations and declining 
this form of correspondence for the future. I also sent the remainder 
(i.e. of the correspondence) to the government at home. My relief at 
getting out ©f the present quarrel is indescribable. It is not for 
me to become a cause of quarrel between the two countries at this
crisis ".
The whole question of intervention was still carefully
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watched "by Adams. After Palmerston's statement in the House of
on fuj< q$t
Commons quoted a%&v-», Mams wrote to Seward on June 26th that there 
was not so much talk of intervention or even of mediation in American 
affairs as there had "been a few weeks "before. But on July 3rd he 
wrote to Seward giving an account of an interview which he had had 
with an 'unofficial person* the previous Saturday. During this 
interview the unofficial person had stated that the want of cotton was 
"becoming very serious in Europe and that the governing power, both 
in Prance and England, could not withstand any great severity of 
pressure for intervention. The result might therefore "be some joint 
representation to the government of the United States.
How doubtful the question was,is naturally clearly seen from 
the despatches of Mr Adams. Now he writes that there is a danger of 
foreign intervention, now he states that the danger is decreasing and 
then once again it manifests itself.
The government was still, I consider, averse to interference. 
Adams, also seems to take this view, for on July llth lie wrote to 
Seward that so long as Parliament remained in session ;he thought that 
no particular consequences were to "be apprehended, "but that after the
*
adjournment if things went against the North,he would not be surprised 
if some occasion were not made to plunge them into difficulty.
America, herself, was still averse to any foreign interference. 
Seward f s despatch of July 18tii clearly shows this. 'It needs only any 
real or seeming danger of foreign intervention in the conflict to 
revive and renew devotion to the Unio^ even with the sacrifice of 
slavery throughout the whole United States. Europe will not intervene 
or appeal to us except for cotton. Intervention will end the 
exportation of cotton by extinguishing the slavery which produces it".
However certain members of Parliament were not content with
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the government's policy, and in the House of Commons on July 18th, 
Ifr Lindsay M.P.,.brought forward the subject of mediation and it 
underwent a full discussion. The introduction of the subject even now 
was thought inexpedient and attempts were made by several members to 
induce him to postpone his motion. He, however, declined, and so the 
debate took place. The motion was as follows :-That in the opinion 
of this house, the States which have seceded from the Union of the 
Republic of the United States, have so long maintained themselves 
under a separate and established Government, and have given such 
proof of thetr determination and ability to support their independence, 
that the propriety of offering mediation, with the view of terminating 
hostilities between the contending parties, is worthy of the serious 
and immediate attention of Her Majesty's Government". Mr Lindsay then 
stated that the South had had grievances against the North for a 
quarter of a century, that the Government at Washington had 
precipitated the war and that slavery was not its cause. The real 
cause of the war, he said, was that the Southern States had been slowly 
losing their influence in the House of Representatives! and their 
people, whose interests were bound up with free trade, found that they 
had practically no voice in taxation and that the tariffs were framed 
in the interests of the Northern States, which pursued a policy of 
protection. He said that he believed that re-union was hopeless and 
if so, it behoved England to offer her mediation. He also read letters 
from Unionists in America acknowledging the. hopelessness of the contest 
and pleading for the mediation of England.
This view was supported by several other members, including 
Hr Gregory and Lord A»V.Tempest', but another member, "Mr Taylor, moved 
*n amendment. Mr Porster, one of the best friends the North possessed
luring these years, contended that there was nothing in the aspect of
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affairs which could Justify intervention by Great Britain, and that 
•ven if the offer were made it would not be accepted. Although. members 
had professed to discuss the matter in a friendly spirit, yet threats 
had been held out of more than mediation, and the language used could 
only increase the feeling in the North against this country, and any 
offer of mediation on the part of England just at that time would be 
taken as an indiaation that we presumed upon the weakness of the Uorth.
Lord Palmerston then stated that the subject was one of the 
highest importance and of the most delicate character,and he regretted 
that Mr lindsay had brought forward the question of intervention for 
discussion at that time. He also expressed a hope that the House 
would leave the matter in the hands of the Government. He also 
considered that Britain would not be justified in assuming that the
In Je(i« nJCMte
iHdefenoc of the South had been permanently established and that 
consequently the Confederate Government could not yet be recognised. 
Prom the whole speech (an extract only being quoted above) 
we gather that the Government was then averse to interference,but that 
it was quite ready to offer mediation if a favourable opportunity 
should arise. This view is confirmed by the events of September and
October.
Rumours that the Emperor of Prance intended to intervene
were now current in England. Many of them were, of course, inspired 
by the Confederate agents for their own ends. But even in August, 
the question of intervention was not being seriously considered by the 
British Government and nothing resembling a crisis had arisen. Mason 
had applied to Russell asking once again for the recognition of his 
government and requesting a personal interview; but Russell, after 
submitting the draft of his answer to the Cabinet declined the 
interview and stated that "Her Majesty's Government are still
determined to wait". Even early in September, before the news of the
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defeat of the Federals on August 31st had reached England, Russell 
remarked to Adams that he hoped the latter was now quite at ease in
American affairs. H,«
But after the news of^Bull Run. reached England, the attitude
of Russell aadPalmerston altered. On September 14th Palmerston wrote 
to Russell, who was attending the Queen «f Gotha .as follows :- "The 
detailed accounts given in the 'Observer 1 today, of the tattles of 
August 29th & 30th, "between the Confederates and thce Federals show 
that the latter have got a very complete smashing: and it seems not 
unlikely that still greater changes await them and that even 
Washington or Baltimore may fall into the hands of the Confederates. 
If this should happen, .would it not "be time for us to consider whether 
in such a state of things, England and France might not address the 
contending parties and recommend an arrangement upon the "basis of
separation ?".
Russell's reply of the 17th agreed with the view of his
chief. "I agree with you that the time is come for offering mediation 
to the United States Government with a view to the recognition of 
the independence of the Confederates. I agree further that in case 
of failure, we ought ourselves to recognise the Southern States as 
an independent State". He also suggested a meeting of the Cabinet 
to discuss the proposal for the 23rd or the 30th, and that if a 
dtcision were arrived at, to propose the intervention first to France 
aad then on the part of England and France to Russia and the other
powers. Palmerston's reply of the 23rd pronounced that the plan was
excellent. "Of course, the offer would be made to "both the contending 
parties at the same time, "he wrote. "Might it not "be well to ask 
Russia to Join England and France in the offer of mediation? We should 
be better without her because she would be too favourable to the
North, but, on the other hand, Her* hffartlcipat ion in the offer might
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render the North more willing to accept it. If the Federals sustain 
a great defeat,they may "be at onoe ready for mediation and the iron 
will be struck while it is hot. If on the other hand, they should 
have the "best of it, we may wait awhile and see what may follow".
Meanwhile Russell had reached England,and Lord Granville, 
the President of the Council, had Joined the Queen at Gotha. There 
he received a message from Russell announcing the probability of 
the discussion. He at onoe expressed an opinion averse to 
interference and wrote as follows :- "It is premature to depart 
from the policy which has hitherto been adopted by you and Lord 
Palmerston, and which notwithstanding the strong antipathy to the 
North, the strong sympathy with the South and the passionate wish to 
have cotton, has met with general approval from Parliament, the 
press and the public". Russell forwarded the letter to Palmerston 
and it seems to have shaken his resolution, for on October 2nd he 
admitted that it contained much for serious consideration. 'The 
condition of things which would be favourable to an offer of 
mediation", lie wrote, "would be' the great success of the South 
against the North* That state of things seemed ten days ago to be 
approached. Its advance has been lately checked——Ten days or a 
fortnight more,may throw a clearer light upon future prospects".
Adams, of course, knew nothing of this confidential 
communication but he was extremely dissatisfied with the state of 
things and wrote in his diary September 21st, that unless the course 
of the war should soon change, it seemed to him that his mission 
must end by February.
From this we may claim that Adams had formed a good idea 
of the policy of the British Government, which was that unless the
North made more favourable progress, Great Britain would intervene.
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This, of course, would mean war, and as he says, his mission would
"be at an end.
As a matter of fact, the Northern States were now
recovering from their defeat and the course of events was making 
mediation more difficult. It was left to Gladstone, the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer and the third member of the Cabinet in importance, 
to give public expression to the views of his colleagues. On October 
7th in a speech at Newcastle, he denied that England had any interest 
in the disruption of the American Union and spoke of her "perfect 
neutrality". But itiiile he pmfejsfeed sympathy with the people of 
the Northern States,he declared that there was no doubt that 
Jefferson Davis and other leaders of the South had made an army and 
that it appeared that they were making a navjf and that they had also 
made what was more than either - namely a nation"*". He continued, 
"We may anticipate with certainty the success of the Southern States 
so far as their separation from the North is concerned".
The construction which was put upon this speech was that the 
government had determined on the recognition of the Southern 
Confederacy. The Spectator on October llth stated,"It is hard to 
believe that Mr Gladstone, cabinet minister and dialActic£f, as, 
familiar with English words as with European politics/ would have 
used either of these expressions except to announce a settled and 
official resolve——The recognition may not be immediate, may be 
postponed till Parliament meets, or may await a combination of many 
powers but the Cabinet has made up its mind that henceforward two 
nations must exist on the American continent". Disraeli in the 
following year also averred that the declaration was made with the 
consent of the Government. We know now, of course, from the letters 
of Palmerston and Russell, that the Government had not then decided 
upon its policy, although it seemed as if it were drifting towards
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mediation. Undoubtedly then Gladstone's speech, although merely 
expressing publicly what the prime minister was thinking of, was 
indiscreet. In August 1867, he himself wrote, "I must confess that 
I was wrong; that I took too much upon myself in expressing such an
opinion".
Adams did not know at first what to think of the affair.
On October 8th, he wrote in his diary, "If Gladstone be any exponent 
at all of the views of the Cabinet, then is my term likely to be 
very short". The following day he seems to have decided that 
Gladstone's speech did express the Cabinet's intentions, for he 
wrote that unless things materially changed in America, he did not 
expect to stay beyond Christmas at the farthest.
On October 13th Lord Russell circulated among his colleagues 
a confidential memorandum from which I take the following extract si­ 
lt has become a question——whether it is not a duty for Europe 
to ask both parties, in the most friendly and conciliatory terms 
to agree to a suspension of arms for the purpose of weighing calmly 
the advantages of peace against the contingent gain of further 
bloodshed and the protraction of so calamitous a war".
But certain members of the Cabinet, especially Sir George 
Co me wall Lewis,(the secretary for war), and the Duke of Newcastle, 
were absolutely opposed to intervention. The organ of the 
Confederate envoys in London stated the case rather well. "Now on 
many questions and especially on the American question, there 
prevails the greatest disunion of feeling amongst the members of 
the Cabinet. Some of them sympathise strongly with the Confederate 
States. Others are devoted to the North. Others and notably the 
Prime Minister, car*e nothing for either party——their only wish is 
to let the matter alone. At present this party practically 
determines th« action or rather inaction of the Cabinet; which is
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quite aware that any attempt to have an opinion or lay down a 
policy in regard to American affairs must be fatal to the very 
pretence ofAcoord and to its official existence. Therefore the 
ministry does nothing; because nothing is the only thing which the 
different sections can agree to do 11*
This was one of the chief reasons why the policy of non- 
intervention was carried out. Palmerston by October 23rd knew quite 
well that certain members of his cabinet would never agree to 
interference, and he also knew that his government was not strong 
enough to stand a break in the ministerial ranks. Probably he had 
also received an unofficial intimation that the American Government 
was violently opposed to any mediation.
In July ? Adams had written in his diary that "Mischief to us 
in some shape will only be averted by the favour of Divine providence 
on our own efforts . I wrote a full despatch to Mr Seward 11. In 
that despatch ha asked for instructions as to the course he should 
pursue if Russell approached him with a tender of "good offices". 
A few days after Mr Lindsay M.P. had asked at Ghertsey whether there 
was one man in a thousand who thought that the broken Union could 
be restoredi and a few days after Mr Beresford-Hope M.P. had pledged 
himself at Stoke-on-Trent to vote in Parliament to place the 
Confederacy amongst the governments of the world, came Seward'B 
answer about the middle of August :- "If the British government shall
*s>- "*
in any way approach you directly or indirectly with propositions 
which assume or contemplate an appeal to the President on the subject 
of our internal affairs, whether it seems to imply a purpose to
" •*! '
dictate,or to mediate , or to advise or even to solicit or persuade, 
you will answer that you are forbidden to debate,or hear, or in any 
way receive, entertain or transmit any communication of the
kind. You will make the samevanswer whether the proposition comes
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from the British Government alone or from that government in 
t*. combination with any other power. If you are asked an opinion 
what reception the President would give to such a propositioni you 
will reply that you are not instructed, but you have no reason for 
supposing that it would be entertained. If contrary to our 
expectations,the British Government,either alone or in combination 
with any other government, should acknowledge the insurgents, while 
you are remaining without further instructions from this government 
concerning that event, you will immediately suspend the exercise 
of your functions and give notice of that suspension to Earl Russell 
and to this department. If the British Government make any act or 
declaration of war against the United States, you will desist from 
your functions, ask a passport and return without delay to this 
capital. I have now on behalf of the United States and by the 
authority of their chief executive magistrate performed an important 
duty. Its possible consequences have been weighed and its solemnity 
is therefore felt and freely acknowledged. This duty has brought us 
to meet and confront the danger of a war with Great Britain.  You 
will perceive that we have approached the contemplation of that crisis 
with the caution which'great reluctance has inspired. But I trust 
that you will also have perceived that the crisis has not appalled
us".
From this letter we see that America was absolutely 
determined not to allow foreign mediation ; and that if Great Britain 
persisted in intervening, war would follow.
On October llth, a few days after Mr Gladstone's Newcastle 
speech, Mr Adams was visiting Mr Forster, M.P. the strong friend of 
the Federal cause. In confidence he communicated to his host the 
subsfenoe of his instructions. Forster, thereupon, stated that the 
government ought to be informed before they committed themselves.
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Adams replied that he had "been thinking of it, but that he was 
waiting to see how far Mr Gladstone appeared to "be supported. As a 
matter of fact, Adams never communicated his instructions to Russell,
la l^evbut it is more than probable that ftie^received an inkling of their 
purport from Forster, and that consequently, this was one of the 
reasons why the project of mediation was abandoned.
On October 14th the speech of Sir George Lewis at Hereford, 
made it quite clear that the government had no intention of 
recognizing the independence of the Southern States. "In the general 
opinion of Great Britain," he said, "the contest would issue in the 
establishment of the independence of the South" but "it could not be
•
said that the Southern States of the Union had de facto established 
their independence or were in a position to be entitled to 
recognition on any accepted principles of public law". It was either 
on this day or soon after, that Palmerston and Russell determined 
to continue the existing policy of non-intervention.
Gladstone now found himself obliged to explain his Newcastle 
speech. In response to a letter from Manchester, asking, on behalf 
of the cotton trade, what he really meant, his private secretary 
replied that "the words at Newcastle were no more than the expression } 
in rather more pointed terms of an opinion he had long ago stated in 
public, that the effort of the Northern States to subjugate the 
Southern ones^is hopeless".
what exactly passed between the members of the Cabinet in 
anticipation of the meeting on October 23rd is still a state secret, 
but I consider that the reasons given above (e.g. the violent dislike 
of America to intervention, and the divided opinion of the British 
ministers) furnish sufficient explanation why that meeting was never
held.
Instead, on that day, Adams had an official interview with
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Lord Russell, in vfliich he referred to the departure of Lord Lyons 
for Washington. (It had been previously arranged that lyons should 
sail on the llth, but hie departure had been postponed until the 
Government had decided upon its policy). During this interview Adams 
expressed the hope that lyons would remain in America for a long
*
time. "I had, indeed", he continued, "been made of late quite fearful 
that it would be otherwise. I was obliged to confess that I had 
lately been called somewhat suddenly to the consideration of the 
condition of my travelling equipage  If I had trusted to the 
impressions generally prevailing, directly after the delivery of a 
certain speech, my conclusions as to my departure would have been 
absolute. But I preferred to wait until later developments, lik<e 
those which have since taken place, should give a mordpefinite idea 
of the extent of the authority to which it was entitled. The speech 
of Sir George Lewis had done much to set the balance once more even".
Lord Russell understood the allusion at once and stated that
"> 
Mr Gladstone had been much] under stood. He intimated, as guardedly *
fa~*
as possible, that Lord Palm erst on and other members of the government 
regretted the speech and that Mr Gladstone himself was inclined to 
correct the misinterpretation which had been made of it* He then 
stated that it was still the intention of the government to adhere 
to the rule of perfect neutrality, and to allow the struggle to come 
to its natural end ; without the smallest interference direct or 
otherwise. Adams, naturally expressed his satisfaction with this 
and the interview then terminated.
By a very narrow margin of safety the crisis had been passed, 
and in spite of the attempts ©f Trance, Great Britain still clung
nc
to her policy of non-intervention. On October 50th Monsui er de 
do liiuys, the minister of France for Foreign Affairs, wrote to the
Pronch ambassador in London and St Petersburg, suggesting that the
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three Cabinets ehould unitedly propose to "both North and South, a 
suspension of hostilities for a period of 6 months. But on November 
15th, Russell replied that "after weighing all the information which 
had been received from America, Her Majesty's Government are led to 
the conclusion that there is no ground at the present moment, to hope 
that the Federal Government would accept the proposal suggested". 
On November 15th therefore,Adams was able to write to Seward that 
the state of affairs was satisfactory and that efforts were being 
made, with a good prospect of success, for a more effective 
organisation of the anti-slavery sentiment on behalf of the federals. 
Prom this time, indeed, English popular feeling was strongly 
en the side of the North, and with regard to this the influence of 
Lincoln's proclamation must be noticed. The contest in America had 
really begun on the issue of political independence. Seven states 
had organised themselves in a Confederacy and had claimed the right 
©f a soverign power, saying that since they had entered the Union of 
their own fre« will, they were able to withdraw whenever they 
pleased. The North, however, denied that the South had any right to 
secede and the Civil War began really as an attempt to force the 
Confederates back into the Union. The question of slavery was 
involved from the first but merely as a minor cause. It was not until 
September 23rd 186£ that it became of paramount importance. Until 
this time friends of th« Sou Ida in England had unanimously proclaimed 
that th« North was not fighting on behalf of slavery, and this, of 
course, had strengthened the Southern cause. But now when Lincoln's 
proclamation of freedom stated that "en the first day of January 
1863, all persons held as slaves within any State, the people 
whereof shall then be in rebellion against the United States, shall 
be then, thenceforward, and for ever free? it became quite clear
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that slavery could not toe ignored as an issue in the struggle.
Undoubtedly the ultimate influence of this move in Great 
Britain was immense,but at the time of publication it was received 
with scorn and derision. The 'Times 1 on October 7th characterized 
the Proclamation as "a very sad document" which the South would reply 
to "with a hiss of scorm". As an act of policy it condemned it as 
being "if possible more contemptible than it is wicked". The Morning
r*
Herald said that it was ^an act of high handed usurpation" with "no 
legal forc« whatever ". The'Post remarked, "It is scarcely possible 
t© treat seriously of this singular manifesto. If not genuine, the 
composition would be entitled to no little praise as a piece of 
matchless irony". The ^Standard" pronounced the whole thing a "Sham 0
intended "to deceive England & Europe" - "the wretched makeshift
'u ' 
tf a pettifogging lawyer". Even the Hews which was usually kindly
disposed towards the North pronounced the step thus taken "feeble 
and halting".
I consider this attitude can be explained by the fact that
-I
Englishmen regarded the Proclamation as an incitement to insurrection 
and that they absolutely dreaded the horrors which the negroes might 
commit against their owners in the Southern States. In support of 
this view I quote from the speeches of Mr Lindsay M.P. and of Mr 
Peacocks M.P. The former stated that "Instead of being a humane 
proclamation, it was, in fact, a specimen of the most horrible 
barbarity and a more terrible proclamation than had ever been 
issued in any part of the world". The latter declared that if the 
Proclamation was worth anything more than the Paper on which it was 
inscribed, and if the four millions of blacks were really to be 
emancipated on January 1st, then we should be prepared to witness"a 
carnage so bloody that even the horrors of the Jacqutrie and the
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Massacres of Cawnpore would wax pale in comparison". He concluded
Te-fl«h
that when we replied that it was merely a vindictive measure of 
spite and retaliation upon nine millions of whites struggling for 
their independence, it was one of the most devilishaots of fiendish 
maligaity which the wickedness of man could ever have achieved.
Even the friends of the North doubted the wisdom of the act. 
On October 20th, the Duchess of Argyll wrote Sumner that "In England 
there are great misgivings about the effect of the Proclamation—— 
it is difficult not to tremble". But many friends of the North 
reserved their judgement and waited patiently for January 1st. 
Meantime the feeling of the country was changing. On December 6th 
John Bright wrote as follows to Sumner :- "The anti-slavery sentiment
•4
here has been more called forth of late, and I am confident that 
every day the supporters of the South among us find themselves in 
greater difficulty owing to the course taken by your government in 
reference to the negro question——The Proclamation like everything 
else you have done, has been misrepresented, but it has had a large 
effect here and men are looking with great interest to the first of 
January and hoping that the President may be firm".
The comment of the Spectator on this message is interesting. 
"The mills of God grind slowly", but when an American President can 
take and express that view of the great national offence, then> 
surely, amidst all our impatient doubts, the world is not moving
back ".
Motley's views on the subject expressed in a letter to
Holmes, as early as February 26th 1862, are also interesting :- "I aa 
say, then, that one great danger comes from the chance of foreign 
intervention. What will prevent that ?
"Our utterly defeating the Confederates in some 
great and oonoluelve battle; or,
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''Our possession of the cotton ports and opening them 
to European trade; or
"A most unequivocal policy of slave emancipation. 
"The last measure is to my mind the most important. The South has, 
by going to war with the United States Government, thrust into our 
hands against our will, the invincible weapon which constitutional 
reasons had hitherto forbidden us to employ. At the same time it 
has given us the power to remedy a great wrong to four millions of 
the human race, in which we had"hitherto been obliged to acquiesce. 
We are threatened with national annihilation and defied to use the 
only means of national preservation.
"The question is distinctly proposed to us, Shall slavery 
die, or the great Republic ? *
On December 51st a great public meeting was held in London^ 
and in a resolution it hailed "the dawn of the new year as the 
beginning of an epoch of universal freedom upon the Western 
continent". The same night ; meetings were also held at Sheffield and 
Manchester, and profound sympathy with the United States was expressed 
At the meeting im Sheffield it was even resolved "that it is the 
duty of Eagland to give her sympathy and moral influence to the 
Northern States". Eleven days later another assemblage in the same 
city prayed "that the rebellion may be crushed and its wicked object
defeated".
On January 16th a deputation from the Emancipation Society
called on Mr Adams, expressing their satisfaction with the 
proclamation,and congratulating the President on the stand which he 
had taken. "Adams, the following day, was able to write in his diary 
that "it is clear that the current is now setting strongly with us 
among the body of the people. This may be quite useful on the 
approach of the session of Parliament".
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The following Sunday, Spurgeon, the most popular
Uoncomformist preacher of the day, "before a congregation of thousands 
prayed as follows :- "flow oh! God, we turn our thoughts across the 
sea to the dreadful conflict of which we knew not what to say; "but 
aow the voice of freedom shows where is right. We pray thee give 
success to this glorious proclamation of liberty, which comes to us 
from across the waters. We had feared our "brethren were not in 
earnest and would not come to this——God "bless and strengthen the 
florth. Give victory to their arms and a speedy end to fearful strife- 
—Sow that we know their cause, we can exclaim,"God speed them"!' 
And the immense congregation interposed in the midst of the prayer 
with a fervent 'Amen 1 .
On January 29th, a meeting was held in Exeter Hall, and it was 
reported that it was one of the most extraordinary ever held in 
London and that it was the most earnest demonstration made in London
*
since the days of the Anti-Oorn law league. The crowd was so vast 
that an overflow meeting was held in a lower room and another in 
the open air. The mention of Jefferson Davis brought out 
manifestations of dislike, while the name of Lincoln was greeted 
with eheers. On the same day public meetings in favour of the 
North were also held at Stroud & Bradford and addresses expressing 
good-will began to psur into the American Legation.
.. "\ * - *f
Such meetings, naturally, clearly showed the sentiment of
- f
the middle classes and proved to the government that, in spite of 
the poverty and misery caused in Lancashire by the cotton famine, 
intervention would not be tolerated.
With reference to the trend of popular sentiment, Adams 
wrote as follows :- "It will not change the temper of the higher 
classes, but it will do something to moderate it", and when on
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February 3rd, the delegation from Exeter Hall called to present the 
address,Adams wrote that there was no mistaking their tone of strong 
and hearty sympathy. "I think « he continued, "there can be little 
doubt that the popular current now sets in our favour. They left me 
with hearty shakes of the hand, that marked the existence of an 
active feeling at bottom. It was not the lukewarmness and 
indifference of th« aristocracy, but the genuine English heartiness
of good will".
It must not be imagined, however, that all classes now
sympathised with the North. On the contrary the greater part of the 
aristocracy, a certain portion of the press, and some public men/ stilj, 
held aloof* The paper which was supposed to represent the views of 
the Prime Minister, (The Morning Post), referred to the Exeter Hall 
meeting as "a great disgrace to the Christian religion and an 
egregious blunder as a step towards emancipation". The Times stated 
that not one man whose opinion the country would listen to on any 
political subject, not one statesman or representative of the Peerage
was present. Even Lord Russell, in a despatch to Ijyons on January
• 
17th had condemned the Proclamation by stating that it made slavery
at once legal and illegal. He also intimated that its object was 
not total and impartial freedom for the slave, but vengeance on the 
slave owner. Even on March 26th, Adams wrote to Seward that four- 
fifths of the House of Lords, were no well wishers to anything
American, and from a letter Mason wrote to Benjamin, the Confederate
4 
secretary of State, we gather that "5 of the Commons sympathised with
the South•We are forced to ask them why Great Britain did not intervene.
I think the reason is to be found in the fact that the people and 
government realised that intervention meant war, and Great Britain 
earnestly wished to avoid war at this time. Not even from
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Lancashire, the district affected by the cotton famine, was there 
a cry for intervention, and in spite of a certain amount of Southern 
sympathy, men knew that the true policy of this country was to 
observe a strict and undeviating neutrality. The general community 
undoubtedly was averse to intervention/ and the foremost statesmen 
were pledged to that policy, no matter what were their private 
wishes and sympathies. Hot even from the manufacturers, whose 
Interests depended on the cessation of the struggle, did there come 
a protest against the Government's policy.
Yet it must not be thought that because we did not want war, 
that we were afraid of it. On the contrary the Trent case showed 
that Great Britain was quite prepared to defend her rights;but, and 
this seems to me to be an important point - she had now realised 
that she had no right to interfere in American affairs, for the
struggle was purely domestic and consequently only offended the
contending parties.
Another reason why the Government adhered to the policy of
non-intervention is to be found in a letter of Gobden to Sumner, 
describing the gathering at Exeter Hall. That Meeting has had a 
powerful effect on our newspapers and politicians J1 he wrote. 'It 
has closed the mouths of those who have been advocating the side 
of the South. And I now write to assure you that any unfriendly 
act on the part of our government - no matter which of our 
aristocratic parties is in power - towards your cause,is not to 
apprehended. If an attempt were made by the government in any way 
to commit us to the South, a spirit would be instantly aroused 
which would drive that government from power".
In spite of this, there existed at this time, certain 
features which we are now obliged to regret. Lord Salisbury,(then 
Sir Robert Cecil), expressed friendship for the South as a good
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customer of ours and antagonism for the North as a rival in our
business. «Win the battles and we Tories shall come round at once"
t
he told a Northern lady. Apart from politicians It seems that 
only two Englishmen of the first rank - Tennyson and Darwin - cared 
from their hearts for the North. Carlyle stated that no war which 
had been waged in his time had seemed more profoundly foolish 
looking", and a contribution of his which appeared a little later 
in Macmillan's Magazine was insulting to both parties. Dickens, too, 
in his letters, shows a hatred of the Northern States,and he stated 
that the opinion, which some people held, that the North would 
ultimately triumph, would prove a "harmless" hallucination".
The opening of Parliament on February 5th was now being 
anxiously awaited. On January 20th, Bright wrote to Sumner as 
follows :- "you will see what meetings are being held here in 
favour of your emancipation policy and of the North in general. 
I think in every town in the kingdom, a public meeting would 'go* 
by an overwhelming majority in favour of President Lincoln and the 
North. I hope what is doing may have an effect on our Cabinet 
and on Parliament which meets on the 5th of February".
When we compare the above with a letter which the Solicitor 
General, Sir Roundell Palmer, wrote on January 8th I think it is 
quite clear that the effect of such popular meetings was not 
neglected. "The bearing'of the upper classes ^ Conservatives and 
Liberals alike)," wrote Palmer, "to the side of the South is so 
strong, that, but for the apparently opposite bearing of the 
intelligently industrial population, there would be some danger of 
the Government being driven, or drifting of its own accord, into 
the enormous mistake (as I think it would be) of a premature 
recognition of the South. For such a step there could not, I
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"believe, be found anything like a precedent in the whole range of 
modern history, except the recognition of the United States them­ 
selves "by Prance, which was treated "by us very justly as equivalent 
to a Declaration of Wart and if we were to do the same" thing now, 
the United States would certainly view the act in the same light 
and would resent it accordingly".
On February 5th, the Royal Speech was delivered from the 
throne by the Lord Chancellor. It contained these momentous words:-
 
"Her Majesty has abstained from taking any step with a view to 
induce a cessation of the conflict between the contending parties 
in the Uorth American States, because it has not yet seemed to 
Her Majesty that any such overtures could be attended with a 
probability of success "• Then came a reference to the cotton 
famine :- "Her Majesty has viewed with the deepest concern the 
desolating warfare which still rages in these regions; and she has 
witnessed with heartfelt grief the severe distress and suffering 
which that war has inflicted upon a large class of Her Majesty»s 
subjects, but which have been borne by them with noble fortitude
and with exemplary resignation. It is some consolation to Her 
Majesty to be led to hop* that this suffering and this distress 
are rather diminishing than increasing, and that some revival 
of employment is beginning to take place in the manufacturing
districts".
This speech must have given satisfaction to all friends of
the Bforth. They had feared and somewhat naturally, that the 
distress occasioned in Lancashire by want of cotton, would force 
the Government to intervene and break the blockade. Now, however, 
they are told that the crisis of suffering and want has passed, and«
that there is no intention of interference.
Lord Dudley's remarks in answer to the address showed a
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partiality towards the North. He stated that an effort which had 
"been made to induce Her Majesty's government to intervene and put 
down the war in America, had "been rightfully rejected "by them, 
inasmuch as any such proposition must have fallen to the ground, 
looking at the temper in which the combatants were at the time, and 
in which they still continued, in regard to this country. He 
concluded that if there was one "bright spot in America, it was 
that amidst all her troubles, she had not forgotten to dispense 
her charity amongst the sufferers in Lancashire. This was a 
reference to the food ships which the Federals had sent to Liverpool 
to help to alleviate the prevailing distress.
Lord Granard seconded the address "by stating that however 
much the members of the House of Lords might deplore the war which 
had so materially affected us, and however we might hope for a 
epeady cessation of hostilities, he hoped that all would agree in
the prudence which dictated the government's policy of non-
-H
intervention. This opinion was that intervention would only have
produced intense irritation among the American people, that it 
might have given rise to unpleasant complications,and that it 
certainly would have had no effect in terminating the war.
Even Lord Derby, the leader of the Opposition, expressed 
his approval of the policy of non-intervention, although he
-. f
regretted that we had not joined Prance in an offer of mediation. 
He definitely stated, however, that he could not bring himself to 
the conclusion that the time had arrived when it would be wise, 
politic, or even legitimate,to recognise the South, but at the 
same time he considered that there was no possibility of the Union 
between Berth v and South being re-established.
Russell's reply which vindicated the Government's refusal
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of Louis Napolean's proposal of intervention, was remarkable for 
its strong Northern tone. He stated that there were two kinds of 
recognition. One kind consisted in giving aid to a power against 
its adversary and he did not believe that anybody in England desired
a forcible intervention of this kind. The second kind of
/ 
recognition took place under other circumstances; namely, when it
became obvious that one of the parties was exhausted. He continues 
as follows :- "The American struggle has not nearly reached that 
state of things.  Therefore, nothing could be more unwise than at 
present to have recourse to the plan recommended. One thing might 
be the result of this struggle, namely, the subjugation of the 
south by the north, and in that event, the union might be re-formed. 
If feelings of attachment could be revived  no one would rejoice
i~i
more than myself. If, on the other hand, the north were to fail 
and separation were finally decreed by events, I should be glad to 
see peace established on those terms. But there would be one event 
which would be a calamity to the world ; and more especially to the 
negro race, and that would be the subjugation of the north by the 
south.  -I hope that whatever may be the end of this contest, 
such may not be the result".
The same general approval of the Government's policy was 
also expressed in the House of Commons. Mr Disraeli, the leader 
of the opposition,stated that it seemed to him that the course 
upon which Her Majesty's Government had resolved was one which was 
honourable to this country and would prove beneficial to all 
classes of the community.
Meanwhile the months of February and March witnessed 
meetings similar to tha.t held in Exeter Hall;and practically the same 
resolutions expressing absolute approval of the President's action^
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and hopes that the North would succeed in their efforts, were 
adopted. There were gatherings in Leeds, Bath, Edinburgh, Paisley 
Carlisle, Birmingham, Manchester, Liverpool, South Wales, and 
other places. Adams wrote home to Seward that the current of 
popular sentiment flowed with little abatement of strength, "but
^
that he took no part whatever in promoting such movements, for he 
was well convinced that the smallest suspicion of his agency would 
do more harm than good. But in spite of this awakening of 
anti-slavery sentiment the next few months were extremely critical, 
on several occasions it seemed as if war must ensue. The reasons 
for this will "be seen in the next chapter.
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CHAPTER 2 THE FLORIDA. THB ALABAm. THB ALEEA3SDRA AND THE RAMS. 
THE CRITICAL MOHTHS - RBASOffS BOR THIS*
We must now consider the efforts of the emissaries of the 
Southern Confederacy in Great Britain, and we shall find that their 
policy caused considerable friction "between the Federal and British 
governments. Yet, in spite of this, we shall see how Southern 
hatred of Great Britain became worse and worse,and how finally 
all attempts at diplomatic intercourse were given up.
We have already seen how, during 1861, lord Russell 
declined to enter into any official correspondence with Messrs 
Yanoey, Host and Mann. The efforts it Mason, too, on "behalf of 
the South, were just as unsuccessful, although Lord Russell granted 
him an unofficial interview shortly after his arrival in England.
^WVM£ V*
During this interviewfee;oontended that the Confederacy had been in 
complete and successful operation as a Government for nearly 18 
months, that it had proved itself capable of defence against every 
attempt to subdue or destroy it,and that it had shown itself to be 
a united people, determined to maintain the independence it had, 
affirmed. Russell's reply was that the Government could not alter 
the policy which had been adopted.
In July again, Mason was urging his cause and saying that 
the South would welcome the offer of mediation. Russell's answer 
was that any proposal to the United States to recognise the South 
would irritate the United States and that any proposal to the 
Confederates to return to the Union would irritate them. Therefore, 
th« British Government could do nothing. But Mason was not inclined 
to despair. On July 24th his reply was that the resources, strength 
and power in th« Confederate States was more developed than
Previously, and that the proof which had been given of their
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resources entitled it to a place amongst the independent nations 
of the earth. Under no circumstances could the Union be restored ; 
and the question of recognising the Confederacy was but a matter of 
time. On August 1st he again wrote as follows :- If it is true, 
as one assumes, that the separation is final} then the failure of 
Great Britain to recognise the fact formally, gives an opposite 
"belief and must therefore prolong the contest. It is impossible 
for the Government of the United States to restore the Union, and 
yet, "because, foreign powers fail to recognise this, the North will 
not concede Southern independence. To withold thebreoognition of 
the South as an independent nation, encourages the continuance of 
a war hopeless in its object and ruinous to the parties engaged 
and to the prosperity and welfare of Europe" Russell's reply of 
August 2nd was quite definite and gave no sign of the crisis which 
was to arise a few months later. "Upon the question of the right 
of the South to withfraw from the Union"r he wrote, 'tter Majesty's 
Government have never presumed to form a Judgment and must decline
4- ^"
the responsibility of assuming to be judges in such a controversy. 
You say that under no circumstances can the Union be restored, but 
on the other hand, the Secretary of State for the North, affirms 
in an official despatch that a large portion of the once 
disaffected population has been restored to the Union, and that 
the Southern Confederacy owes its main strength to its hope of 
assistance from Europe. Placed between allegations so contradictory 
Her Majesty's Government are still determined to wait. In order to 
be entitled to a place amongst the independent nations of the 
earth, a state ought to i« have not only strength and resources 
for a time, but Bhe ought to afford promise of stabilityjand 
permanence. Should the Confederate States of America win that
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place amongst natione.it might be right for other nations Justly 
to acknowledge an independence achieved by victory and maintained 
by a successful resistance to all attempts to overthrow it. That 
time, however, was not in the Judgement of Her Majesty's Government
yet arrived".
But the efforts of Captain James H. Bullock, the naval
ageat in Europe of the Confederacy, were better rewarded. The 
Confederacy had begun the struggle without a navy, but it was quite 
well aware that it must provide itself with ships as quickly as 
possible. And so long as ships were obtained, it mattered little 
where they were built,or what breaches of neutrality were committed.
On June 4th 1861, Captain Bullock reached Liverpool direct 
from Montgomery, and loyally began to work to carry out his orders', 
and within a month of his arrival the keel of the Florida, one of 
the privateers which was to plunder and destroy American commerce, 
and consequently cause friction between Britain and the North,was 
laid at Liverpool. But the American consul at Liverpool, a certain 
Mr Dudley, was an extraordinarily efficient man ; and partly from 
the current rumours of the town and partly from the fact that 
Captain Bullock was known as the accredited agent of the Southern 
States, he became suspicious that the steam gunboat Oreto (or 
Florida as she afterwards became) was destined for the use of the 
Confederacy. He at once notified Adams, who, upon the information 
received, informed Russell on February 18th 1862, that an armed 
steamer was preparing to'sail from Liverpool to make war against
the United States. ^ _. _ Russell ordered the Commissioners of Customs at Liverpool
to investigate the matter, and on their authority on February 26th 
he was able to inform Adams that the Oreto was being built for the 
purpose of trade with Sicily, and that she was not fitted for the
reception of guns. Special directions, however, were given to the 
officers at Liverpool to watch the vessel.
On March 22nd, Dudley wrote to Mams saying that the Ore to 
was still in the river, but that he had "been told by some of the 
crew of the American steamer, Annie Childs, that she was destined 
for the Southern Confederacy. They also stated that they had 
discovered from the Southern officers on board the Annie Childs 
during the voyage,that several other vessels were being built in 
England for the South.
This information was transmitted to Lord Russell and Adams 
again proclaimed his belief that the Oreto was intended to be a 
Southern warship and that any pretence of commerce with Sicily had 
been long abandoned.
Russell's reply of April 8th was an enclosure of a report 
respecting the Oreto, which he had received from the board of 
customs. This enclosure stated that the Oreto had sailed on March 
22nd having cleared for Palermo and Jamaica. Her crew consisted 
of 52 men, all British except 3 or 4, and of these only one was
an American.
The customs officers also stated that she carried no
gunpowder and not even a signal gun.
Still Adams was not satisfied,and on April 15th, during a 
personal interview with Russell,he told him that the fact of the 
true destination of the vessel was notorious all over Liverpool 
and that no commercial people were blind to it and that the course 
taken by Her Majesty's officers in declaring ignorance led to an 
inference that British Neutrality was unfavoprable to the North. 
Russell expressed his regret but did not see how the government 
oould change its position.
On June 23rd, however, Adams wrote that he had the strongest
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reason for believing that the Oreto had sailed direct for ffassan 
and that she had there "been engaged in completing her armament, 
provisioning, and crew, for the object of making war upon the 
United States. And as a matter of fact,this is what had happened. 
The Oreto was destined for a Southern warship and Adams's suspicions 
were quite correct. At Nassan, the ship was seized by the British 
authorities on the protest of the United States consul, but she 
was afterwards released,and she took on board Semmefc, her destined 
commander. Then under the British naval flag she entered Mobile, 
finally leaving that port under the name of the Plorida, to begin 
her career of devastation.
The question arises as to how far the British Government 
are to be considered blameworthy. The Foreign Enlistment Act states 
that none of Her Majesty's subjects were to fit out vessels for 
warlike purposes in Her Majesty's dominions and that the armament 
of ships of war was not to be increased in British ports. It is, of 
course, apparent that this is extremely unsatisfactory. Nothing 
is said which may prohibit a warship from being built in a British 
port provided that she does not receive her armament in British 
dominions. Of course, it would also be difficult to prove that 
any ship was being built for warlike purposes. The Confederate 
agents were well aware of the deficiencies of the act and naturally 
made the most of them. On their behalf, the Act was examined by 
counsel and its provisions riddled. Undoubtedly the Act was 
designed to prevent any belligerent from obtaining ships for use 
against a power friendly to Great Britain, but from the actual words, 
counsel saw nothing in the act which made illegal the building of 
warships in one port and the purchase of arms and munitions to 
equip the vessel in another, provided that the two deeds were kept
 eparate. If they afterwards coalesced and the result was a
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man-of-war, ready equipped for service, still there was nothing 
illegal, if the result were brought about more than one marine 
league from the British coast. Naturally, it will be seen that 
this interpritation (although it was in keeping with the letter of 
the Act) rendered the Foreign Enlistment Act^null and void.
Consaquently, the British Government must be condemned 
because it did not take sufficient care to see that the spirit of 
the Act was kept. Yet we must remember that proof that any vessel 
was intended for warlike purposes was very difficult to obtain. 
With regard to the Florida; Russell, even after her escape, received 
statements from the collector, *the surveyor, and the examining 
officer at Liverpool* that she left that port entirely unarmed. 
Even the pilot testified to the same. Consequently one must agree 
that the difficulties of obtaining definite information were great 
and there was no law which forbade a ship from being constructed 
in a British port for the purpose of peaceful commerce, and until 
it was proved that "peaceful commerce" was not intended,the 
Government was not justified in seizing a suspected vessel.
But a really sincere and diligent inquiry on the part of 
the authorities at Liverpool would have probably disclosed the true 
character of the vessel and the Government is to be condemned for 
its negligence in not ordering a sufficiently careful investigation-
We must now consider a case of evasion of the Foreign 
Enlistment Act which is more famous than that of the Florida - 
namely, that of the'290* or the Alabama. On August 1st 1861, 
Bullock made a contract with Messrs Laird, large Liverpool 
shipwrights, for the construction of this ship, and she was 
launched on May 13th 1862. It is noteworthy that one of the Lairds 
had already made himself conspicious in Parliament by his advocacy
of the Southern cause,and those in charge of the vessel, encouraged
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by the action of the Government in case ofjthe Creto f made no 
special effort to disguise the purpose and object for which the 
"290" was being "built.
Again Mr Dudley wrote to Adams that a "teore powerful war
•••i
steamer" than the Florida was "being constructed at Liverpool, and 
that it was believed that she was destined for the use of the 
Confederacy. As early as June 25rd we find Adams informing Russell 
of these facts, and he asked him to take action, either to stop 
the projected expedition or to establish the fact that the ship was not 
intended for a purpose inimical to the United States. Russell 
immediately referred the matter to the commissioners of customs, 
and the collectors at Liverpoo^replied that the fitting out of the 
vessel had not escaped the notic« of the officers of the revenue, 
but that nothing had come to light which appeared to demand a 
special report. They also stated, however, that there was no 
attempt on the part of her builders to disguise what was most 
apparent - namely, that she was intended for a ship of war, that 
she had several powder canisters on board, but neither guns nor 
carriages and that the current report was that she was intended for 
a foreign government, but there was no reliable information as to 
her destination after she had left Liverpool. This information was 
submitted by the Commissioners of Customs in London to their 
solicitor, and he reported that in his opinion there was not 
sufficient ground to order the detention of the vessel-
The 1 Commissioners then reported these facts to Russell and
also stated that before the vessel could be detained, the United•«. 
States consul at Liverpool must lay sufficient evidence before the
Collector at that port to warrant her detention, but a promise was 
given that the officers at Liverpool should watch the vessel 
strictly and report at once any further information which they
might obtain.
Dudley was indefatigable in collecting the evidence
required, and on July 9th he was able to send a letter to the 
collector showing beyond doubt that the vessel was destined for the 
Southern Confederacy. Much of the evidence, however, would not 
have been accepted in a court of law, and the collector and 
Commissioners of Customs were well aware of this, so on July 15th 
they still insisted that there was not sufficient proof to justify 
her seizure. In their hearts, however, they must have been 
convinced of the real destination of the vessel and we are bound 
to admit, therefore, that they wished the "290" to get away.
But Adams did not relax his efforts to prevent the vessel 
from sailing. On July 17th he ordered Dudley to employ a solicitor 
and secure affidavits to submit to the collector. By the 21st this 
was done* Six affidavits were submitted to the collector and amongst 
these,a certain William Passmore, a mariner of Birkenhead, swore 
that Captain Butcher, who was engaging men for service on the vessel 
in questio^had told him that the vessel was going out to the 
Government of the Confederate States. He continued as follows :- 
TEhe said vessel is a screw steamer——built and fitted up for a 
fighting ship in all respects. She has a magazine, and shot and 
canister racks on deck,and is pierced for guns, the socket for the 
bolts of which are laid down.——There are now about thirty hands 
on board her, who have been engaged to go out in her. Most of these 
are men niio have previously served on board fighting ships and one 
one of them is a man who served on board the Confederate steamer 
Sumter. It is well known by the hands on board that the vessel is 
going out as a privateer for the Confederate Government to act 
against the United States.
The originals of these affidavits were sent to the Collector
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and copies were also transmitted to Russell. The Board of Customs, 
acting under the advice of their Solicitor, even after a 
consideration of this testimony,.to" sanction the detention of the 
vessel as there was not sufficient evidence. Mr Dudley then 
obtained two additional affidavits,and Adams submitted the whole 
case to R.P.Collier, an eniment Queen's Counsel. His opinion was 
that the collector would he Justified in detaining the vessel. 
"It appears difficult" he wrote, "to make out a stronger case of 
infringement of the Foreign Enlistment Act, which if not enforced 
on tiiis occasion, is little better than a dead letter* It well 
deserves* consideration whether, if the vessel "be allowed to escape, 
the Federal government would not have serious grounds of
remonstrance".
On July 23rd this opinion went to the collector at Liverpool
and a copy was also sent to Russell. The collector still refused 
to act and referred the matter to his superiors, the Commissioners 
of Customs. Still the latter held that there was not sufficient 
evidence, but both the Foreign Office and the Customs, authorities
x
sent the documents which they had received to the law officers of
•
the Crown. Unfortunately, Sir John Harding, the Queens advocate, 
to whom they were first submitted, was suffering at the time from a 
mental breakdown and this fact was not known. Consequently, the 
papers lay untouched at his private house for several dayTs and in 
the meantime, the Alabama was being prepared for sea with all speed-
But on July 28th the papers came into the hands of the 
Attorney-General and the Solicitor General. The following day they 
recommended that the vessel should be stopped without loss of time. 
This order was at once telegraphed to Liverpoo^ but it was too late> 
for th« "290" had left Liverpool that morning under the pretence
of a trial ship. The Federal warship, the Tttscarora, which was
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lying in wait for her, was successfully evaded, and she proceeded to 
Terceira in the Azores and anchored in Portuguese waters* There
c
she was Joined by the Agrippina, a* barque which had sailed from 
London with a cargo of arms. While the"290*was completing her 
armament, another English vessel, the "Bahiama", arrived from 
Liverpool, bringing the man who was to command the 290 - a 
Confederate Captain called Semme* - his staff, the rest of the 
crew, and additional stores and arms. When the transfer of the cargo 
was concluded, Semmeii took command, hoisted the Confederate flag 
at the mast head, and christened the steamer the 'Alabama 1 .
In spite of all the efforts of Adams and Dudley, therefore, 
the vessel had escaped. Upon whom must the blame be laid? To a 
certain extent Russell is guilty of negligence and indecision, but 
this is the only charge which can be brought against him. As soon 
as he knew that the law officers had decided that the vessel should 
be detained, he sent orders to Liverpool commanding that this 
should be done,and after the escape he also despatched instructions 
to Ireland and the Bahamas to detain the vessel if she should put 
into Queenstown or Nassau. The gossip which was current in London 
at the end of 1862, stat'el that the warning which had been given to 
Bullock on July 26th^?that it would not be safe to leave the ship 
at Liverpool another 48 hours) came from Lord Russell must be 
regarded as absolutely untrue. Cobden, who was no friend of 
Russell*si wrote to Sumner early in 1862 that Russell was genuine 
in his desire to prevent the escape of the Alabama and that he had 
been tricked: Adams also tells us in his diary that Russell told 
him that he regretted the escape of the Alabama and that the case 
was a scandal and in some degree a reproach to our laws. Even at 
Geneva, Adams said as follows :- "I am far from drawing any
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inferences to the effect that he (Earl Russell) was actuated in any 
way by motives of ill will to the United States,or, indeed by 
unworthy motives of any kind. If I were permitted to Judge from 
a calm comparison of the relative weight of his various opinions 
with his action in different contingencies, I should be led rather 
to infer a balance of goodwill than of hostility to the United
States".
We have also the authority of Spencer Walpole for the->- in 
statement that Russell actually proposedAa cabinet meeting that
the Alabama should be detained at any British port at which she 
might touch. The following letter from the Duke of Argyll to 
Russell on December 5th 187* supports this :- "Jfou and I had a 
conversation one day about the escape of the Alabama or the Florida, 
(I forget which) and I urged on you that although she had 
fraudently escaped, when you had meant to seize her, that was no 
reason why we should not detain her if she touched at any of our 
ports. You agreed with me in this view and you drew up a despatch 
directing the Colonial authorities to detain her if she came into 
their power. If this order had gone forth, one great plea of the 
American should never have been urged against us, and the American 
claims would perhaps have never been made at all. But what 
happened? When you brought it before the Cabinet, there was a 
perfect insurrection. Everybody but you and I were against the 
proposed step. Bethell (the Lord Chancellor) was vehement against 
its legality and you gave it up".
Mozleyi a regular writer for the •Times 1 , in his 
•Reminiscences• says that there was not one of Her Majesty's 
ministers n*io was not ready to Jump out of his skin for Joy when 
he heard of the escape of the Alabama. The above statements show 
that this view is untrue as regards Russel and Argyll, and we may
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•be quite certain that Sir George Lewis and Milner Gibson, two 
steadfast friends of the North, also regretted the escape.
Mr Price Edwards, the collector at the port of Liverpool 
has also "been severely criticised,and it has been stated that it 
was he who gave Bullock the warning of the '<£6th. There is, however, 
no evidence of this,and Edwards was probably an honest and well 
meaning man, who was afraid to assume any official responsibility 
without definite orders from the Commissioners of Customs. "Whether 
he deliberately shut his eyes to the real facts of the case,it is 
of course impossible to discover.
But I certainly think that the Commissioners of Customs and 
their solicitor must be blamed, for with evidence before them which 
morally , if not legally, justified them in detaining the vessel, 
they abstained from action. Besides, why did they not formally 
require an answer from the Lairds respecting the real destination 
of the vessel^and thus setjall doubts at rest?
Pord Rhodes states that it is doubtlessly true that the 
ship builders and ship owners of Liverpool and other ports,exulted 
in the escape of the Alabama, for the prospect that she would destroy 
the shipping of England's greatest rival on the sea gave them joy. 
He also thinks that certain members of the House of Commons shared 
these feelings and that probably the same ideas entered the minds 
of certain members of the Cabinet. Yet no man can help his secret 
thoughts and so long as one f s wishes and sympathies do not interfere 
with one's policy they can be disregarded', and I am quite certain 
that although the negligence which allowed the Alabama to sail can 
never be denied yet I am also convinced that the British Government 
were not at this fcime actuated by unfriendly feelings. They were 
criminally negligent but they were not hostile. I consider that
this is proved by the fact that when Palmer and Atherton stated
(131)
that the Alabama should "be detained, orders were at onoe given that 
this should be done. The illness of Sir John Harding was also
•
extremely unfortunate. Probably if the papers concerning the case 
had been examined at once the Alabama would never have escaped and 
one serious cause of friction would have been avoided.
Eord Rhodes considers that the aotion of Britain was 
unfriendly. I must confess that I cannot see this. The Government 
certainly neglected to use due diligence for the fulfilment of its 
duties as a neutral and its procrastination was fatal, but the sin 
was one of omission and not one of hostility or unfriendliness. 
Pord Rhodes, too, considers that the fault was one of omission and 
he thus seems to me to contradict himself.
It is, of course, much to be regretted that the British 
Government did not take more decisive measures to prevent the 
building and equipment of similar vessels. That this was not done 
we learn from Adams*s despatches to Russell. On September 30th, 
for instance, he wrote to Russell that he had reasons to believe 
that other enterpriser of a kind, similar to that of the Alabama, 
were in progress in British ports. Russell's reply of October 4th 
was curt and unsatisfactory, for he said that as much as Her 
Majesty's Government desired to prevent such concurrencies,they 
were unable to go beyond the law, municipal and international. 
It must be remembered that it was Just at this time that the mediation 
project was being put forward and this probably accounts for the 
nature of the reply. Again on October 16th, Russell showed no 
desire of amending the existing state of things. "I have to remark 
that it is true the foreign enlistment act, or any other act for the 
same purpose, can be evaded by very subtle contrivances, but Her 
Majesty's government cannot on that account go beyond the letter of 
the existing law':
Consequently, on the same day, Adams reported to the State 
Department at Washington that it was very clear that no disposition 
existed in Great Britain to apply the powers of the Government to 
the investigation of the acts complained of, and that the main 
object of the United States must "be to make a record which might 
be of use at some future day. This is the first hint we get of 
the correspondence which is to follow with regard to the depredations 
of the Confederate cruisers.
On November 20th, however, Adams,upon the instructions of 
his governmen^formally solicited redress for the national and 
private injuries thus sustained. These injuries were "by no means 
inconsiderable, for from September 6th to December 5th the Alabama 
alone had captured and destroyed 28 vessels. Adams's position was 
strengthened by the fact that in 1794 all losses caused by the 
capture of British merchandise by vessels originally fitted out in 
the ports of the United States had been referred to a commission 
and compensation granted. He stated, however, in his despatch to 
Russell, that he was quite well aware that the provisions of the 
treaty of 1794 were no longer in existence, and that if they were, 
they bound only the United States to make good the damage which had 
been done, but he could not bring himself to suppose that Her 
Majesty's flovernment, by pressing for the recognition of the 
principle when it applied for its own benefit, did not mean to be 
understood as equally ready to sustain the same principle / when it 
might be justly applied to the omission to prevent similar actions
of British subjects.
Russell's lengthy reply of December 19th defended the
position of the Government. He stated that the circumstances which 
existed in 1794 were absolutely different from those of the Alabama, 
for then the French had openly and deliberately equipped privateers"
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in American ports,and these privateers had captured British vessels 
in American waters and had taken them as prizes into American ports. 
This, of course, was a systematic disregard of international law. 
With regard to the claim for compensation now put forward by the 
American government ; he regretted that "both North and South had 
deliberately set the Queen 1 s Proclamation at nought. Arms had been 
shipped to both parties,and the government which had profited most 
by such unjustifiable practices was that of the Northern States. 
He then contended that Her Majesty's Government had just grounds of 
complaint against both of the belligerent parties, especially 
against the North, and he stated quite definitely that Great Britain 
could not be held responsible to either party for the irregular 
proceedings of British subjects. Any endeavour to make her so *-
» r
would be about as reasonable as if Her Majesty's Government were to 
demand compensation from the United States for the injuries done to 
the property of British subjects by the Alabama, on the ground that 
the United States claimed authority and jurisdiction over the 
Confederate States by whom that vessel was commissioned.
Passages from American authors of high authority were then 
quoted in support of the British position. From wheaton's 
International law he took the following :- "It is not the practice 
of nations to undertake to prohibit their own subjects from 
trafficking in articles which are contraband of war. Such trade 
is carried on at the risk of those engaged in it, under the 
liabilities and penalties prescribed by the law of nations or 
particular treatiesf and from Kent's Commentaries he stated that the 
United States had successfully shown that neutrals could lawfully 
sell at home to a belligerent purchaser or even carry to the 
belligerent contraband articles, subject of course to the right of 
atizure in transit. (134)
Russell then claimed that the Alabama had sailed not only 
without the direct authority or indirect permission of the British 
Government, "but actually in opposition to the municipal law and in 
spite of earnest efforts to prevent her.
He concludes as follows :- 'Her Majesty's Government cannot, 
therefore, admit that they are under any obligation whatever*to make 
compensation to the United States citizens on account of the 
proceedings of that vessel. As regards your demand for a more 
effective prevention for the fuhire, of the fitting out of such 
vessels in British ports, I have the honour to inform you that Her 
Majesty's Government, after consultation with the law officers of 
the crown, are of the opinion that certain amendments might be 
introduced into the foreign enlistment act, which if sanctioned "by 
Parliament would have the effect of giving greater power to the 
Executive to prevent the construction in British ports of ships 
destined for the use of "belligerents. But Her Majesty's Government 
consider that, "before submitting any proposals of that sort to 
Parliament, it would be desirable that they should previously
»
communicate with the government of the United States and ascertain 
ifaether that government is willing to make similar alterations in 
its own foreign enlistment act".
Russell's reply is exceeding skilful, but it does nob take 
into consideration the all important fa'ct that the British Government 
had been criminally negligent in allowing the Alabama to sail, and 
that the "earnest efforts" made to stop the Alabama, were rather
*
imagined than real.
Adams again showed in his reply of December 30th that the 
claim made by Great Britain in 1794 rested on exactly the same basis 
as the American claim of 1862, and he also denied that the Federal
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fovernment had made systematic attempts to violate British neutrality, 
Then he proceeded to state that British vessels were constantly 
leaving British ports laden with contraband for the purpose of 
breaking the "blockade.and that such vessels were insured by British 
merchants with the understanding that they were despatched for that 
illegal purpose. Already British property valued at £8.000.000 had 
'been captured by United States cruisers for attempting to violate
the blockade.
On January 19th Seward wrote that Russell's argument did
not satisfy the President, that redress ought not to be granted} 
and that he hoped Great Britain would reconsider the subject. Adams 
was alee authorised to enter into negotiations with regard to the 
amendment* of the Foreign Enlistment Acts of both countries.
Before Adams received this despatch, Russell on January 24th 
had replied to his letter of the 30th, and he again contended thai- Hie. 
circumstances existing in 1794 were different from those of 1862, 
because in 1794 the United States Government deliberatelyJacquiesced 
ia the fitting out of French privateers in American ports and 
allowed French ships to bring captured British prizes into American 
harbours. This, of course, was a just charge, and Adams by omitting 
any discussion of the topic in his next despatch, seems to agree 
with Russell'8 view.
But the Americans had no intention of allowing their claims 
to drop and the correspondence still continued. Seward on February 
19th wrote as follows *•- "It seems only necessary so far as that 
particular case (the Alabama) is concerned to repeat——that this 
Government does not think itself in justice to relinquish its claim 
fer redress for the injuries which have resulted from the fitting 
•ut and despatch of the Alabama in a British port.
But If the Americans had determined to press their claims,
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the British Government were equally determined not to grant them,
and en March 9th, Russell wrote to Adams that Her Majesty's
<• 1 
Government entirely disclaim^ all responsibility for any acts of the
Alabama fand they had hoped that they had already made this decision 
plain to the government of the United States.
By the end of this month matters were extremely serious. 
The correspondence of Mams and Russell re the Alabama had Just 
been published ia the London papers, and the nation as a whole was 
inclined to treat the American demand as a joke. It was known that 
other vessels were being built in British ports for the Confederate 
navy, and this fact, combined with the depredations of the Alabama 
and the refusal of Great Britain to acknowledge any responsibility) 
caused great irritation in America. Also on March 18th, a 
Confederate loan was floated in England and £5.000.000 were
fc# •*• • 'rf
subscribed the same day. Indeed,before the books were closed, 
£16.000.000 were nominally subscribed. Mason wrote to Richmond in 
high glee of the 'triumphant success of our infant credit, which 
shows in spite of all detraction and calumny that 'Cotton is King 1 
at last'. As a matter of fact his triumph was short lived, for 
within a few days the loan began to dropx and although the 
Confederate Government bought £1.500.000 worth of securities the 
Confederate credit never recovered. The money which was raised,was, 
however, destined to be spent in the building of war vessels for 
commerce destroyers, for breaking the blockade, and probably for 
attacking New York.
Adams was quite conscious that war could only be averted by 
careful diplomacy. On March 18th he wrote in his diary that 'the 
talk about the Alabama is "it is done and cannot be helped"1 Two 
days later he added, "Over all this grows a cloud,hanging darker
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and darker from this country. I now begin to fear again that the 
peace will scarcely last six months". On March iilst he wrote "My 
spirits^are also failing me a good deal as the pu'blic indications 
grow more threatening. The course of the wealthy classes is turning 
the scalt against us. They are recovering from the shock occasioned 
by the public manifestation of the popular sympathy, and are doing 
by indirection what they cannot effect directly. The only thing 
which would really'check the*, military success* does not come at
our call.
Then on March 2Jdnd he was visited by Mr Forster, and they
discussed the gravity of the situation, Mams saying that he feared 
that a collision would come unless the British ministry could be 
persuaded to act with more energy in restraining the outfits of 
ships intended for the Confederacy in British ports. He then stated 
that there would be a demand in America for the issue of letters of 
marque if these outfits continued, and that if the President allowed 
thisi the chances of a collision on the ocean would be much 
increased. He, therefore, urged Eorster to do something to make 
the British ministry alive to the nature of the difficulty.
Meanwhile in America, the struggle with regard to the issue 
of letters of marque had already begun. In February a bill had been 
introduced in the Senate to legalize the issue of letters of marque. 
On March 3rd the bill became law, and Seward wished to put it into 
effect at once. Sumner, who had already protested against the bill
*
being paseed, strongly objected to this, and in support of his views 
produced letters from John Bright and an American banker in England 
called Bates, which showed that the issue of the letter^s would 
almost certainly mean war.
A letter of Sumner to Bright, dated March 16th, is
exceedingly interesting as showing the prevailing state of feeling
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in America, just as Adams shows the sentiment of Great Britain in
his diary.
Sumner wrote as follows :- MI am anxious, very anxious, on
account of the ships building in England to cruise against our 
commerce. Cannot something be done to stop them? Our people are 
becoming more and more excited and there are many who insist upon 
war- A very important person said to me yesterday "We are now at 
war with England, but the hostilities are all on her side". Today 
the Cabinet consider whether to issue letters of marque under the 
new statute. I have seen the President twice upon this question, 
which I regard as grave, for it is intended as a counter movement 
to what is done in England. I found myself powerless against it in 
the Senate, for there was a war fever, and you know how irresistible 
and diabolical that becomes. But in England, as we saw in Chapter 
111, pages 117 & 118, Russell's attitude was extremely favourable 
to the Northland this gave Adams a ray of hope. Another speech of 
the Foreign Secretary's on March 2srd was also cheering to a certain 
extent. "I do not believe the efforts of the Federals will be 
successful. But no man can say that the war is finally over, or that 
the independance of the Southern States is recognised. It would be 
a failure of friendship on our part at th&fe moment, if we were to 
interpose and recognise the Southern States——It is our duty at 
present to stand still,and not to proceed to an act so unfriendly 
to the United States as that of the recognition of the South".
Yet Adams's hopes were soon to be extinguished. On March 
27th, in the House of Commons, Forster called the attention of the 
government to the fitting out of ships of war in British ports for 
the Confederates and made a reference to the destructive career of 
the Alabama. Sir Roundell Palmer, the Solicitor General, maintained
that the British Government had acted with diligence and promptitude
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and that it was free from "blame. Laird, whose firm had "built the
i
Alabama, declared that in the "building of that ship, "everything was 
straightforward and above board"; and in the midst of great cheering, 
he declared that he would rather he handed down to posterity as the 
man who "built the Alabama, than as such a man as Bright, who had 
deliberately set himself to cry up the. institutions of another 
country, which when tested, had proved to be of no value whatever. 
Palmerston's speech which closed the debate was anti-Pederal. He.••i'
spoke as follows :- "There is no use in concealing, there is no 
use in disguising it - that whenever any political party^whether in 
or out of officejin the United Statesx finds itself in difficulty, 
it raises a cry in England - as a means of creating what in American 
language is called political capital.---The solicitor general——has 
demonstrated that the Americans have no cause to complain——The 
British Government have done everything which the law of the countr}' 
enabled them to do——-You cannot seize a vessel under the foreign 
enlistment act, unless you have obtained evidence upon oath, 
authorizing just suspicions. We did not obtain such evidence——Tfitiat 
would happen if you seized a vessel unjustly and without good grounds: 
There is a process of law to come afterwards and the government would 
"be condemned in heavy costs and damages——Our neutrality is sincere 
and honest——Whenever it is in our power to enforce the provisions 
of that act legally and according to justice, we shall not be found 
wanting in the performance of our duty. I can only say that we 
cannot go beyond the law, which is one very difficult of execution—- 
I do trust that the people and the government of the United States 
will believe that we are doing our best in any case to execute the 
laws, but that they will not imagine that the cry raised will induce 
us to come to this house to alter the law".
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Naturally, such a speech minimi seethe effect of all thati
Lord Russell had said a few days before. The feeling in Great 
Britain was that war was meant,and the great mercantile houses in 
London "began to take precautions. Adams was quite conscious «* 
aaoinnt of the gathering storm ;and wrote in his diary that he should 
do his best to avoid hostilities. It must "be mentioned, however, 
that everybody did not unanimously agree with the position of the 
Government. The Spectator of April 4th said :- "We read the debate- 
on the Alabama question with profound humiliation——The House of 
Commons——cheered and cheered again the statements of the Prime 
Minister and Sir Roundell Palmer——Mr Laird was not ashamed to Justify
v
his infraction of the provisions of the English statute book".
In Manchester, the Union and Emancipation Society held a public
meeting to protest against the fitting out of ships for th«
Confederacy and there it was stated that no nation had ever inflicted
upon another a more flagrant or more maddening wrong than Great
Britain inflicted upon America when she allowed the Alabama to
escape.
Meanwhile still another vessel, the Georgiana, had left
Liverpool on January 22nd, in spi-te of Adams's remonstrances. In this 
case,as in that of the Alabama,very conflicting reports were sent to 
Russell. The American consul stated that there were small arms on 
board and probably rifled cannon, and that there were rings in the 
deck for the gun ropes; but on the other hand the foreman, who 
superintended the repairs of the vessel, said that she had neither, 
gun swivels nor ring bolts,and that she was so slightly built that 
if a gun were fired on board her,it would shake her from stem to 
stern. Later, however, she appeared at Nassau as an armed British 
merchant vessel! Fortunately, however, she was driven ashore and 
destroyed before she had time to begin her career of piracy, and so
Bhe cannot oe considered as a mischief maker. During the first week 
in April, however, the Japan or the Virginia, which was to become 
another famous commerce destroyer, left the Clyde, ostensibly for 
Alderney. As a matter of fact, however, she did not stop thereout 
received her armament on the high seas from the steamship Allar of
New Haven*
It was Just before the debate in Parliament of the 27th that*
Dudley informed Adams that yet another ship, the Phantom, had been 
launched at Liverpool, and that the Southerner had arrived from 
Stockton either to coal or fit out as a privateer. He was quite 
convinced that both vessels were intended for the Southern 
Confederacy but he admitted that he supposed that it would be 
impossible to obtain legal evidence against them. Adams brought the 
facts to the notice of Russell who instructed the Mayor of Liverpool 
to make inquiries. At the same time another ship, the Alexandra, 
was being fitted out for sea in the same port, and her outfit was 
being directed by the men who had been concerned in the departure 
of the Alabama.
The friends of the North now knew quite well that unless 
the British Government made some attempt to show that its neutrality 
was sincere, war was practically unavoidable', for it was now known 
that in addition to the ships mentioned above, the Lairds were at 
work on two powerful ironclad ships of war, and as Sumner wrote to 
Bright on March 30th • If these ships get to sea, our commerce is
annihilated".
Eorster* determined to do his best and visited Adams to ask
if the stopping of one vessel would do any good. "5fes, much good^ 
was Adams's reply. Consequently on April 5th Russell informed Adams 
that he had sent orders for the seizure of the Alexandra. At first 
is was reported from Liverpool that when the customs surveyor took
possession of her, she was armed with one very heavy gun and that
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another gun unmounted was found on "board. Later this was 
contradicted, and it was stated that although there was every 
appearance of fitting up for gunsi there were actually no guns on 
"board. This later statement was subsequently found to toe true. The 
evidence with regard to the actual character of the vessel was
by
overwhelming,and an information was filed «a the attorney-general 
on "behalf of Her Majesty against the ship and the "builders. On June 
22nd the trial "began. The Attorney-General showed that the vessel 
was constructed for a ship of war, that gun carriages and other 
warlike equipments were "being made for heri that her builders had 
declared that she was "being "built for the Confederacy and that the 
persons who^contracted for her and supervised her construction were 
Confederate agents* But the summing up of the Lord Chief Justice 
was in favour of the defendants. He read passages from American 
authorities which showed that a neutral power could supply a 
belligerent with munitions of war without any breach of international 
law or of the foreign enlistment act,and he asked why ships should 
not be included in the term'munitions of war*. The question, in his 
opinion, which the Jury had to consider, was whether the vessel was 
merely in course of building, to b« delivered in pursuance of a 
contract that was perfectly lawful, or whether there was any 
intention in the port of Liverpool that the vessel should be fitted 
out, equipped, furnished and armed for purposes of aggression. He 
continued as follows :- f ]irow, surely, if Birmingham or any other
\
town may supply any quantity of munitions of war of various kinds 
for the destruction of life, why object to ships—— a man may make 
a vessel and offer it for sale——The statute is not made to provide 
means of protection for belligerent powers, otherwise it would have 
been said you shall not sell powder or guns and you shall not sell
anas; and if it had done so, all Birmingham would have been in arms
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against it. The object of the statute was thiss that we should not 
have our ports in this country made the ground of hostile movements 
between the vessels of two belligerent powers which might "be fitted 
putt furnished and armed in those ports. The Alexandra was clearly 
nothing more that) in the course of building. It appears to me that 
if true "that the Alabama sailed away from Liverpool without any arms 
at all f as a mere ship in ballast, and that her armament was put on 
board at Terceira, which is not in Her Majesty's dominionsi then the 
foreign enlistment act was not violated at all——If you *tMnk the 
object really was to build a ship in obedience to an order in 
compliance with a contract, leaving those who bought it to make what
/
use their thought fit of it, then it appears to me that the foreign 
enlistment act has not been broken".
It is, of course, apparent that such reasoning is clear and 
eubtle ;but it is absolutely untrustworthy, and it renders the Foreign 
Enlistment act null and void. From the actual terms of the act
indeed, the above may possibly be deduced, but it is in absolute
H* 
defiance of*spirit which had drawn up the act in question.
The Jury, were, however convinced by the lord Chief baron's 
reasoning and gave a verdict for the defendants. Thereupon the 
attorney general gave notice of an appeal. Naturally, the American 
government were far from satisfied with the progress of the law, for 
they considered that if the rulings of the lord chief baron were to 
regulate the action of the British government, there would be no law 
In Great Britain which would be effective to preserve mutual 
relations of forbearance between Great Britain and America. Also 
enaction would be given to the fitting out of the Alabama etc: and 
the United States would be without any guarantee against the unlimite 
tqployment of capital, industry and skill by British subjects in
buildinc, arming, equipping and sending forth ships of war from
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ports to maKe war against the United States.
The following extract from Seward's despatch of July llth 
to Adams ? olearly shows the temper of the American people :- "If the 
law of Great Britain must fee left without amendment and fee construed 
by the government in conformity with the rulings of the chief fearon 
of the exchequer, then there will fee left for the United States no 
alternative feut to protect themselves and their commerce against 
armed cruisers proceeding from British ports, as against the naval 
forces of a public enemy; and also to claim and insist upon 
indemnities for the injuries which all such expeditions have 
hitherto committed or shall hereafter commit against this government 
and the citizens of the United States——Can it fee an occasion for 
either surprise or complaint, that if this condition of things is 
to remain and receive the deliberate sanction of the British 
government, the navy of the United States will receive instructions 
to pursue these enemies into the ports which thus, in violation of 
the laws of nations and the ofeligations of neutrality, "become
Intakes .
harfeours for privateo. The President very distinctly perceives the 
risks and hazards which a naval conflict thus maintained will fering 
to the commerce and even to the peace of the two countries. But he 
is ofeliged. to consider that in the case supposed the destruction 
of our commerce will profeafely amount to a naval war, waged fey a 
portion at least of the British nation, against the government and 
people of the-United States - a war tolerated, although not declared 
or avowed fey the British government. If such a partial war shall 
feecome a general one "between the two nations, the President thinks 
that the responsifeility for that painful result will not fall upon
the United States".
Dudley and Adams were now closely watching the vessels
which are usually called the Iiaird rams. The escape of the Florida
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had caused a certain amount of frictio*, which had naturally "been 
increased "by the still more flagrant case of the Alabama, the escape 
of the Virginia, and the decision with regard to the Alexandra. But 
the tension caused by the Laird rams was to become much more 
dangerous that that of any previous case; and indeed just before the 
rams were stopped, Britain and America were on the verge of war.
It was in the middle of July 1862 that the Lairds began to 
work on the rams, one of which was to be ready in March 1865 and the 
other in May. As early as November 1862, Dudley had informed Seward 
of the preparations of these ships, and he and Adams anxiously noted 
their progress. Public men in America, who still desired peace with 
Great Britain were also exceedingly disturbed. Sumner wrote in 
April that even more surely thai* in the time of the Trent, all the 
signs of war existed, and that all looked forward to action of a 
most decisive character if the ships came out.
Owing to certain unavoidable delays, the first of the rams 
was not launched until July 4th,and the other was delayed until
.*
August. Consequently all through July, Adams diligently called the 
attention of Russell to the ships and furnished him with evidence 
which showed their character and destination. Russell ordered an 
investigation, but the purpose of their construction was really a 
matter of common knowledge.
The Confederate agents considered that they must obtain the 
ships at all costs. Mr S.R.Mallory* the secretary of the Confederate 
ffavy, wrote to Slidell on March 27th that "our early possession of 
these Ships in a condition for service, is an object of such
•:
paramount importance to our country that no effort, no sacrifice, 
must be spared to accomplish it". On the other hand the naval 
officials of the United States were exceedingly alarmed lest this
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should be done. Consequently they acted in a manner which cannot 
"be defended, for they attempted to commit an action similar to that
 
for which they were claiming indemnity. Two private gentlemen of 
high character and business reputation were sent to England at the 
shortest possible notice to outbid the Confederacy; and to buy the 
ships, if possible, for the United States, and they were given ten 
million dollars worth of freshly issued government bonds for this 
purpose. "5fou must stop the rams at all hazards," wrote the assista
nt 
secretary of the navy, "as we have no defence against them. Let us
 
have them for our own purpose, without any more nonsense and at any
 
price. As to guns we have not one in the whole country fit to fire
 
at an ironclad——It is a question of life and death".
The mission, however, came to nothing,for the two emissaries
r
discovered that to "offer to buy the ironclads without success, wou
ld 
only stimulate the builders to-greater activity and even to buildin
g 
new ones in the expectation of finding a market for them from one 
party or the other".
Sheds lighted with gas had been erected over the rams, so 
that the work could be pressed on without any loss of time. But 
Captain Bullock was exceedingly anxious because of the increased 
watchfulness of British officials. He confessed himself much 
perplexed, and at one time said that he thought that the government
 
was prepared to resort to an order in council to override the 
ordinary rules of law. Yet on the other hand, the sympathies of 
Liverpool for the Confederate cause was so great, that he assured t
he 
Confederate Secretary that "no mere physical obstruction could have
 
prevented our ships getting out, partially equipped at least". As a
 
matter of fact, I considered that he overestimated the force of 
Southern sentiment in Liverpool,for from the reports received
concerning the detention of the Alexandra, it is quite clear that(147)
the seizure caused much excitement but nothing at all is said about 
any hostile demonstration- 
Russell was also a factor to "be considered and Bullock knew 
this, for we find him cPUfesbing in January 1863 that "the hope of 
getting the ships out seems more than doubtful". Yet still the work 
of construction went on, and in July this had become so notorious 
that questions were raised in the House of Commons. Palmerston was 
not inclined to think that the ahips were intended for the Confederacy 
and supported the rumour that they were meant for the Bnperor of 
Prance. Earl Cowley, the British ambassador at Paris however, after 
inquiries stated that this was not so. Then it was stated that the 
ships were intended for the viceroy of Bgypt, but this wae in turn
denied.
As a matter of fact, however, Bullock had visited Paris
early in 1863 and the ships had beeaa sold to a French firm, Messrs 
Bravay & Co, who had engaged to resell them to the Confederacy, when 
they had escaped British Jurisdiction. From the documents, which 
Adams submitted to Russell, it is quite clear that he suspected this 
transaction; and that he was well aware that some trick of getting 
the rams out under foreign papers was intended. Consequently his 
remonstrances to Russell still continued. The law officers of the 
crown had meanwhile sifted all the evidence which Russell had 
received and on their authority Russell wrote to Adams on September 
1st that the British Government had been advised that much of the 
information which had been submitted was merely hearsay and that 
there was nothing to show that the purpose of Mr Bravay was illegal. 
Consequently the Government could not interfere with the vessels. 
But a promise was given that a careful watch should be kept over 
them, and that they should be stopped if trustworthy evidence, 
showing that they were really intended for the Confederacy, could
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"be procured.
One must admit that for Russell the situation was disturbing 
in the extreme. He certainly wished to do what was right, Taut he 
was staggered "by the confident assertion of the French ownership 
of the vesselsi and "by the fact that the law was against interference,
i
If he interfered and seized the vessels without sufficient cause, 
the Government would be forced to pay heavy damages ; and naturally 
Russell wished to avoid this. The situation for all concerned was 
critical in the extreme, for now, September 3rd, there was good
>
reason to "believe that at any time, one of the rams might put to sea.
"After long wavering and hesitation" Mams wrote in his 
diary, "there are signs that the ministry will not adopt any 
preventive policy. Their moral feebleness culminates in cowardice,
which acts like the greatest daring. It precipitates a conflict.*
My duty is therefore a difficult one. Without indulging in menace, 
I must be faithful to my country in giving warning of its sense of 
injury. Nothing must be left undone that shall appear likely to 
meet the danger. To that end I addressed a note to Lord Russell at 
once". With this note of September 3rd he transmitted copies of 
further dispositions regarding the vessels, and he affirmed that there 
were no grounds for doubting that the rams were intended for the
Confederacy.
The next day, Friday September 4th f he wrote in his diary
as follows :- "A notice from Mr Dudley that the war vessel was about 
to depart, compelled me to address another and stronger note of 
solemn protest against the permission of this proceeding by the 
government. I feared, however, that it would be of little avail, and 
my prognostications proved but too true,and I received a.t 4 o'clock 
a note (Russell's of the 1st) announcing that the government could 
find no evidence upon which to proceed in stopping the vessel. This
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affected me deeply. I clearly forsee that a collision must now come 
of it. I must not, however, do anything to accelerate it; and yet 
must maintain the honour of my country with proper spirit. The 
prospect is dark for poor America. Her trials are not yet over 11 .
After a night of reflection his conclusion was that another 
note must "be sent to Russell. This was his celebrated despatch of 
September 5th. "My lord, at this moment when one of the iron clad 
vessels is on the point of departure from this kingdom, on its 
hostile errand against the United States, I am honoured *"with yours 
of the 1st instant. =*! trust I need not express how profound is my 
regret at the conclusion^which Her Majesty's Government hav« arrived. 
I can regard it no otherwise than as practically opening to the 
insurgents free liberty in this kingdom to execute a policy of 
attacking Few York, Boston and Portland, and of breaking our blockade. 
*It would be superfluous in me to saint out to your lordship that
this is war——I prefer to desist from communicating to your lordship 
even such portions of my existing instructions as are suited to the
already
case, lest I should contribute to aggravate difficulties^far too
serious".
But before Russell received this despatch^he had decided that
the vessels must be stopped. His reasons for this action are not 
hard to find. At the very end of August, Adams had visited the 
Duke of Argyll and he had told him that the situation was grave and 
critical and that his instructions were far more stringent than he 
had yet been disposed to execute. It is more than probable that 
Argyll communicated this to Russell, who consequently, not wishing 
to give America a similar cause of offence to the Alabama, ordered 
the vessels on September 3rd to be detained, "as soon as there is 
reason to believe that they are actually about to put to sea".
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It is rather curious that on the following dayi he merely 
informed Adams that the Government were seriously considering the 
matter, when really decisive action had been taken. Then on September
X
5th he ordered that the vessels "be prevented from leaving Liverpool" 
or on any other pretext until satisfactory evidence can be given 
as to their destination; and on the same day a confidential note was 
sent to Washington requesting that Seward should be told that the 
rams had been stopped. Yet it was not until September 8th that Mams 
was informed of the action which had been taken. The reasons for 
this I am quite unable to explain. Lord Derby in the House of Lords, 
on Jebruary 15th 1864,asked how it happened that having come to. the 
decision on the 3rd to stop the rams,Lord Russell wrote on the 4th 
to say the matter was under consideration. Lord Russell's answei* 
seems to me to be extremely weak. He contended that the Treasury 
were still considering the matte^ and that he had to wait for their 
answer. Yet in spite of this ? it is an undoubted fact that his 
decision was made before the answer came.
The Foreign Office now made a careful and systematic 
investigation,and discovered beyond all doubt that the ships were 
intended for the Confederacy. Neither the Government or the owners 
wished however to run the chances of a trial-and so, as the best way 
out of the difficulty, the rams were purchased by the British
Admiralty.
How grave the crisis had been; is seen by a remark in Adams's
diary. "I know not that even in the Trent case, I felt a greater 
relief. Undoubtedly if Russell had not ordered the detention of the 
vessels war would have followed. Consequently one cannot agree with 
Lord Charnwood's view that the Trent was the last cause of serious
friction. ^ ^ ^ « ^ ., Even now in spite of the seizure of the rams, a certain
amount of friction existed. The correspondence with regard to the
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Alabama claims was still continued, and a letter of Earl Russell 
dated September 14th shows a certain amount of irritation. "When 
the United States government assume to hold the government of Great 
Britain responsible for the captures made by vessels, which may be 
fitted out as vessels of war in a foreign port ; because such vessels 
were originally built in a British port, I have to observe that such 
pretensions are entirely at variance with the principles of 
international law and with the decisions of American courts of the 
highest authority; and I have only, in conclusion, to express my 
hope that you may not be instructed again to put forward claims 
which Her Majesty's government cannot admit to be founded on any 
grounds of law or justice B.
Another despatch of September 25th was still more unfriendly, 
for it stated that the British Government would not be induced by 
any intimation of hostile proceedings on the part of the United
»
States to alter the foreign enlistment act and that they would not 
shrink from the consequences of such a decision. This, of course, 
is very different from the attitude which prevailed at the end of 
1862, when the British Government was practically willing to mak« 
alterations which would give greater power to the Executive to 
prevent the construction of ships, which were to be used against 
friendly powers, in British ports. As early as February 1863, 
however, Russell had informed Adams that the Cabinet and Lord 
Chancellor had expressed the opinion-that the enlistment act was 
sufficiently effective and could not therefore be amended.
This decision seems to me to herald sufficiently well the 
months of friction and irritation which were to follow.
Seward'e despatch of October 5th also shows that America 
was prepared for war. He says as follows :- «K)ur measures of 
maritime war are intended to rgejet maritime aggression which is
constantly threatened from abroad and even more constantly 
apprehended at home——But the resistance of foreign aggression Toy 
all the means in our power, and at the hazard, if need "be, of the 
national life itself, is the one point of policy on which the 
American people seem to be unanimous and in complete harmony with the
President".
But although .America was quite ready for war, if the
outfitting of ships for the Confederacy in British ports should Toe 
continued, she was ready to make concessions to avoid it. Consequently 
in a despatch dated October 6th,Seward wrote that although the United 
States must continue to insist that Great Britain was responsible 
for the depredations of the Alabama t yet they understood the 
difficulties and embarrassments under which the British Government 
was labouring,and they therefore confessed freely that the time was 
not entirely favourable to claim and candid examination of either 
the facts or principles involved in the Alabama case. Yet Adams was 
to inform Russell that he must give him notice of any claims which 
should arise. If Russell declined to receive this evidence,Adams 
was to duly register and preserve it until a suitable occasion should 
occur for renewing the persecution of the claims". We shall see
ViaHty
later how this, was settled to the satisfaction of both countries.
Prom the above detailed account of the Alexandra and the 
laird rams, we have already seen that the months of April to October 
1863 were exceedingly critical ones. Nor was this state of things 
improved by the activities of certain members of the House of Commons 
with regard to the question of the recognition of the Southern 
Confederacy. This point must now be considered, for i£ is found 
Bide by side with the shipbuilding problem.
In Chapter TTI we saw how the crisis of recognition in 1862 
was passed with the narrowest possible margin of safety,thow at the
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opening of Parliament in 1863, the Government was congratulated 
on its policy of non-intervention, and we noticed the very different 
opinions expressed "by Lord Russell on March kiSrd and "by Lord 
Palmerston on the 27th. We must now consider the vital factor in 
the situation - namely America herself.- Her attitude was made clear 
toy resolutions which were introduced and passed through tooth Houses 
of Congress on March 3rd, acknowledging .the friendly form and 
intention of the overtures made "by foreign powers in the direction
of mediation, and saying that if the idea of mediation should
-»
continue to "be regarded as practicable it might lead to proceedings 
tending to embarrass the friendly relations "between the United States 
and foreign powers, and that to remove for the future all chance of 
misunderstanding on the subject, it seemed fit that Congress should 
declare its conviction thereon. The resolution which followed this 
introduction ; was at once a declaration of the attitude of the United 
States and a formal warning to all foreign powers that their 
intervention was not desired and would not "be entertained. Deep 
regret was expressed that the "blow aimed at the national life, had 
fallen so heavily upon the labouring population of Europe, but it 
was stated that any proposition from any*foreign power with regard 
to intervention would prolong the conflict, and cause increased 
expenditure of blood and treasure. Such an act would also be looked 
upon as unfriendly.
The resolutions also expressed the disappointment of Congress 
at the hospitality and encouragement which a rebellious government, 
founded upon slavery as its corner stone, had received from foreign 
powers and they closed with the announcement that the war would be 
vigorously prosecuted, according to the humane principals of 
Christian states, until the rebellion should be suppressed.
Copies of these resolutions were then sent to the Ministers
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of the United States in foreign countries, and by them they were 
jgonanunicated to foreign governments. But there v.ere still certain 
members of the Commons who wished to meddle in American affairs, and 
of these the two mo&t conspicuous were John Arthur Roebuck and W.S- 
Ifcindsay- Practically from the beginning of the conflict, Louis Napolesn 
had desired some form of intervention, but he could not move without 
the co-operation of the British Government and as we have already seen, 
this was refused in November 1862,.
Owing chiefly to the friction of April to November 1863, 
£oui8 Napoleon in June again revived his schemes, and towards the end 
of this month Lindsay and Roebuck visited him in Paris and received 
assurances of the most outspoken character. Consequently on June 30th, 
Mr Roebuck in the House of Commons brought forward a motion for the 
recognition of the Southern Confederacy, asking the Government to 
negotiate with France for this end. During his speech he gave an 
account of his interview with the IMperor, and of some important 
declarations made by the Emperor, who, he said, had given him permission 
to disclose the same. He stated that the Emperor spoke as follows :- 
"As soon as I learnt that the rumour of an alteration in my views was 
circulating in England, I gave instructions to my ambassador to deny 
the truth of it. Nay, more, I instructed him to say that my feeling was 
not indeed exactly the same as it was, because I was stronger than ever 
in favour of recognising the South. I told him also to lay before the 
British Government my understanding and my wishes on this question and 
to aek them still again whether they would be willing to join me in
r
that recognition".
"Now, sir"i )•• continued Mr Roebuck, "there is no mistake
*
about this matter. I pledge my veracity that the Emperor of Prance 
told me that. And - what is more - I laid before his Majesty two courses
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of conduct. I said Tour Majesty may make a formal application to 
England". He stopped me and. said , "No, I cannot do that and I will tel] 
you why. Some months ago I did make a formal application to 
England- England sent my despatch to America. That despatch, 
getting into Mr Seward's hands ; was shown to my ambassador at 
Washington. It came "back to me", and I feel that I was ill treated 
"by such conduct. I will noti I cannot f subject myself again to the 
danger of similar treatment. But I will do everything short of it. 
I give you full liberty to state to the English House of Commons 
this my wishi and to say to them that I have determined in all 
things to act with England; and more than all things I have 
determined to act with her as^egards America".
After quoting this speeoh r Roebuck urged the Government to 
act with Irance, and asked if they were afraid of war. "War with 
the Northern States of America,11 he exclaimddj "Why, in ten days, 
eir, we should sweep from the sea every ship".
Of course, it is quite obvious that there could only be one 
effect of so disastrous a speech. The Emperor was forced to 
disavow the statements made, and the British Government still 
advocated their policy of non-intervention. Lord Robert Montague 
at' onc« moved an amendment ta the motion in question and he was 
seconded by W.E.Porster. So badly had Roebuck handled the affair 
that although the majority of the Commons were pro-Confederates, 
lie was obliged on July 13th to withdraw his motion without insisting 
on a division. Palmerston himself added some emphatic comments on
I
the occurrence, saying that he thought Mr Roebuck had Judged rightly 
in withdrawing his motion ,for no good could come of its discussion. 
He also hoped that this would be the last time that any member of
V
the House would think it hie duty to communicate to a British House
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of Commons what might have passed "between himself and a sovereign 
of a foreign country. He attached no blame to Mr Lindsay or Mr 
Roebuck, although, their proceedings had "been so irregular.
Thus the affair terminated greatly to the disgust of the 
Confederates. Hatred of Great Britain in the jSouth was now 
steadily growing. Yet at the same time Sumner wrote his letter of 
August 4th to Bright :- "Tour government recklessly and heartlessly 
seems bent on war. A leading merchant said to me this morning that 
he would give 50.000 dollars for a war between England and Russia, 
so that he might turn English doctrines against the English. The 
feeling is very bitter".
Yet the feeling in the South was if possible more bitter. 
Recognition was denied them, and the rams on which they had placed 
their hopes of success were detained. On July 19th a still greater 
bloitoas given to the cause of the South in England,by the news of 
the Federal victories of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. Adams had said 
that military success would further the Northern cause more tha1r» 
anything else.and now this success was being obtained. The following 
note of the 19th in Adams's diary shows the prevailing irritation:- 
"Our amiable friends, the British, mho expected to hear of the
• i
capture of Washington are correspondingly disappointed". On the
. i.
20th he wrote in much the 'same strain :- "Perhaps the most curious 
phenomenon is to be seen in the London newspapers, which betray the 
profound disappointment and mortification of the aristocracy at the 
result. They persist in disbelieving the fact of the fall of
Ticksburg ".
Bright wrote to Sumner as follows :- "I need not tell you
with what feelings of gratification and relief, I have received the 
news of your recent success. The debate on the foolish Roebuck
Proposition took place when there was much gloom over your prospects")
and the friends of the 'seoesh 1 here, were rejoicing in the "belief 
that your last hour had come. How soon are the clouds cleared 
away and how great is now the despondency of those vino have 
dishonoured themselves "by their hatred of your people and 
government. The loan (Confederate) is down near 20# in little more
than a week, and is now, I suspect, unsaleable, and people are 
rubbing their eyes and wondering where the invincible South, has
•
gone to. Our pro- slavery newspapers are desperately puzzled, and 
the whole mass of opinion is in confusion".
As we can well imagine the Confederates in London were very 
disheartened. As early as January) Benjamin the Confederate 
Secretary of State, in a letter to Slid ell, had complained that 
Mason had "been discourteously treated by Earl Russell ," and in 
March he wrote that "the irritation against Great Britain is fast 
increasing". In June his words were practically insulting t- "the 
mutual relations of the United States and Great Britain —— seem to 
have now become settled on the established basis of insulting 
aggression on the one side and tame submission on the other —— It is 
impossible not to admire the sagacity with which Mr Seward penetrated 
into the secret feelings of the British Cabinet and the success of 
his policy of intimidation, which the world at large supposed would 
be met with prompt resentment, but which he with deeper^.nsight into 
the real policy of that Cabinet ; foresaw would be followed by 
submissive acquiescence in his demands". Then on August 4th he 
wrote Mason that the President, from the recent debates was 
convinced that Britain would not recognise the Confederacy and h.e 
was to consider his mission at an end and leave London. This despatch 
was received on September 14th ( but a private letter which 
accompanied it, informed Mason that he could use his discretion
with regard to putting this order into effect. As a matter of fact,
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3*€ waited a week to consult Slid ell and then informed Russell of 
the termination of his mission on September 21st, as follows :- 
"My lord, - In a despatch from the Secretary of State of the 
Confederate States of America, dated 4th day of August last, and 
now Just received, I am instructed to consider the commission which 
brought me to England as at an end, and I am directed to withdraw 
at once from this country. The reasons for terminating this mission 
are set forth in an extract from the despatch, which I have the 
honour to communicate herewith. The President "believes that "the 
Government of Her Majesty has determined to decline the overtures 
made thromgh you for estafclishingly treaty, friendly relations 
"between the two governments and entertains no intention of 
receiving you as the accredited Minister of this Government near 
the British Court. Under these circumstances your continued 
residence in London is neither conducive to the interests nor 
consistent with the dignity of this Government; and the President 
therefor* requests that you consider your mission at an end and 
that you withdraw with your Secretary from London. Having made 
known to your Lordship on my arrival here the character and purposes 
of the mission entrusted to me "by my Government, I have deemed it 
due to courtesy them to make known to the Government of Her Majesty 
its termination, and that I shall, as directed, at once withdraw
from England 11.
Adams wrote to Seward on September 24th that "The Times 
distinctly admitted that this withdrawal was a relief to the British 
Government M J and I consider that this statement can "be considered 
as true. At any rate no serious cause of friction arose "between 
the British and Am«rican governments after Mason's departure. Adams 
himself said that he failed to see how Mason could have annoyed the
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British Governmentjtmt he was doubtlessly instrumental in causing 
friction "between this country and the North.
(160)
CHAPTER V MINOR CAUSES OP "FRICTION TO THE END OF 1863.
We have already discussed the chief events which, until the 
end of 1863, made war "between Britain and America more than a
*
probability - namely the Trent case, the pro-Southern tendencies 
of the aristocracy, the stinging speeches of the press, and the 
activities of the Southern emissaries with regard to recognition 
and the outfitting of ships. We have also seen the general state 
ef Irritation which existed "between the two nations, and how this 
was fostered by what the Americans considered the 'Unfriendly 
neutrality" of Great Britain.
We shall now see how the minor causes of friction which 
arose, were chiefly connected with the "blockade and the violation 
of British neutrality.
As early as November 18th, President Davis in his message 
to the Confederate Congress at Richmond, stated that he had caused
evidence to "be collected which completely proved the inefficiency
••* 
of the blockade and that he had directed such evidence to be laid
before foreign governments. -To make matters worse, Great Britain
had already what she thought to be sufficient cause of protest with
regard to the treatment of British vessels captured while
attempting to run the blockade.
& 
On September llth Seward wrote that the inefficiency of the
British laws to prevent violations of our rights is deeply t® be 
regretted, thus showing that America, too, was considering herself
as injured.
We will now consider the minor causes of friction in 10(5g l^lf
which confirm these points, and we shall find that they centre 
round the Sumter, the arbitary arrests of British subJectB ; and the 
oases of the Adeline and the James Campbell.
(161)
The Sumter was a Confederate sloop of war which as early as 
August had succeeded in capturing eleven American vessels. On 
September 30th she entered the harbour of Trinidad and remained 
there for 6 days and was allowed to supply herself with coal. SewarA 
complained of this, and also stated that the British flag had been 
hoisted on the flag staff in honour of her arrival and that the 
officers of the British war vessel Cadmus seemed to "be on friendly 
terms with the officers of the Burnt er.
Russell acknowledged that the Sumter had been allowed to 
supply herself with coal and provisions but held that there was no 
illegality in these proceedings. He also stated that if the 
Governor had hoisted the British flag, it was not in acknolwedgment
of the arrival of the Sumter, but merely to show the nationality
,,'•> . 
of the island* Lincoln, however, held that the Sumter was a
piratical vessel and that Russell >s reply was consequently not 
satisfactory. Great Britain, however, still held to her original 
position) although, as we shall see, similar complaints were made
later.
I do not consider this claim of the United States as Just.
Ships of the Northern States were admitted to British ports to 
coal and victual and consequently the same hospitality must be
extended to Confederate vessels. When SewardNs i*e>3by that the 
powers of Europe (with the exception of England) refused to allow 
privateers to remain more that 24 hours in their ports, the British 
Government stated that they, too, were ready to comply with this 
rule, but that the same would apply to ships of the United States.
In NAvember, the British Government complained of the arrest 
of a certain William Patrick, a British subject, under the suspension 
of the act ef Habeas Corpus Act, saying that the deed was wanton
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and capriclous,and until Congress formally gave the President 
permission to dispense with the act, they must consider such 
measures illegal. In this case Seward confessed that a mistake 
had "been made, but that the error had been promptly corrected and 
thus he considered that everything necessary had been done.
Then in the following month came the case of the James 
Campbell, a British schooner, captured while attempting to run the 
blockade. This vessel was taken into New York with the British 
flag flying underneath the American one. As soon as the superior 
naval authorities at New York perceived the position of the flag 
they at once ordered it to be removed, and a letter was written to 
the British consul to express regret at the occurrence. The 
Commander of Her Majesty's ship Racer was also informed that there 
was absolutely no intention on the part of the American government 
to show disrespect to the British flag.
When Lord lyons, acting under the instructions of the Home 
Government, made inquiries about the incident ,the following letter, 
from the man who was responsible for the error, was forwarded to 
him S- "Commodore , not being acquainted with the custom of fetching 
in prizes, I was under the impression that I was right. My intention 
was to do right but it was not done for any bad purpose or intention 
to insult the English flag in any way whatever. I was wrong for 
so doing and truly hope the department will forgive me".
The dignified reply of Lyons is in striking contrast to this 
simpl«Vx>nfession. Thanks were expressed for the prompt measures 
taken by the United States authorities to do away with the 
unpleasant impression produced by the error of the prize matter.
Great Britain also showed that she was determined to protect 
the rights of her subjects in the case of the schooner Adeline.
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This vessel, like the James Campbell, was captured whilst 
attempting to run the blockade. Her captain, pilot,and mate /Who 
admitted running the "blockade several times) were claimed as 
British subjects by the British consul at Key West. Woodhull, the 
commander of the United States Ship, Connecticut, which had made 
the capture, on legal advice liberated the men after they had taken 
an oath not to embark again in a like enterprise. logons on December 
50th complained of this| and Seward realising that the act could not 
be defended^released the men from their obligation. Welles, the 
Secretary of the JTavy, also gave orders that similar conditions 
for the release of persons found on board prizes could not be
exacted.
It will of course be apparent that both governments while
zealously protecting their rights, were yet ready to make reparation 
quickly, when any act, not conformable to international law, was 
committed. Of course, while even these minor cases served to 
increase any irritation which existed, yet the willingness of both
boH,
governments to make amends was fully appreciated^here and in
America.
The case of the Perthshire seems to me to well prove the
above statement, at least as regards America. This ship left 
Mobile before the blockade was put in force, and yet she was 
captured by the United States Steamer Massachusetts and illegally
«.
detained. After her release was ordered, her owner claimed damages^ 
and a bill was passed by the House of Representatives to provide 
the necessary compensation.
With regard to the British Government, the affair of the 
British steamer ; General Miramon/ shows a somewhat similar attitude. 
GoIding the captain of this vessel, was allowed to enter the 
blockaded port of Mobile for the purpose of performing an act of
humanity. Yet he took advantage of this permission to discharge 
one cargo of merchandise and take on board another. These facts 
were "brought to the notice of Her Majesty's Government • and the 
answer was given that if the facts alleged did not admit of a 
satisfactory explanation, Her Majesty's Government much regretted 
that a British shipmaster should have abused the confidence of the 
commander of the "blockading squadron. Such an attitude, naturally 
argued the best for both nations.
In 1862, owing to the continued efforts of British subjects 
to run the blockade, similar cases'to the above were much increased. 
The blockade itself and the methods of maintaining it were much 
discussed. On February 10th in the House of Lordi, Lord Malmesbury 
stated that Mason had declared that no less than six or seven 
hundred ships had broken the blockade and entered Southern ports. 
If this state of things continued,the inconvenience arising from the 
blockade could no longer be endured. Russell's reply was that the 
question under discussion was extremely important and that the 
Government were considering the matter. He therefore hoped that 
any Judgement on the question would be reserved until the House
had received further information. It was an evil if the blockade 
was ineffective and therefore invalid, but it would also be a great 
evil if Britain were to run the risk of a dispute with the United 
States without having strong ground for it.
A week after this, Mason sent to Russell a list of vessels 
which had entered and cleared out of the blockaded ports and claimed 
consequently that the blockade was ineffective. But a letter from 
Russell to Iflrons dated February 15th shows that the British 
Government were hardly prepared to take this view. He stated that 
the blockade could not be considered ineffective because various
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ships had eluded it, and that a neutral state ought to exercise the 
greatest caution with reference to the disregard of a de facto and 
notified "blockade.
On March 7th the subject was brought "before the Commons • 
W.E.florstar denied that the "blockade was ineffective and stated 
that the list of 300 vessels which had been handed in by Mason 
dwindled to 19 after investigation and these had escaped on dark 
and stormy nights.
The previous month Seward too had held that the "blockade 
was "ae nearly absolutely effective as any "blockade ever was". In 
this same despatch of February 17th he had also stated that far the 
largest portion of vessels which had run the blockade were British 
vessels and he complained that the British government took little 
care to discourage or repress that prohibited trade.
Russell's answer of March 27th was far from satisfactory 
for while stating that Great Britain had abstained from any 
complaint with regard to the irregularity of the blockade, he said 
that the British Government could not prevent merchants from sending 
ships to s«a destined for the Southern ports. Of course if such 
ships were captured, condemnation was the proper penalty. There is 
of course no doubt that British activity was being vigorously 
directed in this direction. On May 8th Adams wrote to Russell that 
he had before him a list of 11 steamers and 20 sailing vessels that 
had been equipped within 30 days, or which were still preparing in 
one port of Great Britain alone / to run the blockade. He also stated 
his belief that the business of evading the blockade was reduced 
to a deliberate system, emanating from a central authority in
°n *Two days later came Russell's reply - calm, courteous,but
firm and decided t- "The foreign enlistment act is intended to
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prevent the subjects of the crown from going to war when the 
sovereign is not at war. Thus private perspns are prohibited from 
fitting out a ship of war in our ports, or from enlisting in the
a-
service ofA foreign state at war with another state or in the serviee 
of Insurgents against a foreign state. In these cases the persons 
so acting would carry on war——But owners and masters of merchant 
ships carrying warlike stores do nothing of the kind.If captured, 
they are tried and condemned to lose their cargo. This is the 
penalty which the law of nations has affixed to such an offence; and 
in calling upon Her Majesty's government to prohibit such 
adventurers, you in effect call upon Her Majesty's government to 
do that which it belongs to the cruisers and the courts of the 
United States to do for themselves. There can only be one plea 
for asking Great Britain thus to interpose. That plea is that the 
blockade is in reality ineffective, and that merchant ships can 
enter with impunity the blockaded ports. But this is a plea which
I presume you will not urge".
A week later Russell made the British position even more
clear by stating that if the British Government had prohibited the 
transport of arms and ammunition to the Confederate States, it 
would also have been obliged to prohibit such transport to the 
federals. The blockade had naturally prevented the Confederates from 
obtaining ammunition in the same quantity as the Federals, and 
consequently British neutrality had been more advantageous to the
Fortli than the South.
The Howell and Zirman Episode in April 1863 can only be
described as unfortunate. Howell & Zirman were heads of a shipping 
house in England - (one at least if not both, were American citizens) 
- and being about to send a vessel with a cargo to Mexico, they 
applied to C.P.Adams for a certificate which would show that this 
was their real design. (167)
This certificate was to be entrusted to the captain to secure the 
vessel from capture, if she were overhauled by any blockading
vessel.
Adams, on April 9th, thereupon wrote the following letter:-
°f fr""*" 1' 11 *" 
"Amid the multitude^and dishonest enterprises from this Kingdom to
furnish supplies to the rebels in the United States, through the 
pretence of a destination to some port in Mexico, it gives me 
pleasure to distinguish one which has a different and creditable 
purpose. Messrs Howell and Zirman have furnished me with evidence 
which is perfectly satisfactory to me, that they are really bound h>
Mo.hi *ieraf
nwith a cargo intended for the Mexicans. I therefore cheerfully 
give them this certificate at their request. It is not the 
disposition of the Government of the United States to interfere in 
any way with an honest, neutral trade; and it is deeply to be 
regretted, that the frauds which have been so extensively practised 
in this country, have contributed so much -to-throw it under
suspicion 11.
This letter was made public at Lloyd's, and a deputation
of merchants at once brought the matter to the notice of Russell» 
commenting severely upon the action of Adams. The matter was 
discussed in the Lords, and an attempt was made to charge Adams with 
interfering with British commerce and with giving advantage, by 
his certificates, to one British ship over another.
Adams denied any such intention and said that he believed 
that he had a perfect right to give certificates to American 
citizens to trade with Mexico and that this was all that he had done* 
Yet the letter ought never to have been written ; because if the 
granting of such certificates became general, any ship without such 
protection would run the risk of capture by the blockading squadron.
The whole incident indeed, at this time, is to be regretted.
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But although the British Government was not disposed to 
interfere in order to prohibit "blockade running, yet at the same
time it was determined to give no protection to any British subject
i HZ. 
thus employed. In June,^for instance certain British merchants and
shipowners in Liverpool sent a memorial to Russelli stating that 
they viewed with considerable anxiety and apprehension the hostile 
attitude of Federal cruisers in the Bahama waters,and they prayed 
that steps might be taken to protect British shipping in these 
waters and to check the seizures so repeatedly made by the cruisers. 
The. reply of Russell on July 5th was that, owing to the attempts 
made by English vessels to run the blockade, he was not surprised 
at the vigilance of the United States cruisers and that the only 
remedy was for Liverpool shipowners to refrain from this species 
of trade. "It exposes innocent commerce to vexations detention and 
search by American cruisers - it produces irritation and ill will 
on the part of the population of the northern States of America ; 
and it exposes the British name to suspicions of bad faith——Her 
Majesty 1 s Government have done all they can fairly do; that is to 
say, they have urged the Federal Government to enjoin upon their 
naval officers greater caution in the exercise of their belligerent 
rights. Her Majesty's Government have only further to observe that 
it is the duty of Her Majesty's subjects to conform to Her Majesty's 
proclamation and abstain from furnishing to either of the 
belligerent parties any of the means of war which are forbidden 
to be furnished by that proclamation".
No further question arose with regard to the effectiveness
ut- 
of the blockade*! a«d in spite of American protests British vessels
still continued, during this year (1862) and during 1865, their 
attempts to enter blockaded ports. Adams continually brought the
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subject to the notice pf the British government,"but always the 
reply was that nothing could be done. On July llth 186? for 
instance, in a despatch to Russell, Adams complained of the despatch 
from the United Kingdom of "numbers of steam vessels, laden with 
arms and munitions of war of every description, together with other 
supplies, well adapted to procrastinate the struggle,with a purpose 
of breaking a blockade legitimately established and fully recognised
by Her Majesty".
Russell however still defended the neutrality of Her Majesty's
Government. "With regard to the general duties of a neutral, 
according to international law, the true doctrine has been laid 
down repeatedly by Presidents,and judges of eminence,of the United 
States ( and that dectrine is that a neutral may sell to either or 
both of two belligerent parties any munitions of war". A fortnight 
later in his speech of September 26th he maintained the same 
position. "The principle (of the Foreign Enlistment Act) is clear 
enough. If you are asked to sell muskets, you may.sell muskets to
•
one party or to the other; and so with gunpowder, shell or cannon; - 
you may sell a ship in the same manner. But if you will on the 
one hand train and drill a regiment with arms in their hands,or 
allow a regiment to go out with arms in their hands f to take part 
with one of two belligerents, you violate your neutrality and commit 
an offence against the other belligerent. So in the same way with 
regard to ships, if you allow a ship to be armed and go at once to 
make an attack on a foreign belligerent you are yourself taking 
part in the war and it is an offence which is punished by the law".
Yet the continued complaints of Seward and Adams after the 
seizure of the rams were not without effect. In support of this 
from the "Secret Service of the Confederate States", I quote the
fallowing words of Bullock J- "After the seizure of the rams
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Earl Russell applied the Foreign Enlistment Act so stringently with 
reference to the Confederate Statesi that it was very difficult to 
forward the most essential supplies".
Consequently while Southern hatred.of Great Britain 
increased, the tension which had existed "between Great Britain and 
the North was somewhat relaxed. This point will "be further 
developed when we consider the relations of Britain and America 
after October 1865.
So far we have only spoken more or less generally of the 
activities of British subjects with regard to running the blockade, 
tut now we must consider a few of the outstanding casesi Gine of 
which is the Emily St Pierre. Adams wrote to Russell on April 24th 
1862 that this ship, "being under a British register and "belonging 
to British subjects of Liverpool, was found on March 18th 
attempting to run into the port of Charleston in S.Carolina, in 
violation of the blockade there legitimately established. She was 
seized and her crew(with the exception of the commander, the steward,
N i '
and cook)removed, and a prize crew of three officers and 12 men was 
put on board and ordered to take the ship to Philadelphia. The 
commander,being left at liberty on board, formed a scheme by which 
he surprised and took possession of the vessel and compelled the 
seamen to navigate the ship to Liverpool, where he sent them ashore 
and took shelter for himself under the authority of the British 
Government. The Federal Government thereupon asked that the vessel 
should be surrendered, but the British Government would not agree ? 
and after a correspondence which lasted for several months the 
Americans finally gave up pressing this claim.
The case of the Labuan also affords evidence that the 
American government desired to maintain the principle of
international law. This steamer was seized early in 186^ at
(171)
Matamoras in Mexico, by the United States frigate Portsmouth^and 
taken to New York as a prize. This seizure in neutral territory,
t
although the vessel was probably a blockade runner, was illegal 
and the British Government consequently forwarded a protest. Seward 
gave directions that seizures under similar circumstances should 
not be made,but the vessel was not released and finally she was 
brought before a prize court. Russell on April 19th complained to 
Adams that that course was regrettable,especially when Spanish and 
Danish ships (which had been unjustifiably captured) were released 
without being sent before a prize court and when compensation twwb 
Toisn paid. The reply of Adams was that Spanish and Danish ships 
had not attempted to break the blockade in the same manner as 
English ships ,and that they were therefore released more readily. 
In May t however, the Admiralty court decreed restitutions and 
Seward admitted that the claimants were entitled to damages.
The United States also considered at this time that Great 
Britain, while extending the hospitality of her ports to Confederate 
officers and ships, was inclined to treat Federal officers with 
scant courtesy. Consequently when in April, Lieut: Me Dougal of 
the United States ship of war Saginaw was requested to remove his 
ship from Hong Kong and its dependencies, the Federal Government 
complained and said that the interests of American commerce in the 
East required, the presence of American vessels there. In July 
Adams again wrote to Russell and compared the treatment of the
Vt»UtukL»y *«kH<i<Jh>
Saginaw with that of the Sumter in Gibraltar. Russell however took
his stand on the proclamation of January 31st 186^,(which stated 
' that no' belligerent warships were to enter British ports; and if
they were compelled to do so owing to need of repairs^they were 
to leava within 24 hours after these had been completed) and
(172)
claimed that the Sumter was at Gibraltar before the Proclamation 
wae issued but that the Saglnaw went to Hong Kong subsequent to 
the issue. Adams claimed however that the proclamation did not 
go into effect at Hong Kong at the\time of its issue in London but 
from the date of its reception by the local governor, and that 
consequently the Saginaw arrived at Hong Kong more than a fortnight 
before the issue of the Proclamation. The subject was however left
unsettled.
But the Sumter was still to remain a cause of discussion.
After a career of devastation! to escape destruction by Federal 
ships she took refuge in Gibraltar, and on December 19th 1862, in
of
spite of the protests ek the American consul she was sold to an 
English purchaser. On December 30th Adams wrote that his government 
could not recognise the sale, for it was merely a manoeuvre to 
to rescue the vessel from her present position. On January 1st 
Russell stated that the law officers of the crown were considering 
the case. Adams was determined that the Sumter should not be used 
against American commerce,and so on January 3rd he sent instructions 
to Sprague (the American consul) that if the Sumter tried to slip 
off under the British flag, she must be stopped and captured on the 
high seas. Of course, if this had happened, war would probably 
have ensued. Fortunately, therefore, for peace, the Sumter reached 
Liverpool unmolested. On February 16th Adams called attention to 
the proclamation which limited the stay of warships in British ports. 
Russell f e reply on March 9th was, however, that the^jale was legal ; 
and therefore, because the vessel was no longer a Confederate 
Warship, the Proclamation could not be applied. Adama thereupon 
urged the opinion of Br. Phillemore, a legal adviser of the Crown, 
that the purchase of war shipB belonging to enemies is held invalid
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in British courts. Still the British government would not interfere, 
and so early in July, she sailed from Liverpool heavily laden with 
cannon and stores. At first th* British Government attempted to stop 
her "but desisted on the assurance that the guns were only sent as 
freight. As a matter of fact, the ship had sailed to "begin another 
career of devastation under the name of the Gibraltar.
Undoubtedly the action of the British Government must be 
condemned in this case, for the whole transaction was exceedingly 
unfair. Naturally, taking this case as a precedent,all Confederate 
warships ; when pursued and in danger of destruction, would take 
refuge in the nearest British port. A transfer to British ownership 
would then be arranged, the ship would escape, and then at the first 
favourable moment begin a career of devastation under another name* 
We cannot wonder that the American Government violently protested 
against the transaction ; and one cannot help thinking that England 
under similar circumstances would have taken a stronger line of
conduct.
Other complaints at this time centred round the treatment of
British subjects and the conduct of British officers. With regard 
to the treatment of British subjects we have already seen how in
Hie Sa«HC.
1861 Igrons protested against the arbitrary arrests of Drill .all 
euTjJeetfl. IPurther complaints of 1862 and 1863 were on the same lines* 
On February llth 1862, the Earl of Carnarvon in the House of Lords 
said that there were no less than 3 British subjects,who had been
LafayeHe
imprisoned for 4 or 5 months in Lopagelle prison ; and that they had 
been detained without any charge of any kind being made against 
them. An inquiry had been asked for, but it had been refused ; 
unless they first consented to take the oath of allegiance to the 
United States. The state of the prison was bad, the prisoners were
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deprived of. the decencies of life; and the water supplied was foul. 
Russell's attitude was exceedingly conciliatory. He stated that 
the eritical state of America must be taken into consideration, 
that Great Britain could not object to the suspension of the 
Habeas Corpus Act, and that if British subjects chose to engage in 
treasonable enterprises against the Government of the United States 
such detention was not illegal*
From further evidence I consider that the conduct of the 
American Government with regard to the treatment of British subjects, 
suspected of treasonable enterprises was extremely satisfactory;for 
any complaints made by the British Government were courteously 
. attended to at once.
With regard to the conduct of American officers we must 
discuss the question of Nassauf a British possession near the 
Southern extremity of the United States. Prom the beginning of 
the struggle,this port was used as a place of deposit for munitions 
of war sent from England for the use of the Confederacy^and many 
were the complaints made by Adams and Seward with respect to this. 
Another grievance of the United States was that the British 
Government refused to allow federal naval vessels to supply 
themselves with deposits of coal which the Government of the 
United States had provided for them at Nassau. Yet permission was 
granted to Confederate vessels to buy coal and take it on board in 
the same ports where United States ships had not been allowed to 
load coal belonging to their government. On March 25th 1862, Russell 
replied to this charge, saying that coal had arrived at Nassau in 
the schooners Stetson & Perry. This, of course, could hardly be
•
described as a deposit of coal existing at Nassau. By the papers
of the Stetson, the coal appeared to have been shipped by the Navy
(175)
I>«partment. The authorities at Nassau gave directions that the 
coal should be landed, but the United States consul was informed 
that it could not be used in any manner which might involve a breach 
of the Queen's Proclamation of neutrality; and particularly that 
the coaling at Nassau of vessels of war of either belligerent could 
not be allowed without the express sanction of Her Majesty f s 
Government. On the arrival of the Federal warship Flambeau, the 
Americal consul asked permission for the coal to be transferred 
from the Stetson as she was leaking. Permission was given to land
»
the coal but not to transfer it to the Flambeau, because if an armed 
vessel of war were there supplied with coal, British neutrality 
would be infringed. In answer to the Consul's complaint that the 
Confederate vessel, the Theodora, had been supplied with coal by a 
merchant residing at Nassau, the Governor said that the Theodora 
was a merchant vessel and that this consequently did not involve 
a breach of neutrality. Then the Americans stated that the 
Confederate warships the James Adger and the Nashville had been 
allowed to supply themselves with coal at Southampton. The BriblBh 
Government however contended that these vessels were a thousand 
miles away from home and to them coal was a real necessity. The 
Flambeau, howeveri was within reasonable distance of her home ports,
s
vaad her application was not founded on necessity.
i
From the above facts I consider that the British Government 
was in the worng. If Confederate vessels were allowed to coal in 
one British port, then surely Federal ships ought to have been 
permitted to coal in any other, irrespective of distance from home. 
It was such circumstances as these which caused friction between 
British and naval officers in the Bahama waters.
Early in October 1862, Rear-Admiral Wilkes of the United
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States navy visited Bermudai and the governor and British naval 
and military officers bitterly complained of his proceedings, and 
accused him of ordering vessels under his command to anchor so that 
they could control the movements of ships desiring to enter or 
depart from Bermuda. Also they alleged that he unlawfully placed 
sentinels aa British territory; and that he contemptuously evaded the 
orders of Her Majesty 'in regard to the supplies of coal which vessels 
of the belligerent parties might obtain in British ports. Wilkes on 
the other hand denied the charges and accused the governor of 
discourtesy.
Again in the following year Wilkes was reported to have 
threatened to capture a British mail packet bound to a British port, 
on the sole ground of her carrying to that port Confederate officers 
or other Confederate passengers. lyons complained ; and Wilkes was 
ordered to desist by his government, but he stoutly denied making
any such speech.
In November , the conduct of Captaia Malcolm, ofjthe British
war ship Barracouta, was a subject of controversy. Seward complained 
that he had threatened to fire upon United States war ships, which 
should anchor in the waters of Nassau without the governor's 
permission and asked that in order "to obviate the obvious 
consequences of such a proceeding/ proper instructions should Toe 
given to the commanders of Her Majesty's vessels". Malcolm did not 
deny his threat when the matter was investigated. Admiral Milne, 
commanding the British squadron in the waters in question, also 
wrote to lyons stating that while he did not approve of Malcom's 
attitude, yet the conduct of Wilkes would naturally ctuse irritation. 
Seward was however desirous of ending such irritation, and on 
February 7fcfc he informed lyons that instructions had b-een given to
Wilkes to render on all occasions of intercourse with naval officers
of Great Britain the courtesies due from naval officers of one 
nation to those of a friendly power; and he suggested that if 
similar suggestions were given to British officers, the irritation 
which had existed would probably end.
It isi of course, impossible to discuss all the minor causes 
of friction during these years,but one other cause must now be 
mentioned. This is the placing of certain restrictions by the 
Treasury Department upon the transhipment of merchandise at New 
York from steamers from England to vessels for Nassau. Lyons, upon 
the complaint of the residents of Nassau brought the matter to 
Seward's notice. The collector of customs at New York, however 
defended his action by saying that he had only refused clearance to 
articles which were either contraband of war f or in cases where the 
captain refused to give a bond that such articles should not be 
appropriated to aid and comfort the rebels. A promise was also 
given that such restrictions should be removed when the necessity 
which had made them imperative should cease. In August, Seward was 
informed that the British Government did not complain if clearances 
were refused to vessels laden with contraband or vessels believed 
to be bound for confederate ports, so long as precautions were 
taken without reference to the nationality or origin of any 
particular vessel or goods. But under the pretext that there is 
"imminent danger of the cargoes coming into the possession of the 
insurgents" any kind and amount of arbitrary restriction might be 
produced on British trade, and the United States had no right to 
interfere with the exports of ordinary commodities from New York 
to the Bahamas in British vessels. The reply of the collector a 
week lateri was that cargoes shipped for Nassau had gone directly 
to attempt to run the blockade, but that clearances had only been 
refused in the case of extraordinary shipments when there was good
reason for believing that the cargos were intended for the rebels. 
On September 23rd however,Russell wrote that the prohibitions 
furnished grounds for international complaint, and that the United 
States falsely assumed that Nassau violated British neutrality by 
carrying on trade with the Confederacy during the existence of the 
blockade^ and that^to aid the inefficiency of the blockading force 
an embargo had been placed on British commerce at New York, and this 
the British Government, naturally could not submit to. In January 
1868} the United States however promised that the regulations 
concerning the restrictions should be executed in such a way so as 
to afford no Just ground for complaint of partiality or injustice, 
and that past injuries should be redressed.
So it was not until August 1863, in spite of the continuance 
of the restrictions, that the correspondence on this subject was 
again renewed. On August 23rd, consequently, Chaffe,the Secretary of 
the Treasury ? announced a slight concession. "The collector at New 
York and other ports "he wrote, "will be instructed to require only 
substantial security that such goods, wares or merchandise^ shall
r
not be transported to any place under insurrectionary control and 
shall not in any way be used to give aid or comfort to such 
insurgents with or by consent, permission or connivance,of the 
owners, shippers, carriers or consignees thereof 1'.
One can hardly blame the United States for taking precautions 
to prevent goods going to Confederate ports ,but the restrictions 
thus placed upon British commerce seems to me (as Russell said) to 
be an attempt to repair the inefficiency of the blockade. On October 
30th^ons consequently wrote that this was extremely unsatisfactory 
but the Americans clung to their position. In January 1864, the 
British Government was even forced to complain that the required
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bonds (or substantial security) had been extended to shipments to 
Newfoundland. Seward replied that this had only been done in one or 
two instances when it was thought that the cargoes were intended 
for the Bermudas, and that the practice was now discontinued. He 
claimed} however} that the ordinary restrictions could not be 
relaxed with safety to the United Statesi but that bonds were not 
required from firms which were above suspicion. In this the British 
Government seems to have acquiesced,, for the correspondence was then 
dropped; and on "February 24th 1865, the danger arising from the 
restrictions practically disappeared} for the United States consul 
at Nassau wrote to Adams that blockade running from that port had
ceased.
Yet in spite of the many points at issue between the two
countries} we have already seen that war did not result, and this 
says much for the good sense of both Englishmen and Americans who 
were at the head of affairs. Mention must here be made of the 
treaty of May 186 £ between the two countries to suppress the slave 
trade, thus showing that both countries, in spite of neulidl
irritation were yet ready to co-operate to advance the cause of 
human ityj and the following cases seeing to prove that underneath the 
prevailing irritation, there lay material on nftiich an abiding 
friendship could be built.
On February 19th 186 2 f Adams complained that the commander 
of the Vesuvius} a British war ship, had transported a large sum of 
money belonging to the rebels to Liverpool, and he asked that 
investigations should be made and instructions given to prevent the 
same*occurring. On February 25th, Russell wrote to say that orders 
had already been given that the shipment of money was forbidden and 
that the consul at Mob lie, (who had since been dismissed) was to blame
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in the case of the Vesuvius. The British government was also prompt 
in expressing its regret and Lincoln confessed himself satisfied.
Another act of courtesy was performed in October, when the 
United States sloop of war, the Jamestown, ran aground. Admiral 
Kuper of the British navy immediately despatched one of his vessels, 
the Cormorant)to her assistanoe ; and although the ship was refloated 
"before the Cormorant arrived, the United States government much 
appreciated the act of courtesy.
Again when the British government complained that two seamen 
of the British ship Revere, which was captured by the United States 
ship Cambridge, when attempting to break the blockade, had been put 
in irons, Seward while stating that it was necessary to secure the 
safety of the prize vessel yet promised that instructions should be 
sent to the officers of the blockading squadron that irons must be 
used only when and so long as necessary and that they must "in all 
cases practice the utmost kindness consistent with the safety of 
captives and prizes^towards seamen eaptured in attempting to break 
the blockade". Also when Lyons complained that minors who had been 
British subjects had been enlisted in the federal service, Seward 
promised that they should receive their discharge.
The British government, too, showed the same conciliatory 
attitude in small details, for when early in 1865 the Federal 
Government expressed a fear that the Sioux Indian"*^ would obtain 
arms in Canada to use against the United States, the Hudson's Bay 
Company were ordered to prevent their being supplied.
There was, of course, never any danger of these minor cases 
of friction causing war, and although we shall find continued 
complaints during 1864 and the following years ,we shall see that 
the relations between the two countries steadily improved after the
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•nd of October 1863.
The fact that Mason had now left England, that the North was 
steadily approaching success, and that Russell was "bent on 
stringently applying the terms of the Foreign Enlistment Act to 
prevent the outfitting of ships for the Confederacy in British ports 
pro'ba'bly explain;this improved state of affairs.
Adams wrote in his diary on October 24th that there was 
certainly more inclination to let matters go without meddling', and 
on November 21st,that the threatening aspect of things in Europe 
was soothing the temper towards America surprisingly and that he had 
never felt so serene "before.
Gladstone ,on June 30th 1863,had stated publicly that he did 
not "believe the restoration of the American Union "by force was 
attaina"ble / and that he did not think that a more fatal error had 
ever been committed than when men of high intelligence came to the 
conclusion that the emancipation of the negro race was to be sought 
even when they could only travel to it through a sea of blood. 
During the same debate Lord Palmerston took John Bright to task for 
indulging in what he considered the absurd and fantastical idea 
that the Union was still in existence. The Marquis of Salisbury 
also said that the people of the South were the natural allies of
e*S
England as great production of the Articles we needed and great 
consumers of the articles we supplied; while the North, on the 
other hand, kept an opposition shop in the same department as
ourselves.
But by November 5th sentiment in England had changed so much
that Gladstone wrote to Suraner that it would please him much if the 
Union should be re-established by the war, John Bright on November 
20th wrote that "neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I hope a
more fair and friendly neut^ali^ty than we have seen during the
(182)
past two years. There are still heard some voices against you - for 
there is a wonderful ignorance here in all classes on everything 
American; "but I can see and feel all around me that another tone 
prevails". Then on January 20th 1864,Adams again "began to attend 
Lord and Lady Palmerston's receptions - a thing which he had not 
since Palmerston wrote to him with regard to the order of General 
Butler at New Orleans.
Naturally^all this proves quite clearly that the relations 
between the two countries were much improved.
(183)
CHAPTER VI THE GROWTH OP BETTER PEELING IN 1864-.
During the year 1864 relations between Great Britain and 
America were less strained than they had been since the beginning 
of the Civil war, although causes of friction still existed. The 
difficulties of the British Government even now were by mo means
inconsiderable, for it was not easy to satisfy two eager and
i 
jealous combatants of the real impartiality of the exercise of
neutrality. The refusal of Great Britain to recognise Southern 
independency was still a cause of resentment to the Southland the 
North remonstrated because British subjects still continued their 
attempts to break the blockade.
Jefferson Pavis in his message to the Confederate Congress 
at the end of 1865 bitterly complained of Great Britain's attitude 
with regard to recognition. He also accused the British Government 
of partiality in favour of the North ;and said that this had been 
conspicuous since the beginning of the war. He continued as 
follows :- "As early as the 1st of May 1861, the British minister
in Washington was informed by the Secretary of State of the United
- -f 
States that he had sent agents to England,and that others would goii**" 
to Prance to purchase arms; and this fact was communicated to the
British Poreign Office, which interposed no objection. Yet in 
October of the same year, Earl Russell entertained the complaint 
of the United States Minister in London, that the Confederate 
States were importing contraband of war from the island of Nassau, 
directed inquiry into the matter, and obtained a report from the 
authorities of tbfi island denying the allegations, which report 
was enclosed to Mr Adams and received by aim as satisfactory 
evidence to dissipate"the suspicion naturally thrown upon the
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authorities of Nassau by that unwarrantable act". So, too,when the 
Confederate Government -purchased in Great Britain as a neutral 
country,(and with strict observance both of the law of nations and 
the municipal law of Great Britain) ; vessels which were subsequently 
armed and commissioned as vessels of war, after they had been far 
removed from English waters, the British Government, in violation 
of its own laws and in deference to the importunate demands of the 
United States, made an ineffectual attempt to seize one vessel and 
did actually seize and detain another,which touched at the island 
of Uassau/ and subjected her to an unfounded persecution at the very 
time when cargoes of munitions of war were being openly shipped 
from British ports to New York to be used in warfare against us. 
Then followed a complaint of the seizure of the rams and of the 
enlistment of British subjects for Federal service in Ireland.
This message showed resentment, but absolute fury was 
apparent in April, after Davis had received Russell's letter of 
April 1st, in which he made, on behalf of Her Majesty's Government, 
a formal protest and remonstrance against the efforts of the 
so-called Confederate States to build war vessels within Her 
Majesty's dominions to be employed against the Government of the 
United States. "After consulting with the law officers of the 
crown, Her Majesty's Government have come to- the decision that the 
agents of the authorities of the so-called Confederate States have 
been engaged in building vessels which would be at least partially 
equipped for war purposes on leaving the ports of this country; 
that these war vessels would undoubtedly be used against the United 
States, a country with which this country is at peacej that this 
would be a violation of the neutrality laws of this realm,and that, 
the Government of the United States would have just ground for
serious complaint against Her Majesty's Government should they(185)
permit such an infraction of the amicable relations now subsisting 
between the two countries".
On April^6th f l>avis replied through his private secretary, 
protesting against the use of the term "so-called" Confederate 
States. "Were indeed Her Majesty's Government sincere in a desire 
and determination to maintain neutrality} the President could not 
but feel that it would neither be just nor gallant to allow the 
subjugation of a nation like the Confederate States by such a 
barbarous and despotic race as are now attempting it. As for the 
specious arguments on the subject of the rams advanced by Earl 
Russell) the President desires me to state that he is content to•
leave the world and history to pronounce judgement upon the attempt 
to kelp injury upon insult".
Friends of the South in England were however still active,, 
and it was through the influence of W.S.Lindsay, that Mason now 
obtained an interview with Lord Falmerston. During the interview 
Palmerston confined himself to questions, in answer to which Mason 
said that the North could not replenish its armies, for enlistments 
had ceased, and Lincoln did not dare to conscript or draft. 
Washington was to be destroyed when captured. The defeat of Grant 
and Sherman, which he assumed as a matter of course, would be 
followed by anarchy in the North. Now, he urged, was the time for 
Europe to intervene and insist on peace^and the North itself would
•
look on the action as a godsend. Pa liners tan in his cynical manner, 
remarked that since Mr Mason was of the opinion that such a crisis 
was at hand, it might be better te wait until it arrived. Mason 
took this remark at its face value and reported the words 
complacently te Richmond, expressing the hope v that good might
oome of the interview. This hope, however, was not realised.
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We will now consider Federal complaints against Great 
Britain. These centre round the activities of British subjects
•
in the Confederate'cause. British officers, for instance, especially 
a certain Robert Gator, were accused of violating the blockade and 
of obtaining leave of absence for that purpose. The British 
Government, however, stated that they had no knowledge of these 
facts,but that they would take proper steps to prevent any officer 
holding Her Majesty f s commission from violating British neutrality. 
The Federal government was also informed that the British admiralty 
had refused applications to officers on half pay, for leave to
u>cVt
proceed to the W.Indies, when they fe*d suspected Ww« of any 
intention with regard to blockade running. It was acknowledged 
that six months leave had been given to Cator, but to obtain this 
he had stated that he was obliged to go to Jamaica on family affairs. 
A promise was also given that if he had been engaged in blockade 
running, leave for the future would be refused him.
This year the Alexandra also occupied much attention. We 
have already seen that when judgement in this case was given in 
favour of th© defendants, an appeal was entered,and at the end of 
November 1863 no decision had been announced. The United States 
were, however, quite satisfied with the earnestness and vigour 
displayed by the British law officers. But when the case was 
brought before the House of Lords there was again a difference of 
opinion,and judgement was finally given in favour of the defendants 
in April 1864. I quote the following from Adams's despatch of April 
8th :- "The government has been completely baffled in its honest 
endeavour to obtain a legal base of action against a flagrant 
violation of the neutrality of the kingdom, and is thrown back upon
the task of commencing the work all over again. There was never
(187)
such a comedy performed OH a grave subject in the niiole history of
law".
The nation as a whole knew that the decision was disgraceful,
and the editorial of the London Times on April 7th was as follows :- 
"However much we may admire the learning and subtlety displayed in 
this controversy, the more important question will still recur,
•
ifaat course the government intends to take in cases such as those 
of the Alabamai the Alexandra and the steam rams. Is it not a 
matter for legislation ? Although the insolent assumption of the 
Northern Americans may make Parliament unwilling to pass new 
measures at a time when the presumed concession may be 
misinterpretedi yet after all, we ought not to shrink from doing 
that which is not only just to others,' but advantageous to ourselves. 
If the foreign enlistment act, according to the judgement of the 
court of the exchequer, be insufficient to repress enterprises 
endangering the peace of the country, surely it is better to apply 
to the legislature ; than to trust that in some future case a resort 
to a bill of exceptions will carry the main question to a tribunal 
which may reverse the judgement already given".
Correspondence with regard to the Rappahannock was also 
continued this year. This ship, a Confederate cruiser, was sold
from Her Majesty's Navy into the Confederate service in 1862 and/
consequently the Federal Government entered a protest. The British 
government/instituted a prosecution against Rumble,the inspector 
of machinery at the Sheerness dockyard, for complicity in these 
proceedings. In February 1865, however, the man was acquitted? 
but the justice of the verdict "Not guilty" is-much to be questioned. 
These proceedings naturally did not tend to improve matters.
In several other cases during this year, prosecutions were
instituted in the British courts against subjects who had given aid
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to the Confederate cause by violating British neutrality. But 
while the proceedings themselves were gratifying to the Federals 
the results were not, for practically every case was dismissed after 
a promise was given not to repeat the offence. The case of John 
Seymour in July was notorious. This man," when charged 7pleaded guiltyj 
but the solicitor general stated that the object of this prosecution 
was prevention rather than punishment, and that the crown would be 
satisfied if the prisoner were bound over to appear and receive 
judgement if called upon; and while it was stated that if the
4
offence was repeated the judgement would be severe7 yet a stipulation 
was made that if the prisoner abstained from its repetition, he 
would hear no more of the matter. Naturally such a state of affairs 
was far from satisfactory.
The Alabama, the cause of much correspondence during 1862 
and 1863, in June of this year arrived at Cherbourg. The news of 
her arrival was at once telegraphed to the United States ship 
Kearsage, which arrived in all haste and lay in wait for the 
famoufr privateer outside the port. On June 18th to avoid any 
violation of Preach neutrality, the Alabama was escorted from 
Cherbourg by a French man of war. The Kearsage steamed away to 
seaward, but when outside French jurisdiction she turned to meet 
the Alabama and the duel began. Within an hour the Alabama was 
disabled and commenced to sink. An English yacht, the Deerhound, 
had accompanied the Alabama from Cherbourg to see the fight, and 
now Captain Winslow of the Kearsage asked John Lancaster, her owner, 
to assist him in picking up the drowning men. In less than 10 
minutes Lancaster had rescued the Alabama's commander, Semmes, and 
forty officers and men. Then he immediately sailed for England,
where Semmes and his «raw were enthusiastically welcomed.
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These proceedings caused violent protests on the part of America. 
Welles, the Secretary of the Navy, accused Semmes in titter language 
of abusing the generous confidence of his "brave antagonist,and of 
stealing away in the English ship, the owner of, which proved himself 
by his conduct to be a fit companion for the dishonoured and beaten
corsair. ,4^
Adams idse on June 25th, in an official despatch to Russell,
accused the Deerhound of interfering,with a view to aid the escape 
of Semmes and the others who were rescued,saying that at the time
•
of their rescue they were already prisoners of war.
Russell's reply was that the owner of the Deerhound had 
merely performed an act of humanity in rescuing men who would 
otherwise have drowned and who consequently could not be considered
«
prisoners of war. This correspondence continued all through the 
year and both governments clung tenaciously to their own point of 
view, and Semmes and his men were never surrendered. Here Great 
. Britain was undoubtedly in the right. Lancaster had, as Russell 
averred, merely performed an act of humanity, and it must be 
remembered that he had acted in deference to the request of the 
commander of the Kearsage, and naturally once the men were on board 
a British vessel they could not be claimed as prisoners of war.
But if America considered that she had grounds of complaint, 
Great Britain in certain respects was also an injured party. Early 
ia November 1863, the Kearsage had visited Queenstown,and from 
evidence which was forwarded to the Foreign Office, it was apparent 
that an attempt had been made to induce British subjects to enlist 
in the Federal Service. Russell brought these facts to the notice 
of Mr Adams and an investigation was ordered. From this,it was
clear that British neutrality had been violated. Men had been
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examined by the ship's doctor and provided with uniform. It was 
more difficult to discover upon whom to place the responsibility 
for this. Captain Winslow and the United States consul at Queenstown 
were at first suspected. The prompt action of V/inslow however 
exonerated him from all blame, for on December 7th, when the Kearsage 
again returned to Queenstown, he sent the men in question ashore. 
The consul, too, seems innocentjof the transaction. Prom a despatch 
of Adams of April 2nd,it seems quite clear that the real culprits 
were two Officers of the Kearsage - namely Lieut: Thornton and a 
certain James Haley. Haley, on November 2nd,had gone ashore to 
visit relativee and he had suggested to several men that they might 
find, employment on board the vessel. Thornton, when they presented 
themselves also gave them reason to suppose that they might be 
engaged. Both officers, however, affirmed that they were ignorant 
of any law which made their action illegal. The excuse was, of
• •
course, transparent, and Russell on April 9th expressed his regret 
that the two officers should still hold American commissions. 
Consequently in May, Seward promised that when the Kearsage returned 
to American waters, any officer guilty of intentionally violating 
the municipal laws of Great Britain should receive due punishment.
Now, having considered some of the definite causes of 
friction during this year, we will discuss the general trend of 
sentiment with regard to American affairs. "We depend upon peace 
in Europe and upon war in America, for it is but too probable that 
a reconciliation between the Southern & Northern States, upon any 
terms, will be immediately followed by the most preposterous demands 
on this country", was the statement of the Times at the end of 
December 1862 - a statement which is remarkable as foreshadowing
the Alabama claims and as showing, that in spite of the declarations
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of public men, there still existed a party in England WbWi strongly 
sympathised with tftie Confederacy.
The American government bitterly resented such a declaration, 
and their resentment urged them on to again complain of the 
impartiality of British neutrality. On January 15th Seward wrote 
to Adams that British policy with regard to the insurrection had 
resulted in producing grave claims on "behalf of American'citizens 
against Great Britain. The British realm and British provinces 
were the basts ofc the naval war which the insurgents were waging, 
and British seamen and capital were their chief resource and strength. 
But while a wish was expressed that this state of things should be 
amended, there was no indulgence in any sort of threat. That there 
was a danger of alienation Lincoln well knew, but his great desire 
was to avoid this, for once internal peace was gained, he had no 
desire to wage aa aggressive foreign war.
Great Britain, too, had no desire for war with the United 
States', hence her attempts to stringently apply the Foreign 
Enlistment Act with regard- to the Alexandra, and the persecutions 
of subjects who had violated her neutrality laws. The speech of 
the President of the Board of Trade (the Rt Hon T.M.Gibson) at 
Aahton-under-Lyme in January was also favourable to the North. He 
accused the Confederates of deliberately violating and evading the 
laws of England and he did not consider the restoration of the 
Union impossible.
Lord Russell, indeed, was so anxious to prevent the 
activities of Southern agents in England and thus avoid any cause 
of dissension with the North, that he proposed to the other members 
of the Cabinet that an armed vessel should be sent to the
confederate authorities, with an officer instructed to remonstrate^
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"but on further consideration it was decided not to sanction this 
measure, although Adams's protests with regard to "blockade running 
still continued as vigorously as ever.
As a matter of fact relations with America were not of 
supreme importance at this time, for Great Britain was anxiously 
watching the continent where open hostilities had "broken out between 
Germany and Denmark. Consequently Seward's fear,expressed in his 
despatch of February 1st, that a movement existed ia Great Britain 
to obtain concessions for the insurgents if they would give up the 
struggle, was unfounded. Private parties may have wished this, but 
the Government were far too much occupied to listen. As a matter 
of fact Lord Russell's speech in the House of Lords at the beginning 
of the session made no reference whatever to American affairs. 
Lord Derby^ as leader of the Opposition^spoke somewhat bitterly ; "If
n
I have not misread the papers laid before Congress; he declared" they 
state that if we do not put a stop to the sale of vessels of this 
kind in this country, the result must be that the Federal government
will take the law into their own hands; that their cruisers will
% 
follow these vessels into British ports and will in British waters
maintain their own interests. My lords, I hope the noble earl will 
be able to show that he has answered that despatch in a manner whAch 
will put an end to such monstrous demands for the future".
I do not consider however that Lord Derby was actuated by 
hatred of the North, but that he was simply as leader of the 
opposition following the traditional policy of attacking the party 
in power; which was still determined to avoid interference in 
American affairs- 
Yet the Federal States were not exact ^ satisfied with this,
for in a despatch of February 13th we find Seward bitterly
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complaining that British sympathies with the insurgents were still
»
so strong that the Government was content to leave their relations 
with the United States in a state unsatisfactory to the latter. 
"It is, nevertheless", wrote Seward, "a grave question whether if 
so left, they must not inevitably fall into a worse and more 
perplexing condition. The state of our relations is this : Great 
Britain regards the insurgents as a lawful naval "belligerent; we 
do not. Great Britain pursues a policy in regard to them based 
upon her view of their character. W« pursue a different one. The 
dealings of British subjects with the insurgents are continually 
producing controversies and claims-upon which the two governments 
cannot agree. Interested British subjects require Her Majesty's 
Government to ask of the United States explanations and concessions 
which they cannot make, "*and the interests of the United States and 
their citizens require this government to make claims which Her 
Majesty's Government think they cannot concede". Seward then 
expressed the hope that such controversies should be settled in a
friendly manner.
la Great Britain, too, this question of claims was being
considered. Lord Caraarvoa, ia the House of Lords on February 16th, 
while admitting that the Americans had claims against the British 
Govenament ; yet contended that Great Britain must ask redress for 
the arbitrary arrest aad imprisonment of British subjects, and the. 
coademnatioa of British ships in American prize courts on 
priaciples which were very questioaable. With regard to the 
condemnation of British ships ; Russell upheld the verdict of the 
American prize courts^and said that ia cases where owners of vessels 
had made complaints, it was because international law had not been 
understood. He agala stated definitely that Her Majesty's
Government was not responsible for the acts of the Alabama and that
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consent would never "be given to arbitration. He owned, however, 
that there had been a question of a commission but that this woul.d 
be impossible because the United States would be sure to propose 
that the case of the Alabama should be referred to the commission 
and Great Britain could not consent to that. He agreed, however,
with Carnarvon that causes of friction should be removed but he didy
not see how this could be done while the positions of the two 
countries were so absolutely opposed to each other.
The following month Seward wrote again to Adams expressing 
his disappointenftoi at the decision given in the case of the 
Chesapeake, a Federal steamer,which while plying between Hew York 
and Portland,(Maine), had been seized by certain passengers who 
overpowered officers and crew^ and then navigated the vessel to 
Nova Scotia, claiming that they acted under the authority of the 
rebel states. Proceedings were instituted in the name of the 
Queen against the vessel and cargo in the vice-admiralty court at 
HalifaXjand the Court decreed restitution to the owners on the 
ground that the bringing of the vessel and cargo into a port of
t
Nova Scotia was an offence against British neutrality, and that the 
restoration of vessel and cargo to their original owners was an act 
of Justice to the offended dignity of the British crown. But while 
this gratified the Federal Government,displeasure was felt because 
the judical authorities refused to give up the Southerners who had 
captured the vessel and it was this displeasure which Seward now
expressed.
Great Britain was indeed plaeed in an embarrassing position,
and I do not see how she could have adopted any other policy; for 
any attempt during this year at satisfying American demands would 
undoubtedly have lead to the overthrow of th« Government. Popular
sentiment was indeed not ready for Genevan arbitration. And while
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the South wae complaining bitterly of our partiality for the ITorth 
the latter was declaring Hiat the condition of things which existed 
between Great Britain and herself was little less than actual war. 
Undoubtedly in the Federal States a desire for retaliatory 
proceedings and compensation was on the increase, but the Government, 
while still insisting on its claims; was attempting to prevent the 
growth of any injurious proceedings against Great Britain which 
might lead to open war*
Russell, however, at the beginning of April, while admitting 
to Mams his disappointment at the result of the case of the 
Alexandra,still maintained that the Government could not alter its
position.
Mams too, was now convinced that Great Britain would not
change her policy. On April 7th he wrote as follows to Seward :- 
"I am now more and more convinced of the inutility of pressing these 
(i.e. re outfitting of ships) or any arguments further upon this 
ministry. Meanwhile I should earnestly hope that our efforts to 
bring the deplorable struggle in America to a successful issue may 
be crowned with success, otherwise it is much to be apprehended 
that the causes of offence may be accumulated to such an extent on 
this side as to render an escape from a conflict almost impossible. 
Nothing will keep down the malevolent spirit——but the conviction 
that there is no hope left of effecting a permanent disruption of 
the. United States".
Seward*s despatch of June 3rd seems to me to contain a threat. 
He Bxpreseed his disappointment with the fact that the Government 
would not take stronger measures with regard to Confederate ships 
in British ports and then significantly adds :- "Should our ' 
campaign prove fortunate, the ministry——will probably regret their
shortcoming even more profoundly that we do". whether war would
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have resulted if the Alabama claims had not been subjected to 
arbitration, it is, of course, impossible to say.
But on June 2nd ; instructioris had been issued to the 
governors of British colonies which were intended to remove such 
causes of friction as had been caused by the cases of the Tuscaloosa 
and the Sea Bride. The Tuacaloosa had been captured by Semmes, of 
Alabama fame, and had been commissioned by one of his lieutenants 
to act as a tender. On August 8th 1863, she had arrived in Simon's 
Bay for provisions. Walker, the rear-Admiral commanding the 
British Fleet in these waters, thereupon asked the Governor, Sir 
Philip Wodehouse, for the opinion of the law officers as to whether 
she should be treated as a prize.because she had never been 
condemned before a prize court. Haturally, if she were a prize, 
she could not be admitted into a British harbour. The acting 
attorney general said that the vessel should be regarded as a tender, 
and this was done. Wodehouse in the meantime wrote home for 
instructions and it was finally admitted that the ship was a prize. 
Consequently, when on December 26th she again returned to anchorage 
in Simon's Bay she was detained as a prize. But on March 10th 1864, 
He?/castle sent instructions from England that once having been 
treated as a tender she must now be released with a warning to 
Semmes. This decision, which was carried out much annoyed the 
Federal Government.
With regard to the Sea Bride, the Federals contended that 
she was captured in British waters, but the real truth was extremely 
doubtful and the British Government was not disposed to interfere. 
A question also arose in connection with her cargo. She had been 
captured by the Alabama in September 1863 ; and after her capture,
appeared at Foul Pointe, Madagascar^under the name of the Helen^and
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the confederate flag, and her cargo was bought "by a British subject. 
The United States consul protested that this act was piratical 
"because the property was uncondemned and therefore it belonged still 
to American owners.
It was to prevent similar causes of discord therefore that 
the following instructions were issued to the governors of "British 
colonies :- ,1-If any prize——sha.ll be brought by the captors within 
Her Majesty's jurisdiction, notice shall be given by the governor 
to the captors immediately to depart and remove such prize. 11. A 
vessel^which shall actually have been converted into and used as 
a public vessel of war ; shall not be deemed to be a prize. 111. If 
any prize shall be brought within Her Majesty's jurisdiction 
through mere stress of weather or other unavoidable necessity, the 
governor may allow for her removal such time as he may consider to 
be necessary. T7. If any prize shall not be removed at the time 
prescribed to the captors by the governor, the governor may detain 
such prize until Her Majesty's pleasure shall be made known. V. If 
any prize shall have been captured by any violation of the territory 
or territorial waters of Her Majesty the governor may detain such 
prize until Her Majesty's pleasure shall be made known.
These instructions are of course an honest attempt to apply 
definite rules to questionable cases. To a certain extent they are 
naturally unsatisfactory, but I do not see how anything better 
could have been done. For instance^opinions may differ v/ith rerard 
to a prize which ,has been converted into a ship of war. Some may 
contend that the conversion is satisfactory anri others that it is 
not. Again much depends upon the character of the governor and his 
advisers with regard to the application of the term "stress of
weather or other unavoidable necessity". Still the issue of such
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regulations chowed the desire of Great Britain to act with absolute
impartiality.
Inuring this month another cause of complaint arose and Great
Britain formally protested against the decision of the Federal 
Government to treat British subJects ; found trading with the South
as enemies.
There was however no prospect of intervention. Much public
sympathy was indeed expressed for the Confederacy "but the nation at 
large would not tolerate interference. In July petitions were sent 
to Parliament in favour of a movement to bring about a cessation of 
bloodshed /but the government successfully vindicated their policy 
and nothing was done. Palmerston's reply to Lindsay on July 25th, 
when he asked if the government could not endeavour to bring about 
a suspension of hostilities was extremely curt. He regretted the 
sacrifice of life and property in America, and the distress the war 
had produced in England, but no advantage could be gained by any
interference.
Three days after this in the House of Commons the question
arose of emigration to the United States. Complaints were urged 
that British subjects were engaged as workmen ;but on arrival in 
America were forced into the Federal service. Seward in August, 
however, contended that in cases where complaints had been well 
founded, redress had been done-and that, as a matter of fact, the 
mass of European emigrants were to be found prosperously and happily 
employed in agriculture and manufactures. The whole movement of 
emigration,he concluded, was honest and benificient,and if certain 
men had enlisted he inferred that it was wholly of their own free
will. The following extract from Lord Palmerston's speech at
Tiverton on August ^3rd clearly expresses the policy of the British 
Government with regard to American affairs :- "Some are for the
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north, on the grounds of their hatred of slavery; some are for the 
south on the ground of their love of freedom and independence. We 
might have been involved one way or the other; if we had listened 
to those who urged different courses of action, we might have been 
involved in the quarrel; but I believe the country is glad we have 
abstained from taking that course. We could have had nothing to 
gain and we should only have added thousands of our own sons to the 
hetacomb of victims which that calamitous and bloody slaughtering 
war has sacrificed.——We may hope that many months will not elapse 
before some progress will be made towards healing that tremendous 
breach which now exists. But of this I am convinced, that if we 
had yielded to those who, from the purest motives and from a 
sincere conviction, urged us to interfere to offer our mediation to 
endeavour to reconcile the quarrel between the parties before 
matters were ripe for our adjustment, we should not only have failed 
In accomplishing that object but we should have embittered the 
feelings between that country and this, and have rendered the 
future establishment of good relations between us and them less 
easy and more difficult. ' Therefore I think our neutrality was wise
, •
and I am sure that it is appreciated by the country at large".
The fact that this last statement is true is also apparent 
in the case of the Georgia. This vessel left Greenock in April 
1865 under the name of the Japan ( and proceeding to the coast of 
Prance, there received her armament and stores from a British 
steamer and hoisting the rebel flag began her career as a Confederate 
cruiser. In May 1864 she took refuge from Federal warships in 
Liverpool and was later advertised for sale, and bought by a British 
merchant for £15.000. The Federal government declared that the 
sale was illegal ,and announced their intention of seizing the ship
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on the high seas. To avoid a similar case arising, on August 8th, 
Russell informed Mams that the government had given.directions 
that in future no ship of war of either 'belligerent should be 
"brought into any of Her Majesty's ports for the purpose of being 
dismantled or sold. On August 15th the Georgia was seized at sea 
about 20 miles offLisbon by the United States frigate Niagara,and 
the seizure attracted much attention in England. The general 
impression of the English press was that the seizure was legal and 
that the purchasers of an enemy's vessel of war,vihen the said 
vessel is blockaded in port without means of escape must take the 
risk of subsequent seizure. The Government too acquiesced in this 
view, merely asking that the ship should be brought before a prize 
court as soon as possible and tried by the principles of 
international law. One can hardly help thinking that if the 
seizure had taken place at a time vfoen the relations of the two 
countries were more critical, stronger measures would have been 
taken, for the British Government would probably not have acquiesced
in the seizure.
must now consider the most serious question of the year -
namely British neutrality and Canada. Here indeed there was a 
certain risk of rupture, but fortunately serious danger was averted. 
The trouble was mainly caused by persons who claimed to be in the 
service of the Confederacy^and who devoted their energies to 
organising raiding parties to depredate on the property of citizens 
of the United States and to liberating prisoners of war whenever 
a favourable opportunity presented itself. In Septembe^ one party 
organised by a certain Bennet G.Burley^and consisting of 20 me», 
seized the steamer Philo Parsons, running between the city of 
Detroit and Sandusky^after she had left Kelly ! s Island in the State
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of Ohio. They then captured the Island Queen at Middle Bass Island, 
Ohio, and put ashore all the passengers. They also forced the&plerk 
of the Philo Parsons f at the risk, of his life, to hand over to them 
the money in his charge. The Federal Government at once demanded
So
the extradition of Burley; and^the case was referred to the municipal 
authorities. After a hearing before the Recorder of Toronto, the 
request of the Federal Government was complied witl^and Burley was
surrendered.
The Vermont business in October was far more serious.
Seward, indeed, regarded the outrage as a deliberate attempt to 
embroil the governments of Great Britain and the United States and 
involve them in a border war. The circumstances were as follows. 
Twenty or thirty Confederate subjects crossed the border from Canada 
and entered the village of St Albans in Vermont, where they robbed 
the bank of 120.000 dollars, attempted to burn houses, and fired on 
unarmed citizens, killing one and wounding others. The raid 
lasted an hour, and then the band returned to Canada. Here, however, 
they were arrested and held for punishment, and Seward expressed 
his gratification to the British legation at Washington for such 
prompt and satisfactory proceedings. But when the prisoners were 
brotoght before Judge Coursol at Montreal ; they were discharged and 
the money which they had stolen was returned to them. This caused 
great excitement in New Yorkjand on December 14th, General Dix, 
outraged by such a decision and without consulting th« Government 
issued an order directing all military commanders on the frontier 
shoot down any attempting further acts of depredation and if
necessary to cross the border into Canada in pursuit* and on no 
account were the prisoners taken, to be surrendered to the local 
authorities, but they were to be sent to the Headquarters Department
of the East for trial and punishment by military laws.
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Naturally if these orders were carried out, there could only 
be one result - war. In view of this ; the following entry of 
December 19th in .the diary of an official of the Confederate War 
Department is interesting. "General Dix orders his military 
subordinates to pursue any rebel raiders even into Canada and "bring 
them over. So light may come from that quarter. A war with England 
would "be our peace".
But Lincoln had no intention at this time of war with J&mgland, 
and consequently Dix was foreed to revoke his instructions. The 
British Government also was desirous of maintaining peace, and Lord 
Mo nek, the governor-general of Canada, was instructed to be guided 
by the decision of the proper legal authorities in the provinces ; 
as to whether the persons in custody ought or ought not to be 
delivered up under the treaty of extradition. If the decision were 
that they ought to be delivered up, the Government would approve of 
Lord Monck doing so- If the decision were to the contrary, the 
Government suggested that they should be put on trial on the charge 
of violation of the royal prerogative by levying war from Her 
Majesty f s dominions against a friendly power.
Consequently the criminals were again captured. Judge Coursol 
was also reproved by the Canadian Parliament and suspended. But 
again the prisoners were discharged by Mr Justice Smith of Montreal 
on the ground that Young, the ringleader of the party, bore a 
commission in the Confederate army, and that the attack on St Albans 
must be regarded as a hostile expedition undertaken and carried out 
under the authority of the so-called Confederate States by one of 
the officers of their army. But the Government of Canada was not
»
satisfied and the prisoners were arrested again in March 1865.
The termination of the Civil War, however, caused the case to be
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Taut languidly prosecuted and the criminals received no punishment^ 
tut the Canadian authorities, desiring to maintain friendly relations 
with the United States,refunded the money which was in the possession 
of the thieves when they came into the custody of the Canadian
courts.
In 1817, the British and American governments, after
strenuous rivalry in the matter of armaments on the Great Lake had 
decided that each government should limit its naval forces on the 
frontier to 4 vessels. In October 1864; owing to the annoyance caused 
by the Vermont "business and similar episodes, this arrangement no
•
longer met. with the approval of the Federal Government and so Seward 
instructed Adams to give Russell notice that at the expiration of 
six months the United States would deem themselves at liberty to 
increase the naval armament upon the lakes. At the same time 
Seward clearly stated that the measure was only one of national 
defence and for no purpose of hostility.
But the decision was undoubtedly influenced by the irritated 
feeling which still prevailed - an irritation which is also shown 
by the decision with regard to Lord Wharncliffe*s relief fund of 
£17.000. This money was raised by a bazaar held in Liverpool and 
it was intended to relieve the hardships of Southern prisoners of 
war. Lord TR/harncliffe was chairman of the committee,and he wrote 
to Adams asking that an accredited agent might be sent out to visit 
the military prisons in the No them States and apply the money as 
he thought best. Adams referred the matter to his government. 
Seward 1 s reply on December 5th was as follows :- 'You will now 
inform Lord Wharncliffe that permission for an agent of the 
committee described by him,to visit the insurgents detained in the 
military prisons of the United States and to distribute among them
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£17.000 of British gold is disallowed. Hence it is expected that 
your correspondence with Lord Wharncliffe will end. That 
correspondence will necessarily "become public. On reading it ; the 
American people will be well aware that the United States have ample 
means for the support of prisoners as well as for every other 
exigency of the war in which they are engaged. The American people 
will "be likely also to reflect that the sum thus insidiously 
tendered in the name of humanity, constitutes no large portion of 
the profits •which its contributors may be justly supposed to have 
derived from the insurgents,by exchanging with them arms and 
munitions of war for the coveted productions of immoral and 
enervating slave labour. Nor will any portion of the American 
people be disposed to regard the sum thus ostentatiously offered for 
the relief of captured insurgents as a too generous equivalent for 
the devastation and desolation which a civil war, promoted and 
protracted by British subjects, has spread throughout States which 
. before were eminently prosperous and happy. Finally in view of
las/-
this far«tv officious intervention in our domestic affairs the 
American people can hardly fail to recall the warning of the Father 
of our Commonwealth directed against two great and intimately 
connected public dangers - namely sectional faction and foreign
intrigue. I do not think that the insurgents have become debased,»
although they have sadly wandered from the ways of loyalty and 
patriotism. I think that, in common with all our countrymen, they 
will rejoice in being saved by their considerate and loyal 
government from the -grave insult which Lord Wharncliffe and his 
associates, in their zeal for the overthrow of the United States, 
have prepared for the victims of this unnecessary, unnatural and 
hopeless rebellion". (205)
Comments on this speech are absolutely unnecessary. I have 
quoted it fully,"because it seems to me to illustrate exactly the 
feelings of the Federals to England at the end of 1864. They are 
calm and dignifiedi they are determined not to embark upon foreign 
war, but they are exteemely conscious of their wrongs and are 
determined, when the struggle is over, to get them redressed. 
The nation as a whole is thoroughly irritated but all are unanimoue 
upon one point - there must not be war. And in Great Britain at 
this time, almost the same feelings prevailed. Certain sections 
still sympathised with the South, and considered that we had Just 
claims of resentment against the North,but all upheld the 
Government's policy of non-intervention.
In the following year, 1865, the Nortfa approached its 
triumph. If we were not aware of the course of events,we should
*
here ask ourselves one all important question :- "Would this mean 
war with. Great Britain?11. In the next chapter, we shall find the 
answer to this.
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CHAPTER Vll- RELATIONS IN 1865.
In 1863 we have seen how the relations of Great -Britain 
and America were exceedingly critical, and we have seen how matters
, •
steadily improved, despite much friction and irritation, until the 
autumn of 1864. Then for a tim« owing to Confederate activities 
in Canada and the order of Major-General Bix, war seemed more or 
less imminent, but owing to the.desire of both governments to 
maintain peace, this danger was averted-
At the beginning of.1865,sentiment in Great Britain was, I 
consider, more favourable to the North, than it had ever been. 
On January 26th, for instance, Bright wrote to'Sumner as followst- 
"I think you need not trouble yourself about England. At this 
moment^ opinion seems to have undergone a complete change and our 
people and indeed our Government is more moderately disposed than
•
I have ever before known it to b«. I hear from a member of the 
Government that it is believed that the feeling between our Cabinet 
and the Washington Government has been steadily improving". Then 
on February 17th he wrote i- 'There still seems to be an idea in 
America that somebody in Europe intends to meddle in your contest. 
I suppose the rebels invent the story and credulous people believe 
it. With us such a notion is unknown. All parties and classes 
here are resolved on a strict neutrality ( and I believe there is an 
honest intention that no further cause of irritation or quarrel shall 
come from this side.——The tone of Parliament is wholly ©hanged, and 
men begin to be ashamed of what has been said and done during the
last four years".
Even*Historicus ; who had contributed to the London Times some
of the most violent attacks on the North wrote on January llth
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condemning the confederate maritime policy and expressing the hope 
that no confederate cruisers should ever again hail t from an English 
port. "It certainly would "be a strange example of an "engineer 
hoist by his own petard", if Liverpool merchantmen were to "be seen 
"burning on the high seas lay the act of cruisers sent out from 
Liverpool J1 he wrote. English sentiment had indeed changed!
But American sentiment was not so favourable to Great Britain 
as British sentiment was to America. The Reciprocity Treaty of 
1854 1 "by vihieh American subjects were allowed to take fish in the 
bay's, harbours and creeks of the British North American provinces, 
(with the exception of Newfoundland) and which allowed British 
colonists to send duty free into America the principal products of 
the soily mines and forests, was now attacked,and Congress on 
January 18th gave notice that the United States desired to terminate 
the agreement after the expiration of the stipulated notice of 12
months.
These measures caused a certain amount of anxiety in Great
Britain. Adams, on February 2nd, wrote to Seward that the press 
was giving great publicity to them, that it was thought that they 
indicated a determined spirit of enmity towards Great Britain, and 
that reconciliation of North and South would mean a joint 
declaration of war against this country and an advance into Canada. 
"It is then whispered about J he continued, "that the really wise 
way to avert so grave a danger would be to anticipate it by 
sustaining the insurgents so far as to prevent their ruin; even
though it should be at the hazard of a war".
^ But the British Government still had no wish for hostilities,
and when Parliament was opened on February 7th the Queen 1 s speech 
stated that Great Britain still stood steadfastly neutral". But a
bitter attack was made on the United States by the Earl of Derby,
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who declared that the notices for the termination of the reciprocity 
treaty and for the conclusion of the regulations of armaments on 
the Great Lakes,were adopted in a spirit of hostility towards this 
country- Russell, in reply, said that the subject was an 
exceedingly difficult one. He acknowledged that acts had been 
committed in Great Britain which had caused irritation in America,
f
and he acknowledged that the Confederates had equipped their 
cruisers in British ports. But he thought that Great Britain had 
done all that was possible to prevent this; and he again defended 
British recognition of the belligerent character of the Confederacy. 
The whole speech however was exceedingly uneasy in tone, and 
betrayed a certain amount of restlessness and indecision. Prom the 
conclusion of the speech it is quite apparent that the Government 
was aware that the American claims for redress would have to be 
considered | and with a General Election pending the whole business 
was extremely distasteful, Russell, therefore, not knowing what 
surprises the next few months might hold in store, was obliged to be 
extremely careful and accordingly spoke as follows :- ^KTow and then 
we hear a threat that the day is comi'ng when the United States will . 
make a demand upon Her Majesty's government. That question, as 
your lordships heard laejb year and the year before, is that a 
demand should be made by the United States of America on account 
of the capture and destruction of merchant vessels by the Alabama 
and other ships, which being originally built in England were 
afterwards taken to distant ports, there to receive their armaments,
Tf!*
and thus to'be enabled to cruise against the property of the United 
States. Looking at the precedents in international law——such a 
claim upon the government of this country would be extremely unfair.
Therefore , while I say we are bound to make every allowance for
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the irritation that may arise in the United States——we cannot 
allow that any of these claims are justly preferred".
At the same time much uneasiness prevailed in Great Britain 
with regard to the intentions of America,^Canada especially was a
"bone of contention. Many people were quite certain that as soon
> 
as peace was made "between North and South, a joint attack on Canada
would result. Consequently the defences of Canada "became a subject
»
of extreme importanc«jand the Government while disavowing and 
discouraging the alarmists, nevertheless inquired into the means 
of defence against invasion and the measures required to place the 
frontier in a state of security. Upon the publication of this 
report* the-measures taken by the United States were bitterly 
attacked in the House of Commons on February 10th, as being 
equivalent to a declaration of war. Palmerston, however, was 
opposed to this view and stated that events had occurred on the 
lakes which the United States had a right to complain of, and that 
they were perfectly justified in adopting such measures. Russell, 
too, in an interview with Adams a few days later, expressed very 
favourable sentiments towards the Northern States ; and showed Adams 
a letter which he had written to Messrs Mason , Slidell and Mann.,; 
on the 13th protesting vigorously against the violation of British 
neurality by Confederate agents and requesting that such practices 
should cease.
But Sevsard's attitude, as expressed in his despatch of 
February 21st, was by no means so conciliatory. He declared that 
the United States had many just causes of war and that vessels for 
the Confederacy were still being fitted out in British ports. 
Therefore America could not adopt a less vigorous defensive policy 
but there was no intention of making hostility to Great Britain a
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condition of reconciliation with the insurgents, as certain sections 
in England seemed to fear.
Yet the whole tone of the despatch was hostile as will "be 
seen by the conclusion :- 'I cannot omit to say that the British 
Government ."by its toleration of the hostilities of its" subjects, 
forces upon the American people the question whether Great Britain 
is, or is not, actually intervening in favour of the insurgents".
MeanMfoile the alarmist policy was still vigorously pursued, 
and in the Cabinet on February 23rd the termination of the 
arrangement of 1818! and of the reciprocity treaty was considered, 
and on the following day Russell in an interview with Mams
\
expressed the wish that some arrangement coul€ be made with regard 
to these matters. It was probably owing to this and to Adams's 
warnings that the policy of the United States was causing trouble 
in Great Britain, that on March 8th Seward wrote that since no 
further hostile expeditions were apprehended from Canada the United 
States government was willing that the convention of 1817 should 
remain in force and that no additional vessels would "be sent to the
lakes.
In an interview with Mr Burnley, the British charge d'affaires
at Washington, Seward also stated that when the Civil War should 
end,the United States Government would cheerfully enter into 
negotiations witli regard to the Reciprocity Treaty. He also stated 
that the government did not contemplate war against Great Britain, 
but that it desired the redress of its wrongs "by peaceful means. 
Naturally this contributed towards the decline of the alarmist 
policy and the debate in the House of Commons-on March 13th clearly 
showed the friendly feelings of the British Government. After a 
long discussion, Palmarston averred that, in spite of the irritation 
against Great Britain which the war had occasioned ( there still
existed in America far deeper feelings of goodwill and that there
was little danger of the interruption of friendly relations. "We 
have no complaints to make of the Government of the United State*,
he continued. "They have acted in a fair and honourable manner, 
in all the matters that may have arisen between us. No doubt there 
are claims which they have put forward, not urging them at present, 
but laying, the ground for their discussion at some future time. No 
doubti also, w<8 have claims upon them which we do not put forward 
at present, but have announced to be claims which at some future 
tim* may be discussed. But I trust that we both feel it to be for 
the interest and for the honour of the two countries that peace 
should be preserved, and that matters of this sort ought to be 
capable of a friendly and amicable adjustment. All I can say is 
that the government, as long as they continue to be chargeable with 
the conduct of affairs, will do everything that the honour and 
interests of the country permit them to'do,to maintain inviolate 
the relations of peace and friendship between the two countries 11. 
This speech Is, of course, a great advance,and from it one 
concludes that at some future time the British Government hoped to 
be able to adjust the American claims. Its effect, too ; on the 
alarmist polieyj was by no means inconsiderable. The decision of 
the American Government with regard to passports also helped to 
diminish the fear which existed. On December 17th 1864,an order 
had been issued commanding all travellers entering the United 
States (except immigrant .passengers directly entering an American 
port from a foreign vessel^ to produce a passport, but this order 
was now (March 8th) modified and free intercourse with Canada 
restored. Yet on the other hand the Americans were quite determined
•
that the Reciprocity Treaty should not continue, at least in its
existing form and so, on March 17th Adams gave formal notice that 
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it would terminate 12 months from that date.
By March 23rd however the alarmist policy was definitely 
abandoned j and Russell's speech in the House of Lords showed nothing 
"but goodwill towards the Federal States. Adams indeed a week later 
wrote to Seward that "there is now not a word said about the danger 
of war from the United States". In this same despatch he also gave 
an interesting side light on Palmerston's policy. "The one great 
dread of the prime minister, as it regards American affairs,is that 
of appearing to be bullied", he wrote. "It inspired his whole 
course of action as I well recollect in the Trent case. It has 
had great influence in producing the sluggishness with which our 
remonstrances have'"been generally met. It is this feeling shared 
in some degree "by both branches of the English race, that interposes 
most of the obstructions in the way of their harmony".
Early in the next month, with the surrender of General Lee, 
the civil war came virtually to an end. The North, triumphant and 
victorious, with an army of 1.000.000 and a powerful navy, were 
desirous of settling the Alabama claims, believing that they had 
grievances against every other branch of the English speaking race. 
The W.Indian colonists had thrived by means of the blockade runners
through whom the Confederacy had been enabled to protract the/
struggle. Canadians had given refuge to Confederate agents; and in 
the African and Asiatic colonies of Great Britain, the Alabama and 
other Confederate cruisers sent from British ports had received 
hospitality. Prom Australia too; came reports that the Shenandoah, 
the last of the Confederate cruisers, had by illegitimate privileges 
allowed to it at Melbourne, been enabled to destroy the American 
Hialing fleet in Arctic seas.
There was also a desire for revenge upon Great Britain in
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the South for the Confederacy held that Great Britain was 
responsible for their catastrophe "by her refusal of recognition.
Why, then did we not drift into war? I consider that there 
are several reasons for this. The North had indeed emerged from 
the contest victorious, but her sacrifices had been tremendous* 
The South was broken and bankrupt. Neither party therefore in 
spite of latent hostility wished for open war. Then again French 
intrigues in Mexico were beginning to cause suspicion and anxiety, 
and America had no wish to meet the united forces of England and 
Prance. The problems of the reconstruction of the South were also 
overwhelming and as time went on they became more and more absorbing.
Consequently although governmental actio?,legislative, 
diplomatic,and administrative, as well as popular sentiment, showed
great irritation and ill concealed enmity, there was no outbreak of
. t
hostilities.
The President's Proclamation of April llth was one of the 
first indications of this existing resentment after the end of 
hostilities. Neutral nations during the struggle had, of course, 
imposed certain restrictions on the war vessels of both belligerents 
in neutral ports. For instance, on January 31st 1864, the British 
Government had ordained that no ship of war belonging to either 
party should enter the port of Nassau or any other port of the 
Bahamas except by special leave of the governor or in case of stress 
of weather! even in these cases she was to put to sea again as soon 
as possible,and only take on board supplies for her immediate use. 
Also in no port of Her Majesty were ships to obtain any warlike 
equipment. If repairs were necessary^he ship in question must 
leave within 24 hours of their completion. Again a ship could only 
take on board sufficient coal to carry her to her destination and
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no coal was to be supplied to that ship in any port until three 
months had elapsed.
Lincoln now declared that the need for such regulations no 
longer existedi and that, if the privileges, which the war vessels 
of other nations were granted in American ports, were refused to 
American vessels in foreign ports, the United States would adopt 
the same measures.
But all irritation and ill feeling was to Toe forgotten for a 
time owing to the great catastrophe which was even then so close 
at hand. Three days after the issue of the above Proclamation.
* /
Lincoln was shot while attending the theatre and the following morning 
died from the effects of the wound. In Great Britain there was 
universal horror and indignation at the crime, and sympathy and 
regret were universally expressed. Queen Victoria wrote personally 
to Mrs Lincoln a touching letter of condolenoe ; and the Corporation 
of London and other municipal and public bodies testified in public 
meetings their respect and sorrow for the great American statesman/ 
and the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge expressed their 
indignation and abhorrence. In the House of Lords on May 1st 
Russell moved an address to the Queen expressing the sorrow and 
indignation of the House at the assassination of the President and 
prayed the Queen to communicate their sentiments to the government 
of the United States. *There havej said Ruseell,"been difficulties 
in maintaining peaceful relations between the United States and 
England, but these difficulties have always been treated with temper 
and moderation both on this side of the Atlantic and on the other. 
I trust that temper and moderation will continue to prevail. I can 
assure the House that as we have always been guided by a wish to 
let the people and Government of America settle for themselves,
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without interference of ours, the conflict of armies, so likewise 
during the time that may "be required to restore peace and 
tranquillity to the country, we shall equally refrain from any kind 
of interference or intervention,and shall trust that the efforts 
made will be successful and that that great republic will flourish 
in the enjoyment of that prosperity which she has so long enjoyed— 
— our relations of kindred with the people of the United States 
make us feel their misfortunes more than the misfortunes of any 
country on the face of the globe".
The same sentiments were expressed in the House of Commons, 
and directions were given to .the British Minister at Washington to 
make known to the American government the universal horror and regret 
of the British nation.
But the death of a single individual, however great he may 
be, and no matter what services h.e may have rendered to the state, 
cannot be allowed to interfere with the national life. In spite of 
an overwhelming sense of loss, things must proceed as usual.
On the death of Lincoln, therefore, the Vice-President,
to
Andrew Johnson succeeded tiae office, and on May 10th he issued one 
of his first proclamations, stating that armed resistance in the 
insurrectionary States was at an end, and that all Confederate 
cruisers must be arrested and brought into American ports. "And I 
do further proclaim and declare* runs the third paragraph of the 
Proclamation "that if, after a reasonable time shall'have elapsed 
for this proclamation to become known in the ports-of nations 
claiming to have been neutrals, •*• the said insurgents cruisers and 
the persons^on boardAthem shall continue to receive hospitality in 
the said ports, this government will deem itself justified in 
refusing hospitality to the public vessels of such nations in ports
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of the United States and in adopting such.- other measures as may be 
deemed advisable towards vindicating the national sovereignty 11. 
This was, of course, a warning to Great Britain that the Confederacy 
must no longer be regarded as a belligerent power.
But the British Government was anxious to remove all cause 
of friction, so on May 1st orders were given that the act of 
January 51st 186k, was no longer to be enforced, (see p.£14 & k;15). 
How much Lincoln's proclamation of April llth influenced this 
decision it is impossible to say. The-question of the belligerent 
rights of the Confederacy was also under consideration. On May 15th 
in the House of Lords, Russell was asked whether the Government 
intended to withdraw their recognition of the Confederacy as a 
belligerent. His answer expressed regret that such a question 
should have been brought forward for discussion,and he contended 
that with regard to the belligerent rights of the Confederacy there 
was no question of concession, but that the question was simply one
•
of fact. Lincoln by his declaration of a blockade, recognised the 
South as a belligerent f and the British Government was consequently 
obliged to pursue the same course. Now, if the Federals still 
exercised the right of searching British vessels, we could not 
admit that the war was over, and until the Government knew whether 
the United States still intended to stop, search and capture British 
vessels, no answer could be given to the question which had been
asked.
On the same day, Lord Palmerston, in the House of Commons
thus replied to a similar question :- "Whenever the government of 
the United States shall declare that it ceases to exercise with 
regard to neutrals those rights of search, capture and condemnation 
which belong to belligerents, then the war, as far as neutrals are
concerned! ceases, and there will "be no acknowledgment of 
belligerents either on one side or the other".
Towards the end of the month an attempt was made to revive 
the fear and suspicion which had existed at the "beginning of the 
year with regard to American designs upon Great Britain. A story 
was circulated that the change in the Presidency had "been the signal 
for a renewal of the old demand for reparation for the damage done
i
"by the Alabama and other Confederate cruisers; and that this demand 
was couched in a more absolute and imperious manner. Lord 
Palmerston's answer of the *6th, to an inquiry on this subject was 
so ambiguously worded that it rather increased than diminished the 
credit of the rumour. Then on the 30th in the House of Commons
the subject was again discussed.
^
I take the following from the London Times of May 31st:-
*
Mr Shaw Lefevret- "As some misapprehension was caused by the 
answer of the noble lord the other night to a question put by an 
honourable member, I wish to ask whether the communication which 
the noble lord said had been received from the United States 
government! with respect to the losses caused by the Alabama and 
other vessels! is in any way contradictory in tenor and spirit to 
Mr Adams's despatch of October 1863, In which he stated that, in 
order to preserve amity and friendship between the two countries, 
he was instructed by his government to postpone any question which 
might arise with reference to the depredation of the Alabama to 
some future time when it could be discussed with calmness; and I 
also wish to ask whether that communication was dated before or 
after the accession of President Johnson.
Lord Palmerston t- "I can only repeat what I said on a former 
occasion - that communications have been going on between the two
governments for a considerable time past with regard to the captures
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made by the Alabama and other ahipe of the game kind. My honourable 
friend wishes to know whether, in a recent communication the
I Jen he* I
critical words are repeated, which were contained in any former 
one. I am not aware that the identical words are used, but the 
general tenor of the communication is the same 11.
Mr. W.E.Porster then explained that there was an impression 
in the country that since the accession of President Johnson the 
claims with regard to the Alexandra had been made in a different 
spirit, and he asked that the mind of the country should be set at 
rest upon this subject. The reply of Mr Layard, the under-secretary 
for foreign affairs,was extremely satisfactory, for he stated 
definitely that no fresh feature had been introduced into the case 
and the demands were still presented in the same spirit. Naturally 
this plain and straightforward answer once again checked the 
increasing fear of American designs.
On June 2nd Adams had an interview with Lord Bussell / who 
stated, that both the French and British Governments had decided to 
recognise that the war was at an end. The same day the following 
instructions were sent to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty:- 
T have the honour to state to your Lordships——that intelligence 
has reached this country that the late President of the so-called 
Confederate States has been captured by the military forces of the 
United States and transported as a prisoner to fortress Monroe and 
that the armies hitherto kept in the field by the Confederate 
States have for the most part surrendered or dispersed. In this 
posture of affairs Her Majesty's Government are of the opinion that 
neutral nations cannot but consider the civil war in H.America as at 
an end———As a necessary consequence of such recognition Her 
Majesty's authorities in all ports, harbours and waters, belonging
to Her Majestyi whether in the United Kingdom or beyond the 
must henceforth refuse permission to any vessels of war carrying the 
Confederate flag to enter such ports, harbours and waters f and must 
request all vessels therein to depart". At the same time directions 
were given that any Federal cruiser lying within the said port, 
should not be allowed to start in pursuit until 24 hours had 
elapsed. Also all Confederate cruisers within British Ports and 
those entering within a month of the receipt of these orders,could 
disarm and remain in British waters.
This acknowledgment that the war was at an end naturally 
deprived the South of the recognition of belligerency, and 
consequently removed one grave cause of remonstrance which had 
existed since the beginning of the struggle.
But the United States were far from satisfied^and regret was 
expressed officially that the British Government deemed it necessary 
to forbid the pursuit of a Confederate cruiser until 24 hours had 
elapsed and that such ships shoultt be allowed to disarm in British«
ports. It was also stated that all such vessels were forfeited 
or ought to be delivered to the United States when reasonable 
application was made, and that if they were captured at sea, under 
no matter what flag, the United States would hold the capture lawful.
Yet the same despatch expressed pleasure at th« withdrawal 
of the concession of belligerent rights to the insurgents, and 
admitted that because normal relations were practically restored, 
the rights of blockade and search of British vessels would be 
abandoned. Thus another cause of friction was removed! At the same 
time, however, because Great Britain would not withdraw her 24 hours 
rule, American naval officers were instructed that the customary
courtesies were not to be paid to vessels of the British navy.
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In July, a General Election was held in Great Britain. 
Parliament had expired on the 12th of the month simply by efflux 
of time ( and there was in no sense anything like an ^appeal" to the 
countryi for there was no prominent question or controversy to "be 
decided. ^One aspect of /the election^ wrote C.3?.Adams "is 
particularly deserving of our notice in America. None of those who 
have been marked by their disposition in Parliament to preserve 
friendly relations with the United States appear to have lost any 
ground on account of it; while in the populous London constituencies 
the accession of not less than 4 new members, well known for their 
decided goodwill is a significant circumstance——Mr Bright and Mr 
Porster have been returned without opposition. It is not unfair 
to infer that the termination of our struggle has not been without 
its effect on *this result".
The practical results of the Elections were that of 657 
Members who were returned to the new House of Commons, 367 were 
described as Liberals and 290 as Conservatives. In the changes of 
the election the Liberal party lost 33 seats and gained 57, this 
representing a gain of 48 votes on a division.
It was therefore by this Liberal Government that the Alabama»
claims were again considered. Russell began the continuance of the 
correspondence on August 20th, by stating that it appeared to Her 
Majesty's government that there were but two questions by which 
the claims of compensation could be tested; T Had the British 
Government acted with due diligence or in good faith and honesty, 
in the maintenance of the neutrality they proclaimed? 11 Had the
*
law officers of the Crown properly understood the foreign enlistment 
act when they declined in June 1862 to advise the detention and 
seizure of the Alabama and on other occasions when they were asked
to detain other ships building or fitting in British Ports? 
"It appears to Her Majesty f s government that neither pf these 
questions could be put to a foreign government with any regard to 
the dignity and character of the British Crown and the British
x
nation", continued Russell. TOer Majesty's government are the 
sole guardians of their own honour. They cannot admit that they 
have acted with "bad faith in maintaining the neutrality they 
professed. The law officers of the Grown must be held to be better 
interpreters of a British statute than any foreign government can be 
presumed to be - Her Majesty's Government must therefore decline 
either to make reparation and compensation for the captures made by 
the Alabama or to refer the question to any foreign state 11.
But at the same time Russell stated that the British 
Government was willing to consent to the appointment of a 
commission to consider all claims arising from the Civil War, which 
the two powers should consent to refer to the Commissioners.
Russell's own feelings in the matter are seen by a letter 
which he wrote to Gladstone on September 17th, and which stated 
that the questions which would have to be submitted to arbitration 
were:-T Was Lord Russell diligent or negligent in the duties of 
his office? 11 Was Sir Round ell Palmer versed in the laws of 
England or was he ignorant or partial in giving his opinion to the 
Government? Til Ought the Government and Parliament of England to 
have provided fresh laws to prevent merchant ships leaving their 
ports until it was proved that they had no belligerent purposes?
•I feel that England would be disgraced for ever," he 
continued, "if such questions were left to the arbitration of a 
foreign Government.——The question has been the principal object of 
my thoughts for the last two years and I confess I think that paying
20 millions down / would be far preferable to submitting the case to 
arbitration".
British sentiment was now extremely favourable to the cause 
of the Union. In spite of -the end of the war, the Confederate 
cruiser, the Shenandoah,was still continuing her depredations. 
Consequently in the Times of September llth there was an expression 
of general indignation,and an attempt was made to excuse American 
irritation. "We can make great allowances", ran the article, "for 
the exasperation of the shipping interest in California. It is, 
perhaps, natural that their resentment should betray itself in 
bitter allusions to the alleged complicity of this country with the 
evil deeds of the Shenandoah. *The English pirate", "the English 
thief", "the English pirate, thief, or robber Sea King, called 
Shenandoah.", - such are the titles which the unhappy mates and 
captains of the captured vessels apply to the spoiler".
But while horror was expressed at the career of the 
Shenandoah, and while a wish was expressed that the British squadron 
in the Pacific should help in checking so lawless a career, it was 
clearly stated that "this is not the time to revive the wearisome 
controversy on the original equipment of the Alabama and her 
consorts*.
*
Yet as we have already seen by Russell's despatch of August 
31st,the government were prepared to make some concessions in this 
direction. But the American Government had no intention of
•
accepting Russell's proposal until they knew exactly what it meant. 
Consequently Seward on September 27th instructed Adams to ask 
Russell to specify exactly what classes of claims Her Majesty's 
Government were willing to refer and what classes they would not 
refer* Three days before Adams wrote to ascertain this fact, the 
following (evidently an official insertion) was published in the
London Times :- "In order to guard against any misunderstanding we 
are requested to re-state that the proposal of Earl Russell to the 
American government was conveyed in the following words :- Her 
Majesty's government are ready to consent to the appointment of a
commission to which shall be referred all claims arising during the \
late civil war which the two powers shall agree to refer to the, 
oommissioner*. These concluding words limit the subject of reference, 
since it would be inconsistent with the position taken up by Her 
Majesty's government, and with the arguments which induced it to 
decline arbitration, to permit the claims for losses by the Alabama 
and other vessels of the same character to be brought before a 
commission for discussion. It must be understood, therefore, that 
if any such commission were agreed on, those cases would be excluded 
from its jurisdiction*
Russell in a communication to Adams on the same day (October 
14th) took the same stand,and said that the British Government could 
not refer claims arising out of the eaptures made by the Alabama 
and the Shenandoah ; because the British Government could not be held 
responsible for acts of British subjects committed out of British 
jurisdiction and beyond British control.
While this, however, was regarded by America as extremely 
unsatisfactory,the order of October 13th which removed all 
restrictions from American war ships in*British ports and stated 
that henceforth unrestricted hospitality of friendship would be 
shown to such vessels in British ports at home and abroad, removed 
all irritation which the ^ hours rule had caused. Instructions at 
the same time were also given that the Shenandoah should be detained 
if she .entered any British port,or captured if found on the high 
seas. As a matter of fact , a few days after this, on November Sth, 
the vessel in question entered the Mersey,and was delivered over to
the United States consul.
Early in November, owing to tlie death of lord Palmers ton, 
Russell became Prime Minister and the Earl of Clarendon succeeded 
to the Foreign Office. In the other offices there was no change 
from the Palmereton Cabinet ; and of course no change was made in the 
existing policy of the Government. The speech of Lord Russell,on 
Lord Mayor's Lay, expressed the prevailing friendly sentiments. 
"Tor the last few years, on occasions like the present, we have had 
to lament the civil war which devastates the United States of 
America. That war is happily now at an end: and that great republic ; 
having freed herself from the guilt and stain of slavery, I trust 
will now continue in freedom and prosperity for years and centuries 
to come. Such at least, I believe, is the wish of Englishmen. I 
believe there are none but friendly feelings entertained towards 
that mighty republic".
Yet, in spite of Great Britain's friendly attitude, America 
was still determined to obtain ample redress for the Alabama 
depredations. Consequently on November Silst Earl Clarendon was 
informed by Mr Adams that the American government respectfully 
declined the creating of a joint commission, because it could not 
allow the exclusion! of the Alabama claims.
Thus the correspondence on this subject closed until the
following year, but, of course, neither of the parties concerned
(
was satisfied. Friendly relations still existed, but America was 
convinced that she had been wronged and that compensation must be 
given to her. Also Russell's attitude, which his letter to 
Gladstone shows extremely well, failed to win the support of an 
important section of the British public t who knew that America had 
been wronged, and who, being anxious for American friendship, wiUied 
to see the controversy settled. Besides, if foreign nations, when
Great-Britain was at war, relaxed their neutral duties, they knew 
that our maritime commercial interests must suffer. Also a general 
respect for America now prevailed^ and it was acknowledged in high 
quarters that America had grounds for complaint.
But the year came to a close without anything "being done /and 
on December 2nd the correspondence was clo&ed for a time "by a 
despatch from lord Clarendon to Mr Adams ; stating that no advantage 
could come from prolonging the controversy and that the British 
government had steadily and honestly performed their neutral duties.
Thus 1865 ended, with Britain and America in much the same 
position as at the "beginning of the year. British sentiment had, 
however, "become more favourable to America, but in America irritation 
against Great Britain still prevailed, for the end of the war had 
brought little abatement of the ill feeling which existed. Still, 
however, there was no danger of an open rupture, for America 
realised that there was a growing tendency in Great Britain towards 
settling the Alabama claims and for this she was quite prepared to 
wait.
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CHAPTER 7111. 1866.
During this year the relations of Britain -and America had 
the same trend as in 1865, A certain amount of irritation still 
prevailed} but both countries were anxious to establish a more 
friendly feeling. Hence we shall see that the action of the United 
States Government with regard to the Fenian movement was extremely
conciliatory and pleasing to the British Government, while the
•
desire of Great Britain to settle the Alabama claims afforded the 
United States some satisfaction although nothing definite was done.
The following extract from Adams's despatch of January 4th 
to Seward; shows the sentiment which prevailed in Great Britain :- 
"I think the tone of the press towards the United States is 
gradually improving——the position of the country has never been 
so high before——I forsee little danger of difficulty here no matter 
who may be called to the direction of affairs".
It is with this attitude in view therefore,that we must 
consider "the Fenian movement, which, if Great Britain and America 
had not been desirous of friendly relations, might have caused 
serious friction. The movement first became dangerous in 1865, and 
its adherents directed their attention to both Ireland and Canada. 
We will first consider the efforts of the Fenians in Ireland.--- -. 
Hundreds of thousands of Irishmen had emigrated to the United States, 
had settled there as American citizens; and had fought in the Civil
War.
Consequently, when the war was over^they were easily induced
to join the Fenian brotherhood, a society^which the members bound 
themselves by an oath to free and regenerate Ireland from the 
English yoke. The centre of the movement seems to have been in the 
United States,and its first convention was held at Chicago in
November 1863. After the end of the civil war emissaries were sent 
to Liverpool and Ireland but the British Government being informed 
of the plans "by traitorous members and spies, made numerous arrests. 
The "head centre", James Stephens, was seized in Dublin, but 
escaped from prison a few days later and returned to America. A 
special commission which sat at Dublin from November 30th to 
February 2nd, for the trial of other prisoners, brought the whole 
scheme to light, and out of 41 who were tried, 36 were convicted 
and sentenced to various terms of penal servitude. Then on 
February 14th the Lord Lieutenant was informed that the police 
knew of 500 Irish-American Fenians who were ready to head an 
insurrection and he demanded power to seize them. On February 17th 
1866, therefore,a Bill for suspending the Habeas Corpus Act in 
Ireland was passed, and 250 people were promptly arrested. Naturally 
amongst this number there were persons who claimed to be American 
subjects,and unfortunately, the views of Britain and America 
regarding allegiance were absolutely different. Since'the great 
immigration from Europe in the "Forties" the American Government 
had attempted to claim for its naturalized citizens the same rights 
in the land of their birth as were granted to native born Americans. 
The British Government, however, denied the right of expatriation 
and objected to the American view. Naturally, therefore, the arrest 
of Irish-Americans would cause a certain amount of difficulty. 
Fortunately, for both countries, however, Mr Adams knew how to deal 
calmly with the situation } and while fairly representing to the 
British Government the cases of American subjects who had been 
arrested, yet he realised that many of the people under arrest were 
more or less implicated in the conspiracy to overthrow British rule, 
He was also quite aware that they desired to embroil the British
and American nationsy and that their efforts were "bent in this 
direction. His policy, therefore, established a clear understanding 
with the British ministry that really innocent persons should be 
secured from serious annoyance, but that questionable offenders 
should be dealt with as they deserved.
The British Government too were extremely anxious that no 
cause of offence should be given to America, and all the interviev/s
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of Adams and Clarendon^with this subject were conducted in the most 
friendly manner. In an interview on March 8th, for instance, 
Clarendon expressed the wish,that, under the circumstances which 
existed, when people eame from the United States in such numbers 
and were found plotting against the government, Adams would not 
attempt to shelter them under his diplomatic mantle. Adams in the 
same conciliatory manner said that if the law of habeas corpus had 
not been suspended,and in cases where sufficient evidence was 
produced ( the law would have been allowed to take its own course. 
But now when no reasons were given and no charges were made , he 
thought that with regard to American citizens, the grounds of 
detention should be assigned to him.
This was also the opinion of the American Government, which, 
while anxious to protect its innocent subjects, was yet quite ready 
to agree to the punishment of offenders, saying that Americans, 
whether native born or natural!zed,owed the same submission to 
British laws while residing in Great Britain,as did British subjects* 
And on the other hand the British Government was quite ready to 
meet America, for when Seward remonstrated against the American 
consul at Dublin not being allowed to visit naturalized Americans 
suspected of conspiracy, the British Government removed their 
prohibition. Again in the case of several suspects, when papers
were produced showing that they were native Americans innocent of
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any evil desig^ they were at once released t and other people who 
were doubtlessly implicated in the movement were released after 
promising to leave the countryi merely because the American 
Government had taken an interest in their fate.
The whole spirit of the business was one of courtesy and 
conciliation;and indeed,Clarendon on June 1st told Adams that the 
one desire of the British Government was to get rid of the men nftio 
had been imprisoned as quickly as was possible, consistent with 
their own safety. Consequently in August Adams was able to inform 
Seward that the people wftio had been arrested in Ireland, under the 
act utoich suspended the habeas corpus, were being steadily liberated, 
and that some of them were greatly discontented at their failure to 
create a misunderstanding between Great Britain and the United 
States, with regard to what they called "wrongful detention*. 
In September the correspondence of the two governments re this 
subject ceased, for before the end of the month all American 
citizens, native or naturalized, had been released.
We must now consider Fenian activity in Canada^ %iere at 
the beginning of the year, considerable excitement prevailed, owing 
to expectations of a Fenian attack from over the border. Por 
instance, a concerted and formidable invasion was anticipated on 
6t Patrick's day. To meet this the Canadian Government called for 
volunteers,and the towns and villages along the frontier were 
strongly garrisoned. The United States Government too*took prompt 
measures,and despatched troops to the Border to prevent an invasion 
across the Maine boundary. Consequently the day, awaited with 
anxiety on both sides, passed off without any hostile demonstration.
During April and May, the action of the United States 
authorities was again satisfactory. In April, for instance, 750
stands of arms, sent to the Penians by sympathizers with the
(220)
movement in Portland,were seized at Eastport upon the protest of the 
British Consul-and in May still further seizure*of arms took place 
along the border. Such actions clearly showed that the United 
States were determined that the British Government should have no 
cause to complain of lack of viligance, and that there was no wish 
in official circles to make the United States a base for hostile 
action against Canada.
On June 1st however, a Fenian invasion of Canada from 
America really took place, and a band of between 1.000 and 1.500 
crossed in canal boats near Buffalo and took possession of Port Erie- 
Volunteers from various parts of Canada were hurried forward to 
meet them ( and the next day the battle of Limestone Ridge was fought, 
ffine Canadians were killed and a considerable number wounded^so the 
volunteers retreated. The Fenians, however, received no 
reinforcements,and so retreated across the river into the United 
States. Many of them were captured by the United States steamer 
Michiganx which had been stationed off Black Hock to intercept them, 
and steps were taken by the military authorities to prevent another 
invasion. At the same time the Fenian general Sweeney and his 
staff were arrested at St Albans by United States officials, and 
Fenians on their way Uorth were prevented from reaching the Border 
by the order of Major-General Meade* who was commanding the United
. *
States forces on the frontier.
It is, of course, quite apparent that the United States were 
anxious to prevent friction, and that the action which was taken was 
prompt and energetie. Indeed the measures adopted were so 
successful that on June llth Seward was able to inform Sir Frederick 
Bruce, (the British minister at Washington), that the communications 
which the President had received from Major-General Meade warranted 
the belief that the trouble was at an end. But at the same time
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regret was expressed with regard to the action of Canadian and 
British troops which were rumoured to have entered the territory 
of the United Statesi and to have there taken prisoners ; who had 
afterwards been conveyed to Canada. The despatch concluded as 
follows :- "The reports go so far as to say that——the Canadian 
agents have threatened that these prisoners——will be executed 
without legal trial. It is believed that these reports are 
exaggerated. Care has been taken by Major-General Meade -to have 
them investigated. In the meantime I am instructed by the President 
to represent to you and through you to the British and Canadian 
authorities, that this Government would not look without serious 
concern, upon the practice of any unnecessary severity, especially 
on the exercise of retaliation or other illegal proceeding, upon 
the persons of such offenders as have fallen or shall hereafter 
fall into the hands of the Canadian authorities". Then a wish was 
expressed that even the customary administration of the law would 
be tempered with clemency and forbearance.
It will be seen, consequently, from the above,that although 
the United States had acted promptly in suppressing Fenian 
invasions, they were still zealously determined to protect their 
own rights and the rights of their subjects. Yet their conduct at 
this time seems to me to be specially praiseworthy, for it is 
marked by a strict regard for international law and by a desire to 
fulfill the obligations which one nation owes to another.
The opinion of the Fenians themselves with regard to the 
attitude of the United States is seen by the proclamation which the 
Jenian Brigadier-Ge.neral Burns issued on June 14th to the officers 
and soldiers of the Irish Army in Buffalo :- Brothers——I had 
hoped to lead you against the common enemy of human freedom^and
would have done so, had not the extreme vigilance of the Government
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of the United States frustrated our plans.. It was the United 
States and not Efagland that impeded our march to freedom".
The British Governmentitoo, was quite willing to meet the 
views of America with regard to the treatment of prisoners,and 
when the House of Representatives on July 23rd requested the President 
to urge the Canadian authorities and the British Government to 
release the' Fenian prisoners captured in Canada, Seward was able to 
pay a tribute to the action of the British authorities. "On the 
llth of June last", he stated,"a note was addressed to the Hon.Sir 
Frederick Bruce, Her Majesty's minister in the United States. It is 
proper to say in relation to that note, that the reports mentioned 
therein to the effect that prisoners had been taken on the soil of 
the United States and conveyed to Canada and threatened by Canadian 
agents with immediate execution, without legal trial, were found 
on examination to be false and without foundation. It is due to 
the British Government to say that the representations made in the 
said note have been received and taken into consideration by the 
British Government and the Canadian authorities in a friendly
manner*.
Indeed, so friendly was the disposition of the British
Government that upon learning the wishes of the United States in 
this matter, instructions were tent to the Governor General of 
Canada, that the capital sentences passed on Fenian prisoners should 
not be carried out. Consequently the Fenian movement absolutely 
failed to cause any serious friction between the two Governments.
With regard to the Reciprocity Treaty, however, matters were 
not quite so satisfactory. Due notice was given by the American 
Government in 1865 that this would expire on March 17th 1866. The 
British Government, however, desired to renew the treaty in order 
to avoid friction over the fishing rights e* round the British Uorth
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American coast.
But British interests had to be protected, and so in February 
the Government gave notice that when the Reciprocity Treaty came to 
an end, the rights of American subjects to fish in the Inshore 
waters of Canada would cease. On the 16th of the month however, 
Sir Frederick Bruoe wrote to Seward informing him that the British 
Government would 'be quite content to renew the Treaty in its existing 
form or to enter into negotiations for some other arrangement. 
Meanwhile a conference had been held "between a delegation from the 
Colonial Government and the Committee of Ways and Means of the 
United States House of Representatives. It was found impossible, 
however, to come to any agreement,as the demands of the United 
States were far too excessive;and as there was no sign that these 
demands would be modified, Seward's reply to Bruc« gave little hope. 
"Careful inquiry made during the recess of Congress^1 he wrote, 
"induced the President; to believe that there was then no such harmony 
of public sentiment in favour of the extension of the Treaty as 
would encourage him in directing negotiations to be opened.Inquiries 
made since the re-assembling of Congress- confirmed the belief then 
adopted f that Congress prefers to treat the subject directly and not 
to approach it through the forms of diplomatic agreement M.
As Congress showed no intention of extending the Treaty it 
expired on March 17th. The British Government,while expressing 
regret made its position quite clear,and stated that by the 
termination of the Treaty, two important rights of this country, 
the enjoyment of which, through the operation of the Treaty, was 
temporarily ceded to citizens of the United States, reverted 
absolutely to the British crown. Those rights were first, the
*
exclusive right of British subjects to fish on the sea coasts and
shores and in the bays, harbours and creeks of the British
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possessions of N.America,except in so much as certain restricted 
privileges may have been conceded to American citizens by the 
Convention of 1818; and secondly, the exclusive right of naviration 
by British subjects of the River St Lawrence and the canals 
communicating between the great lakes and the canals in Canada. 
It was stated however, that American subjects would still be 
allowed the privileges of the navigation of the St Jjawrence and the 
canals, but henceforth American subjects would not be allowed to 
fish in British waters or land on British territory to dry their 
nets or cure their fish.
This prohibition would undoubtedly cause irritation in the 
Northern States of America,and possibly it might lead to 
misunderstandings between the two governments. Consequently in 
April, to avoid any collision when the fishing season approached, 
the United States proposed to Great Britain that a commission should 
be appointed to T define the limits which separated the British 
exclusive right from the common right of fishing on the coasts and 
in the seas adjacent to the British North American colonies, IT to 
agree upon and establish such regulations as would secure to 
fishermen of the United States the privilege of entering bays and 
harbours for shelter, to repair damages, to purchase stores,and to 
obtain water, 111 to agree upon the penalties which should be 
imposed upon the violators of rights and the transgression of the 
restrictions adopted*
About the same time the House of Representatives asked the 
President what steps he had taken to protect the rights and 
interests of American citizens in the fishing grounds adjacent to 
the British provinces, and the reply was given that a sufficient 
naval force was to be sent to the grounds in question for that
purpose. But it was clearly stated that this act was not one of
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hostility, and the department of state said that there was reason 
to believe that there were no grounds for apprehending any collision 
or any necessity for the employment of force.
Yet, at the same time, the situation might "become extremely 
delicate, and the British Government was aware of this. Consequently 
after considering the American proposal for a commission,it was 
decided to send out authority to Sir Frederick Bruce,to enable him, 
after consulting with the provincial authorities,to make the 
necessary arrangements with the United States.
On May 31st a temporary measure was decided upon, and it was 
decided to issue fishery licenses to American citizens upon the 
payment of 50 cents per ton of measurement of the vessels proposed 
to "be used in fishing. The licenses were to remain in force for 
the fishing season of 1866,and conferred upon their holders all the 
rights enjoyed by fishermen of the United States under the 
Reciprocity Treaty.
Thus, by the conciliatory attitude of both governments, a 
temporary arrangement, which afforded a security against any 
collision, was effected.
Meanwhile changes were taking place in the government of 
Great Britain. In June the Government was defeated e* the struggle 
over the Reform Bill and consequently resigned. A new ministry was
•
formed by the Earl of Derby, with Lord Stanley as the secretary for 
Foreign Affairs, instead of Lord Clarendon. Early in July Mr Adams 
received his first interview with Lord Stanley,*and it was then quite 
apparent that the relations, which had existed between Great Britain 
and America during the previous administration, were still to 
continue. Stanley definitely stated that he had always favoured the 
cultivation of friendly relations with America,and that he regretted 
that such relations should have been at all endangered during the
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Civil War by ill considered speeches made in Parliament and "by the 
ill temper of the newspapers.
At the end of July the attitude of the Government was made 
still clearer, when Mr White M.P. for Brighton, asked Lord Stanley 
whether, having considered the conspicuous good faith and friendly 
feeling o'f the government of the United States towards Great Britain 
in its recent conduct to the Fenians, Her Majesty's Government were 
prepared to submit all claims and matters in dispute between the , 
two powers to an arbitration mutually acceptable.
Lord Stanley's reply was carefully guarded, but it intimated 
that if the claims should be revived, Lord Russell's rejection might 
possibly be re-considered. "I agree in the opinion which the 
honourable member has expressed as to the friendly and honourable 
feeling that has been shown by the Government of the United States 
with regard to this Fenian affair", h« said. "I am very anxious, 
if possible - and I can speak for my colleagues as well as myself - 
to do anything that is reasonably possible to remove any feeling of 
irritation or of soreness which may remain in consequence of Jrti- 
circumstances connected with the late war. But, with respect to 
these claims, I am afraid I cannot give him so precise and so 
positive an answer as he may desire. With regard to the most 
important of those claims; a full discussion has taken place between 
the government of the United States and those who preceded us in 
office. That discussion was terminated 6 or 7 months ago,and 
during the very short time I have been in office those claims have 
not been revived. They involved questions of considerable 
perplexity and difficulty fand I need not add that I have had a 
very short time and very little leisure to consider them. In any 
case, it would be premature on the part of the government to say
immediately what answer we should be prepared to give to claims of
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that kind when they are revived, until and unless they are
Preferred.
Perhaps I may say that, with a view to lessen if possible
the probability of such differences arising in future, it is the 
intention of the government to advise Her Majesty to issue a royal 
commission to inquire into th« working of the neutrality laws, and 
if necessary, to revise those laws 11.
Public opinion was also desirous of attaining some 
settlement. A letter to the London Times of August 20th proclaimed 
that Lord Russell had made a mistake in refusing to refer the claims 
to arbitration and a hope was expressed that it was not too late to 
retrieve the error.
The United States seized their opportunity, and Seward met 
th« tacit overtures by his despatch of August 27th. "It is the 
President's desire", Vhe wrote to Adams,"that you now call the 
attention of Lord Stanley to the claims in a respectful but earnest 
manner,and inform him that, in the President's judgement a 
settlement of them has become urgently necessary to a re-establish­ 
ment of entirely friendly relations between the United States and 
Great Britain". The tone of the despatch was courteous and 
conciliatory, and indeed it was stated that while America must insist 
upon the claims she was not desirous of assuming an unkind or 
hostile attitude to Great Britain.
Ihen Adams brought the subject to Lord Stanley f s notice in 
September, he was told that such largejconsiderations were involved, 
that nothing could be done until the other members of the Cabinet 
had been consulted, and that it would be difficult to do this until 
the latter end of October. Uo objection, however, was made to this 
delay, and from the interview Adams received the impression that 
the matter would be carefully considered.
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The British press, too, was urging that American demands
•
should "be satisfied. The Times on October 4th said that there 
could be nothing derogatory to the honour of England if she offered 
to submit her neutrality laws, together with those of the United 
States, to revission by a mixed commission. The Morning Star, on 
November 15th, sneered at the committee of confederate bond-holders, 
who were engaged in bringing their claims to the attention of the 
government,with a view to a consideration of them as against those 
of the American government in relation to the Alabama and other 
claims. (The confederate bond-holders were of course people who had 
subscribed to the Southern loan^and who owing to the failure of the 
Confederate cause had lost ftier money). The Morning Star continued 
as follows :- "Now when our own government is believed not to be 
indisposed to do what is right in the matter of the Alabama, the 
bond-holders wish to put forward a claim against the United States, 
because they have lost their money in doing them injury and giving- 
aid and comfort to their enemies. If the United States were to put 
in an Item of several millions in their bill, as representing the 
injury done them by the confederate bond-holders, we could 
understand it; but for the latter to claim satisfaction against the
ol hither
United States is something already unique in the matter of claims. 
The bond-holders should present their old bonds to the writers in 
the public press who misled them as a recognition of their folly, 
and cease to trouble themselves further about steps which only end 
in chagrin and disappointment.
On November 30th, Stanley replied to Seward's despatch of 
August 27th in hie communication to Sir Frederick Bruce, which 
denied the liability of the British Government,but which stated that 
they were fully alive to the inconvenience which arose from the
(239)
existence of unsettled claims between the two governments. "Ihey 
would be glad 1,1 continued the despatch, "to settle this question if 
they can do so consistently with justice and national respect; and 
with this view they will not be disinclined to adopt the principle 
of arbitration, provided that a fitting arbitrator can be found and 
that an agreement can be come to as to the points to which 
arbitration shall apply".
Bruce, on January 7th, sent a copy of Stanley's despatch to 
Seward,and asked whether the United States were prepared to accept 
the proposed principle of arbitration. 1 am instructed at the
*
same time", he wrote, wto state that independently of these claims, 
there may be other demands on the part of American citizens arising 
out of the events of the late civil war, while there are certainly 
numerous British claims arising out of those events which it is very 
desirable should be inquired into and adjusted——The time seems 
now favourable for reviving the subject,and Her Majesty's government 
think that they may fairly invite .the government of the United States 
to undertake, in the event of an understanding being come to between 
the two governments as to the manner in which the special American 
claims alluded to in the enclosed despatch shall be dealt with, 
that under a convention to be separately but simultaneously
«
concluded, the general claims of the subjects and citizens of the 
two countries arising out of th« event of the late war may be 
submitted to a mixed commission 11.
Seward*s reply on January 13th said that the United States 
were quite ready to submit the claims to arbitration,provided that 
the whole case as presented in the correspondence of the two 
governments should be submitted.'t Stanley on March 9th said this 
could not be allowed, for such an extensive and unlimited reference
would compel the British Government to submit to the arbiter the
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question as to whether British recognition of the Confederacy as a 
"belligerent in 1861 was Justifiable. Yet on the other hand,the 
British Government was prepared to submit whether, in'matters 
connected with the depredations of the Confederate cruisers, it was 
morally responsible to make good the losses' of American citizens.
Naturally it will be seen that the American and British points 
of view differed. Great Britain was prepared for a limited reference 
to arbitration in regard to the Alabama claims yand adjudication by 
means of a mixed commission in the case of general claims, but the 
United States were desirous of presenting the Alabama claims without 
any restriction.
Owing to the delay in coming to any definite understanding>
»
irritation in America against Great Britain was once again surging 
prominently forward. On July k;6th 1866, an act, to alter American 
neutrality laws so as to accomodate them to the standard which 
Americans considered Great Britain to have maintained during the 
war, was passed unanimously by the House of Representatives. Hopes 
were also expressed that Irish Independence would be restored and 
frlint a belief that England owed reparation to Ireland "was clearly 
stated. The neutrality bill failed to become law, however, for the 
Senate refused its consent" but now in 1867, the sentiments, which 
had swayed the House of Representatives in the previous year^were 
also talcing possession of the Senate. Again on March 27th 1867, the 
House of Representatives expressed its sympathy with Ireland and 
spoke of "the just efforts" which' the Irish had made to maintain the 
independence of their country. On the same day, too, it was 
resolved that no subject of a foreign government should be 
compensated for any loss of property sustained during the rebellion 
until Congress had given its consent, and a still further resolution
testified to the existing anger against Great Britain. TBe it
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retolved--— that the people of the United States", ran the 
declaration, "cannot regard the proposed confederation of the
provinces on the northern frontier of this country without extreme
\ 
solicitude. A confereration of btates on this continent extending
from ocean to ocean,established without consulting the people of 
the provinces to be united»> and founded upon monarchical principles. 
cannot be considered otherwise than as in contravention of the 
traditions and constantly declared principles of this government, 
endangering its most important interests and tending to increase 
and perpetrate embarrassments already existing between the two 
governments immediately interested". (This referredi of course, to 
the proposed creation of the dominions of Canada.)
It was after considering the spirit expressed in the above 
resolutions that Seward wrote to Adams somewhat anxiously on March 
28th. "Lord Stanley proposes an arbitration of the Alabama claims, 
with a preliminary condition that technical definitions shall be 
first given to the questions to be submitted* In that form his 
offer cannot be acceptedi because it would permit a belief here that 
what are deemed just claims, absolutely entitled to redress, might 
be defeated by forms obstructive of a fair and full examination.--- 
Time seems to me to have already become an important element in 
the question of adjustment. If delays are continued, it may perhaps 
pass beyond the reach of settlement by a friendly correspondence--- 
It is not the President's desire to do anything f which would be or 
would even seem to be,unfriendly to Great Britain. At the s&jne time 
I think it important that the ministry shall understand the 
increasing delicacy of the question as it stands in the United
States".
Stanley*s despatch to Bruce on May 44th made some attempt
to improve matters. Seward on April 16th had stated that the
President of-the United States must respectfully decline the 
proposal of Her Majesty's Government, for America could not consent 
to a special limitation of arbitration with regard to the Ala'bc.r.a 
claims,and preference could not be given to any other claims over 
the Alabama claims on the form of adjustment which was to "be
adopted.
Prom the last statement,Stanley thought that Seward had
understood his offer of March 9th to have applied only to claims 
arising out of the proceedings .of the Alabama, excluding similar 
claims arising from like proceedings of the Florida, Shenandoah 
and Georgia. How, on May ii4th, he hastened to inform Seward that 
the offer was not limited merely to the case of the Alabama, but 
that the depredations committed by other Confederate cruisers would 
also be considered. An explanation was also given for the division 
of the claims into the special claims arising from the proceedings 
of the Alabama and general claims. "The special claims') wrote 
Stanley/ " depend for their settlement on the solution of what may 
be called an abstract question,namely, whether in the matters 
connected with the vessels out of whose depredations the claims of 
American citizens have arisen, the course pursued by the British 
Government and those who acted under its authority, was such as 
would involve a moral responsibility on the part of the British 
Government to make good, either in whole or in part, the losses 
of American citizens; the other, or general class of claims, admits 
of no such narrow restriction. The number of claims in this class 
on either side may be great, the circumstances of each more or less 
different,and the points involved in them complicated in their 
nature and bearing; and on these grounds alone it is obvious that 
they cannot, like those of the Alabama class, be comprised within 
a single proposition applicable in principle to all and bringing
within the compass of a single division of an arbiter".
These reasons, to me, seem entirely satisfactory. 
Unfortunately, the United States did not consider them to be so. 
Seward»s reply on August 12th informed Stanley that he had quite 
understood that the offer of arbitration was not limited solely to 
the depredations of the Alabama^nd he refused to acknowledge any 
distinction between special and general claims. "Ho distinction 
as to principles between the tribunals seems to the United States 
to be necessary," he wrote, "and in every case the United States 
agree only to unrestricted arbitration".
On November 16th Lord Stanley wrote to Mr Ford, who was 
acting as British charge d'affaires at Washington, owing to the 
death of Sir Frederick Bruce, that Her Majesty's Government could 
not possibly consent to refer to a foreign power to determine 
whether the policy of Her Majesty's Government, in recognising the 
Confederate States as belligerent; was or was not suitable to the 
circumstances of the time when the recognition took place. He also 
contended that with regard to the general claims there was no 
question of moral responsibility, as in the case of the Alabama 
claims,and that consequently the two sets of claims could not be 
Judged by like principles or by the same tribunal.
On November 29th the correspondence closed for a time, by 
Seward definitely stating that the United States could not waive 
the position they had maintained from.the beginning, namely, that 
the Queen's proclamation of 1861 was unjustifiable and a departure 
from the law of nations, and because Great Britain would not agree 
to submit this question to an arbiter, the proposed limited 
reference was declined.
Another stage in the negotiations had finished, and although
nothing definite had been arranged it was quite apparent that on
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"both sides hopes existed that soon matters would he settled amicably. 
Great Britain certainly desired an arrangement f and although American 
irritation had steadily grown owing to the failure of the negotiations', 
wishes were still expressed that the claims might be adjusted 
without any resourVto hostility. These wishes after several more 
years of intricate negotiations were satisfied. It will only "be 
possible here to indicate the general trend of events which lead to 
this. C.P.Adams in 1868 gave in his resignation as American 
representative in England^and Reverdy Johnson was appointed to
succeed him.
Upon Johnson*s arrival in England he at once began
negotiations with Lord Stanley^ and on November 10th 1868 the 
Stanley-Johnson convention was signed at London. This was, however, 
unacceptable to the Government of the United States;and so 
negotiations were at once resumed, although there had been changes^ 
in the British Government, for as a result of the general election 
which was held in November! the Liberals were returned to power 
with Mr Gladstone 1 as Prime Minister and Lord Clarendon as the 
secretary for foreign affairs. Consequently it was by Lord 
Clarendon and Mr Johnson that another general agreement was worked 
out. This - the Johnson-Clarendon convention - was signed at 
London on January 14th 1869, and provided for the organization 
of a mixed commission with jurisdiction over"all claims on the part 
of citizens of the United States upon the Government of Her 
Britannic Majesty, including the so-called Alabama claims, and all 
claims on the part of subjects of Her Britannic Majesty upon the 
Government of the United States which may have been presented to 
either government for its interposition1 with the other, since the 
26th July 1855 and which yet remain unsettled".
tfrom this it will be seen that the British Government had
(246)
yielded all which it had previously stated was impossible, for now 
the administration of our neutrality laws and our recognition of 
the "belligerent rights of the Confederacy were subjected to 
arbitration.
This same agreement also decided that naturalized citizens 
of the United States should be given the full rights in Great
»
Britain which were enjoyed by native born citizens of the United 
States, thus, of course, recognising the right of expatriation. 
A boundary dispute which had arisen in the N.W. was also to be 
referred to arbitration.
But this concessive attitude of Great Britain did not bring 
the desired settlement,for the internal conditions of the United 
States were unfavourable. In November 1868, there had been a 
presidential election, as a result of which General Grant was to 
succeed Andrew Johnson in the following March t and unfortunately* 
great antipathy existed between the outgoing and the ingoing 
administrations. Consequently the Grant administration would hardly 
be .likely to accept an agreement negotiated under the Johnson 
presidency, and there was also a feeling in the United States that 
the offence of Great Britain could not be expiated by the mere 
compensation of private individuals for national losses. When the 
treaty, therefore, was brought before the Senate in April,it was 
rejected by 44 votes to 1.
The speech of Senator Sumner, who had been considered one of 
England's best friends during the Civil War,had much to do with 
this. The treaty, he said, did not settle the pending claims and 
was nothing but a snare, which provided only for the adjustment 
of individual claims on both sides and left untouched the great 
wrong done to the United States as a nation - a wrong which had
brought suffering and-humiliation in addition to vast expense.
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The individual losses, he considered, were trifling compared with 
this national loss^nd British responsibility was consequently to 
the American nation,and was not to be limited to the property 
destroyed by the Confederate cruisers. Amongst the national 
losses he included the loss of the American carrying trade, through 
th* transfer of goods to the British flag as a protection against 
the cruisers, the injury to the shipbuilding interest, the rise in 
the cost of marine insurance, and the expense of the war for the 
time British negligence had prolonged it.
Only hundreds of millions, he suggested, could satisfy the 
American nation. Great Britain would never forfeit this,and so she
must make some other compensation. Then followed a suggestion of
i« unparalleled audacity. 9n return for the wrongs done to America, why
should not Great Britain sacrifice Canada?
As one can well imagine such a suggestion caused a storm 
of indignation in England. Even John Bright complained and the' 
Duchess of Argyll wrote to Sumner as follows :- Tor the first time 
I am silenced when you are spoken about. I understood you through 
the war. I do not now".
Yet I do not consider that Sumner was actuated so much by 
hostility to Great Britain as by party jealousy and rancour, for if 
Sumner had fully and impartiality in his speech represented the 
views of the whole Cabinet, th« settlement which was effected within 
the next two years, could not have been brought about so quickly. 
And as a matter of fact, both the British and American Governments 
wanted to settle the matter, so Pish, the American secretary of 
State in Grant's cabinet attempted valiantly to overcome the effect 
of Sumner's speech and bring back the negotiations to the position 
in which they had been left by Seward. The Gladstone cabinet was 
also as anxious as Pish, for in view of the European complications
which were now threatening, Great Britain had no desire for 
inconvenient relations with America. There were, however, 
difficulties on "both sides. Great Britain was excessively annoyed 
by Sumner's extravagant demands and any sign of yielding to them 
would undoubtedly destroy the British Government, and in America 
popular sentiment was keyed up to Sumner's pitch.
Yet something had to be done, and in t !869 John Rose, Canadian 
statesman and financier, a man highly respected by both the British 
and American cabinets, was sent to Washington soon after the 
rejection of the Johnson-Clarendon convention, to ascertain whether 
overtures for re-opening negotiations would be accepted by the 
President in spirit and terms acceptable to Great Britain. The 
answer was in the affirmative / and consequently there followed two 
years of secret and unofficial negotiations. During this time 
Sumner quarrelled with Grant and lost his influence; and the 
Franco-Prussian War gave a fresh impulse to the desire of the 
British leaders to settle the matter.
Accordingly on January 26th 1871, the British Government
finally proposed to the American Government that a Joint High
•h Commission should be appointed to hold &*e sessions at Washington,
and there devise means to settle the various pending questions 
between the two Governments, affecting the British possessions in 
N.America. To this overture Mr Pish replied that the President 
would appoint Commissioners with pleasure, provided that the 
differences growing out of the late Civil War should be settled. 
The British Government promptly accepted this proposal and their 
commissioners arrived at Hew York in February, and despite many 
difficulties, on May 8th, the Treaty of Washington was signed, 
concessions being made by both parties. The British Government
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expressed regret, for the escape, under whatever circumstances, 
of the Alabama and other vessels from British ports,and for the 
depredations committed by those vessels,and they consented to refer 
all the Alabama claims to a tribunal of arbitrators which was to
meet at Geneva.
Three rules were also laid down as to the duties of a neutral
and by these rules the arbitrators were to decide. The first rule 
stated that a neutral government must use due diligence to prevent 
the departure from its jurisdiction of any vessel intended to carry 
on war, such vessels having been specially adapted! in whole or in. 
part, within such jurisdiction to warlike use. The second rule said 
that a neutral government must not permit either belligerent to 
make use of its ports or waters as the base of naval operations, 
against the other; or for the purpose of the renewal of military 
supplies or the recruitment of men; and the third rule ordered due 
diligence to be exercised in neutral dominions to prevent neutral 
subjects from violating the foregoing obligations and duties.
That Great Britain should submit to be judged by these rules 
showed an extremely conciliatory attitude, for the principles which 
the rules contained were not obligatory as rules of international 
conduct at the time when the acts concerned were committed.
On the other hand the United States did not press their 
point with regard to the premature recognition of the belligerent 
rights of the Confederacy. Pish said that the act showed an 
unfriendly spirit but that it could not be made a ground of 
compensation. The American national claims were also abandoned and 
all reference to them was avoided.
Other articles of the Treaty settled the fishery, navigation 
and commerce disputes, and submitted the question of the ownership 
of San Juan Island to the arbitration of the German Bnperor, in
order to complete the settlement of the H.W. boundary dispute.
The tribunal of arbitration met at Geneva in December 1871. 
The United States claimed for the destruction of vessels by the 
Confederate cruisers (the direct or Alabama claims) and also for 
the losses involved by the transfer of the American merchant marine 
to the British flag, the cost of the pursuit of the Confederate 
cruisers, the increased rate of insurance and-the prolongation of , 
the war owing to British blockade running, (indirect or national 
claims). The arbiters agreed, however, that the national claims 
could not be allowed, but they found that Great Britain had failed 
to use due diligence in the performance of its neutral obligations 
with respect to the Alabama and the Florida and their several 
tenders; and also with respect to the Shenandoah after her departure 
from Melbourne, February 18th 1865, but not before that date; and 
the damages due to the United States on account of these cruisers 
were assessed at $15,500,000.
With regard to the Georgia, the Sumter, the Nashville and 
other cruisers, it was found that Great Britain had not failed in 
her neutral duties,and consequently no compensation was awarded.
0
Other claims, for losses sustained during the war by either 
government through acts'committed "by citizens of the other, were 
also settled. These claims consisted chiefly of claims made by 
British subjects for the seizure or destruction of their property 
owing to military operations on land and to the blockade of the 
coast. A few claims against Great Britain were presented b'y 
Americans for losses sustained in the operations of the Confederates 
in Canada in raids acrosb the frontier. These were, however, 
dismissed but Great Britain was awarded Jl,900,000 to settle the 
claims of her subjects.
The matter of the inshore fisheries was also decided at tliis
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timei and it was agreed that the Americans should pay for this 
privilege in hard cash. The exact amount was a matter of some 
dispute, "but in 1877 the United States finally agreed to pay Great 
Britain |5,500,000 in gold.
Many people in Great Britain were dissatisfied with the 
Genevan arrangement, regarding the compensation to America as 
excessive. Lord Russell moved an address to the Queen against the 
Treaty of Washington/out the motion was withdrawni and in America, 
Sumner violently assailed the compact. This attack, however, did 
something towards reconciling British public opinion, for it was 
felt that anything which would have satisfied Sumner, would indeed 
have reflected upon the honour of Great Britain. Whether $15,500,000 
was excessive or not, surely it was well tpent in putting an end 
to the misunderstanding which had existed between two great branches 
of the English speaking race.
So we come to the end of our survey, and we find that in 
spite of many causes of irritation, distrust,and misunderstanding, 
good feeling and friendship has been restored amongst two nations 
of the same speech f blood and traditions. And other points of 
dispute which remained after 1870 were settled in the same friendly 
manner. Such an attitude consequently foretold the^est for the 
future of the civilized world ( and this prelidiction was fulfilled 
in the 1914 - 18 struggle against militarism when British and.-— *
American fought side by side to crush the foe of civilisation.
And while American forbearance has been shown in the preceding
chapters, a tribute must also be paid to British toleration and
restraint.
Undoubtedly from 1814-71 the American masses were more
inclined to war than the British, but until the Civil War, America 
had no standing army and only a small navy, and after the Civil War
tiie >robiems of reconstruction and the enormous lo&s of v;ealt;± and 
men, prohibited any outbreak of hostilities. The increased inter­ 
course of private citizens which followed' the introduction of steam 
navigation and'the growth of commercial interests also bound the 
two nations in a closer and more abiding friendship.
